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ARTICLES
REGULATING THE INVISIBLE:
THE CASE OF OVER-THE-COUNTER
DERIVATIVES
Colleen M. Baker*
In this Article, I focus on the regulation of the over-the-counter (OTC)
derivative markets. I argue that current reform proposals and draft legisla-
tion fall short of constructing the linked domestic and international
frameworks needed to successfully regulate the OTC derivative markets. The
purpose of my Article is to propose and defend such a framework. Because of
the inseparability of the domestic and international aspects of this issue, I
argue that in addition to increased prudential supervision and regulation,
the regulation of OTC derivative markets requires interwoven domestic and
international systems for regulatory cooperation. This recommendation has
two parts. First, Congress should create a framework of regulatory coopera-
tion between the SEC and the CFTC through a regulatory joint venture.
Second, I argue for an international framework of regulatory cooperation
using a system of public-private partnerships to coordinate regulation of
OTC derivatives in the global marketplace.
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REGULATING THE INVISIBLE
INTRODUCTION
Mark Twain once said, "Everyone talks about the weather but
nobody does anything about it."' The same can be said for one of the
most famous-or infamous-of the financial products that were at the
epicenter of the 2008-09 financial crisis: so-called "derivatives." In
1998, Robert Rubin, then U.S. Treasury Secretary, joined with Alan
Greenspan, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and Arthur
Levitt, then Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman,2
to caution against a proposed "Concept Release" issued earlier that
day3 by Brooksley Born, then Chairperson of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC), urging the regulation of the over-the-
counter (OTC) derivative markets.4 And even now, in the wake of a
global financial disaster that many blame primarily on a host of exotic
unregulated "invisible" financial instruments such as OTC credit
default swaps (CDS), there is strong opposition to imposing restric-
tions on these markets. As one Congressman recently cautioned, "if
Congress overreaches . . . there could be very significant negative
implications on how companies manage risk."5 In addition, "[a] t least
42 nonfinancial companies and trade associations are lobbying Con-
gress on derivatives" 6 and "[m]ore than 160 of Europe's largest com-
panies have swung behind efforts to persuade regulators to exempt
corporate users of over-the-counter derivatives from tough new regula-
tions."7 Several of the former companies argue that the ultimate
stakes include the health of American businesses and the prices con-
sumers pay for all types of products, presumably including even Post-It
Notes.8 And that does not even count the opposition of firms in the
1 See GREGG CAMFIELD, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO MARK TWAIN 216 (2003)
(noting the quote's attribution to Twain, but suggesting that it was originally coined
by Twain's neighbor).
2 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Joint Statement by Treasury Sec-
retary Robert E. Rubin, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan and Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt (May 7, 1998), available at
https://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/rr2426.htm.
3 See Richard B. Schmitt, The Born Prophecy, 95 A.B.A. J., May 2009, at 50.
4 See Concept Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Over-the-Counter
Derivatives (May 7, 1998), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn.
htm.
5 Kara Scannell, Big Companies Go to Washington to Fight Regulations on Fancy Deriv-
atives, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2009, at BI.
6 Id.
7 Jeremy Grant, Businesses Demand OTCExemptions, FIN. TIMEs,Jan. 6, 2010, at 21.
8 For example, 3M Co. officials, the makers of Post-It Notes, have testified in
Congress and have been involved in lobbying efforts surrounding regulation of the
OTC derivatives. See The Effective Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Derivative Markets:
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financial sector itself, most of which strongly oppose increased regula-
tion. As some financial experts explain, OTC derivatives are the "last
remaining source of supra-normal profits"9 for the "world's largest
banks."10
This Article will argue that it is time to prove Mark Twain wrong
and actually do something about derivative markets-specifically
those traded OTC. A flurry of reform proposals and draft legislation
in Congress has arisen in response to the financial crisis. Individually
and in common, they advocate many important changes in both pru-
dential supervision'I and regulation such as increases in transparency,
disclosure, capital, and margin requirements (altogether, regulatory
reforms) for OTC derivatives that are not cleared by a central
counterparty (CCP) clearinghouse, in addition to CCP clearing of
standardized OTC derivatives. But they generally share at least three
major shortcomings. First, they advocate splitting regulation of OTC
derivatives between the SEC and CFTC on a product basis. This solu-
tion has already been proven to be highly problematic. Second, they
advocate mandated CCP clearing for "standardized" OTC deriva-
tives. 12 This division between standardized and nonstandardized
derivative products has not only failed in the past, but also arguably
incentivized the creation of the OTC derivative products that have
Hearing before the Subcomm. On Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored
Enterprises of the H. Comm. Of Financial Services, 111th Cong. 75 (2009) (statement of
Timothy J. Murphy, Foreign Currency Risk Manager, 3M).
9 Over-the-Counter Derivatives: Modernizing Oversight to Increase Transparency and
Reduce Risks- Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 75 (2009) [hereinafter S.
Banking Comm. Hearing] (statement of Christopher Whalen, Managing Dir., Institu-
tional Risk Analytics). For example, in the second quarter of 2009, U.S. banks gener-
ated $1.9 billion and in the third quarter $1.2 billion just from their credit derivative
activities. OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, QUARTERLY
REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, THIRD QUARTER 2009, at 2
(2010), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2009-161a.pdf.
10 S. Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 9, at 75 (statement of Christopher
Whalen, Managing Dir., Institutional Risk Analytics).
11 In general, "prudential supervision" refers to the supervision by banking regu-
lators of the safety and soundness of typically banking institutions. See generally Frede-
ric S. Mishkin, Prudential Supervision: Why Is It Important and What Are the Issues? (NBER
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 7926, 2000), available at http://
www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/fmishkin/PDFpapers/w7926.pdf (providing a gen-
eral introduction to prudential supervision and surrounding issues).
12 But as commentators such as Professor Darrell Duffie note, AIG's problematic
CDS were not "standardized," so this regulatory reform "solution" would have been
inapplicable in AIG's case. See Darrell Duffie, How Should We Regulate Derivatives Mar-
kets? (PEW Fin. Reform Project, Briefing Paper No. 5, 2009), available at http://www.
pewfr.org/projectjreports-detail?id=0017.
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caused some of the biggest problems.13 Third, they do not seriously
address the international aspects of domestic regulations addressing
these global markets. As one commentator has noted, "all of these
efforts [at regulatory reform] leave unresolved a critical problem-
that is, the regulatory arbitrage that will be created by a U.S. regula-
tory regime that is different from that continuing or established in
other jurisdictions."14 And as Professor Joseph Norton notes, there
are "enormous opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and regulatory
jurisdictional ambiguities existing at the international level."15
In sum, current reform proposals and draft legislation fall short
of constructing the linked domestic and international framework
needed to successfully regulate the OTC derivative markets. The pur-
pose of this Article is to propose and defend such a framework.16
Because of the inseparability of the domestic and international aspects
of this issue, I argue that in addition to commonly proposed regula-
tory reforms, the regulation of OTC derivative markets requires inter-
woven domestic and international systems for regulatory cooperation.
This recommendation has two parts. First, Congress should create a
framework of regulatory cooperation between the SEC and the CIFTC
through a regulatory joint venture. Second, I argue for an interna-
tional framework of regulatory cooperation using a system of public-
private partnerships to coordinate regulation of OTC derivatives in
the global market.
The time is right for thoughtful action in this long-deferred regu-
latory field. Many leaders who counseled caution in the 1990s have
changed their tunes. For example, Robert Rubin now predicts that
13 See The Effective Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 164 (June 9, 2009) [hereinafter H. Financial
Services Comm. Hearing] (statement of Christian Johnson, Professor, S.J. Quinney Coll.
of Law, Univ. of Utah); Frank Partnoy, Op-Ed., Danger in Wall Street's Shadows, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2009, at A39.
14 Joel S. Telpner & Jamila A. Piracci, OTC Derivatives-In the Crosshairs of U.S.
Regulatory Change, SECURITIZATION UPDATE (Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago, Ill.), May 19,
2009, at 1, 4, available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=
6753; see alsoJeremy Grant et al., Cracks are Emerging in Transatlantic Approach to Reform,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2010, at 21 (describing diverging approaches to OTC reform in
Europe and the United States). But seeJoseph Stiglitz, Op., Watchdogs Need Not Bark
Together, FT.com, Feb. 10, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3ebdddle-15b7-11df-ad
7e-00144feab49a.html (urging regulatory reform even in the absence of immediate
global coordination).
15 Joseph J. Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modern International Financial Regulation:
Increasing Reliance on a Public-Private Partnership, 37 Iwr'L LAw. 43, 52 (2003).
16 The appropriate basis for mandating CCP clearing is an important issue, but it
is beyond the scope of this Article.
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"'[iln some form it [OTC derivatives regulation] will happen."' 17
And Alan Greenspan has famously acknowledged that he "'made a
mistake in presuming that the self-interests of organizations, specifi-
cally banks and others, were such as that they were best capable of
protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms."'*
While this Article does not claim, as do some proponents of increased
regulation of OTC derivative markets, that the stability of the entire
global financial system hinges on blanket regulation of these instru-
ments, it does argue that additional regulatory measures will add
much-needed transparency and an important degree of protection
from systemic risk that is currently lacking in the OTC derivatives
area.
Legal scholarship concerning the regulation of the OTC deriva-
tive markets has been almost as sparse as the regulation itself.19 This
is unfortunate since much scholarship in financial economics focuses
on this area, but as legal scholars and a host of others-including
Queen Elizabeth 20-note, this financial crisis took most economists by
surprise. 21 Perhaps the economists can be forgiven as legal scholars
such as Lynn Stout argue that "the roots of the catastrophe lay not in
changes in the markets, but changes in the law.. . . It was the deregu-
17 Matthew Leising & Roger Runningen, Brooksley Born 'Vindicated' as Swap Rules
Take Shape, BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 13, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=20601109&sid=aVYf8XDXiSZM&refer=home (quoting Robert Rubin).
18 Brian Knowlton & Michael M. Grynbaum, 'Shocked' that Free Markets Are Flawed,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/business/worldbus-
iness/23iht-gspan.4.17206624.html (quoting Alan Greenspan).
19 Although sparse, a small literature does exist. In addition to materials cited in
this Article, examples include: Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Par-
allel Activities: Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24
ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375 (2005); Brooksley Born, International Regulatory
Responses to Derivatives Crises: The Role of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
21 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 607 (2001); Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of Global
Derivatives Regulation, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 421 (2001); Frank Partnoy, ISDA,
NASD, CFMA, and SDNY: The Four Horsemen of Derivatives Regulation? (Univ. of San
Diego Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 39, 2002), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=293085; and M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not
"Insurance" (Univ. Of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No.
476, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440945.
20 See Associated Press, Sony Ma'am-We Just Didn't See It Coming, July 26, 2009,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32156155 (reporting that "a group of
eminent economists have apologized to Queen Elizabeth II for failing to predict the
financial crisis").
21 See RicI-HARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM 252-58 (2009); Lynn A.
Stout, How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why Re-Regulating Them Can Pre-
vent Another, LOMBARD ST., July 6, 2009, at 4, 4, available at http://www.finreg21.com/
files/finreg2l-finreg2l /Lombard%207.pdf.
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lation of financial derivatives that brought the banking system to its
knees." 22 Professor of finance Darrell Duffie notes that derivative
markets "exacerbated" the financial crisis.23 In recent congressional
testimony, Stout argued that derivatives "may provide some economic
benefit," but cautioned that "no empirical evidence" supports claims
of the "substantial" social benefit of these instruments.24 In another
congressional hearing, however, Professor Christian Johnson cau-
tioned Congress to focus on the "practicalities and complexities" of
regulating the OTC derivative markets and to understand "the need
to proceed carefully in order to preserve U.S. leadership in the
world's capital markets." 2 5 As Congress and major financial regulators
such as the SEC, CFTC, and Federal Reserve Board begin to revisit the
question of regulating the OTC derivative markets, legal scholarship
can also contribute to this conversation. This Article seeks to do that.
In Part I, I provide necessary background for my thesis by discuss-
ing the myriad of participants, instruments, and transacting practices
in the OTC derivative markets. Part II explains the current regulatory
framework surrounding OTC derivatives. I also explain a bit of the
history behind this minimal and inadequate regulatory structure. I
end this Part by addressing whether any justification for government
regulation of these markets even exists. Part III treats what I term the
22 Stout, supra note 21, at 4.
23 Duffie, supra note 12, at 5-6. Professor Duffie argues that derivatives markets
"exacerbated" the financial crisis in two ways:
First, insurance companies such as AIG, Ambac, and MBIA used CDS to sell
protection on CDOs backed by sub-prime mortgages to such an extent that
they were severely impaired when those CDOs experienced large losses from
mortgage defaults. This in turn contributed to the weaknesses of the banks
that had bought and relied upon the protection of these credit default
swaps. Second, the failures of the large investment banks Bear Stearns and
Lehman Brothers were exacerbated by a run of their OTC derivatives
counterparties. The flight of these derivatives counterparties, as they sought
new positions with other dealers, may also have contributed to the fragility of
global financial markets. In the same vein, a number of other large dealer
banks had to be bailed out for reasons that included the dangers posed by
the potential flights of their derivatives portfolios.
Id. For additional background on "runs" on OTC derivative counterparties, see Gary
Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo (Yale Int'l Ctr. for
Fin., Working Paper No. 09-14, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1440752.
24 Letter from Lynn A. Stout, Professor, UCLA Sch. of Law, to S. Comm. on Agri-
culture, Forestry, and Nutrition 1 (June 4, 2009) [hereinafter Stout Testimony], avail-
able at http://216.40.253.202/-usscanf/index.php?option=comdocman&task=doc
download&gid=93.
25 H. Financial Services Comm. Hearing, supra note 13, at 161 (statement of Chris-
tian Johnson, Professor, S.J. Quinney Coll. of Law, Univ. of Utah).
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"regulatory contenders," the regulatory paradigms, reform proposals,
draft legislation, and financial regulators offering complementary and
competing solutions for the reform of these markets.
Finally, in Part IV, I lay out my proposed framework for solving
the OTC derivative regulation problem. My approach is incremental,
simultaneous, and twofold for at least two reasons. First, regulation of
the OTC derivative markets should ideally be part of much needed
comprehensive, financial regulatory reform. Understanding effective
regulatory reforms in the wake of the current crisis will be a lengthy
process as will be the significant challenges of the political process
itself. Second, international considerations are the most critical com-
ponent of the regulation of these markets, but also the most challeng-
ing. Meaningfully progressing beyond the largely hollow current calls
for international "coordination"26 in the regulation of these markets
will also be time consuming. But increased regulation of the OTC
derivative markets cannot wait.
The first part of my approach argues that in addition to many
commonly proposed regulatory reforms, Congress should create an
SEC-CFTC regulatory joint venture to promote a domestic framework
of regulatory cooperation. It would have regulatory jurisdiction over
all major market participants, all currently unregulated OTC deriva-
tive products, and all significant market infrastructure institutions
such as CCP clearing facilities and trade repositories. Therefore, Con-
gress should amend the Commodity Futures Modernization Act2 7
(CFMA) to transfer all oversight of OTC derivative clearing facilities
to this SEC-CFTC joint venture. A protracted turf-war between the
SEC and CFTC has complicated regulation of these markets since the
1970s. Some scholars even suggest that their disputes have contrib-
uted to the lack of effective regulation of these markets. 2 8 Many
reform proposals and draft legislation anticipate continuing tensions
between the CFTC and SEC and, therefore, generally provide for the
creation or intervention of a third entity to address such future dis-
26 For example, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. (as passed by House, Dec. 11, 2009), only makes a very general call for
international consultation, coordination and information sharing. See id. § 3003.
27 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (2006).
28 See Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator. A Comparative Analysis of Securities and
Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 319, 356-66 (2003); Analysts Mull Treasury's Calls for Derivatives Regulation,
PBS Online NewsHour, May 14, 2009, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/
jan-june09/regulation_05-14.html [hereinafter PBS NewsHour] (statement of Lynn
Stout, Professor, UCLA Sch. of Law).
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putes.29 If and when comprehensive U.S. financial regulatory reform
occurs, this joint venture can not only be merged into another agency
structure if appropriate, but also can provide valuable practical lessons
about combining financial regulatory agencies.
The second part of my framework of cooperation approach
builds on theoretical constructs from the economic analysis of inter-
national law30 and Professor Joseph Norton's work on public-private
partnerships as features of modern international financial regula-
tion.3 ' I utilize insights from Norton's descriptive approach to pro-
pose public-private regulatory partnerships that will apply to the
governance of the OTC derivative markets. From the law and eco-
nomics field, I turn to Professors Jeffrey Dunoff andJoel Trachtman, 32
who have conceived of the international legal system as a type of "eco-
nomic market" largely composed of states33 that trade "components of
power."34 Using this model, I suggest that financial regulation can be
thought of as a product,35 and that governments face a Coasian
"make" or "buy" production decision involving government, global
private law, and hybrid solutions.
29 For example, under Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a
Financial Services Oversight Council would resolve jurisdictional disputes between the
SEC and CFTC over OTC derivatives, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1002, and § 3002
provides for judicial review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ofjurisdictional disputes between these regulators. Similarly, under
Senator Dodd's bill, the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217,
111th Cong., which recently passed the Senate Banking Committee, the Financial Sta-
bility Oversight Council would resolve jurisdictional disputes between the SEC and
CFTC. Id. § 119.
30 For examples of the scholarship in this area, see AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw (Jurgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2006); Eco-
NOMic DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds.,
1997); William J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International Law: Transaction Cost
Economics and the Concept of State Practice, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 995 (1996); Jeffrey
L. Dunoff, Some Costs and Benefits ofEconomic Analysis ofInternational Law, 94 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 185 (2000); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of
International Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1999); Symposium, Economic Analysis of Interna-
tional Law, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON 1 (1996); Symposium, Public International Law and
Economics, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1.
31 Norton, supra note 15, at 47-53.
32 Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 30, at 12-22.
33 Id. at 13.
34 Id.
35 See generally ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAw MARKET (2009)
(exploring the "law market" created by the ability of people and firms to move
beyond domestic law's reach and "shop" for legal regimes just as they do for other
goods).
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Domestic regulations addressing global OTC derivative markets
can be thought of as residing somewhere on an international regula-
tory production continuum with opposing poles between government
law and regulation (a "make own rules" condition) and global private
law and governance (the "buy rules from elsewhere" condition). Gov-
ernments face a "production decision" among domestic legal institu-
tions, institutions of global private law, and hybrid legal institutional
arrangements. I argue that recent developments in global private gov-
ernance such as the Credit Derivative Determination Committees of
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association exemplify the
highly successful and rapid growth of global private governance of the
OTC derivative markets. Therefore, international public-private regu-
latory partnerships should combine or create "tradeoffs" of the vari-
ous components of regulatory asset bundles of government regulation
and global private regulation. Such combinations offer global govern-
ance possibilities in the OTC derivative markets which are inaccessible
to either government or consolidated private actors individually.
They also harmonize with recent suggestions of "an urgent need for a
specialist, cross-border financial court"3 6 for the OTC derivative mar-
kets. I use my conceptualization to highlight three urgent global gov-
ernance issues in the OTC derivative markets: global CCP clearing,
global trade repositories, and specialist cross-border financial courts.
As Rubin recently intimated, few doubt that increased regulation
of the OTC derivative markets is imminent and necessary for financial
stability. As Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner states, " [b] ecause
of their enormous scale and the critical role they play in our financial
markets, establishing a comprehensive framework of oversight for the
OTC derivative markets is crucial to laying the foundation for a safer,
more stable financial system."3 7 I agree with this general conviction
and in this Article explore the two basic questions ultimately involved
in the regulation of the OTC derivative markets: by whom and how?
I. SKETCH OF THE OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVE MARKETS
Derivatives have existed for thousands of years,38 but perhaps in
simpler forms. While not as familiar as 3M's Post-It products, finan-
36 Gillian Tett, More Prison Sentences May Renew Financial Credibility, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2009, at 30 (mentioning a suggestion by Jeffrey Golden, a prominent deriva-
tives attorney).
37 Hearing to Examine the Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives Before the H.
Comms. on Agriculture and Financial Services, 111th Cong. 12 (2009) [hereinafter H.
Agric. Comm. Hearing] (statement of Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury).
38 See ALASTAIR HUDSON, THE LAW ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 12 (4th ed. 2006).
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cial derivatives such as interest-rate swaps, foreign currency swaps, and
CDS are an important and widespread part of the infrastructure of
modem business transactions. By some estimates, over ninety-four
percent of the five hundred largest companies worldwide use deriva-
tives to manage business and financial risk.39 In fact, "companies are
among the biggest users of OTC products."40 These include institu-
tions as diverse as 3M, Cargill, JP Morgan Chase, hedge funds and
other types of investment funds, insurance companies, and even gov-
ernment entities. Therefore, the importance of derivatives and their
regulation extends far beyond financial and insurance markets.
Derivatives are so widely used across so many sectors of the economy
that their regulation has implications not only for Wall Street, but also
for Main Street America and international financial markets.
Derivatives are bought and sold in two distinct but related mar-
kets: exchange-traded markets and the OTC markets. Both markets
are also interrelated with their respective cash markets. Exchange-
traded derivatives are sometimes generically referred to as "futures."41
Similarly, OTC derivatives are often generically termed "swaps." 4 2 A
variety of participants trade derivatives on exchanges, but the OTC
derivative markets are primarily the province of highly sophisticated
and largely institutional parties such as banks and other financial insti-
tutions, insurance companies, hedge funds, other types of investment
funds, and even government entities. Because institutional markets
are global markets43 and no global financial regulator exists, the OTC
derivative markets contain important regulatory challenges beyond
those experienced by local exchanges. Exchange-traded derivative
markets and OTC derivative markets, however, have "developed in
parallel" and should be viewed as symbiotic rather than competitive. 4 4
Only "standardized" derivatives can trade on exchanges. This cur-
39 Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, Over 94% of the World's Largest
Companies Use Derivatives to Help Manage Their Risks, According to ISDA Survey
(Apr. 23, 2009), available at www.isda.org/press/press042309der.pdf.
40 Jeremy Grant, Derivatives Reform Draws UK Warning, FIN. TIMES, July 25, 2009, at
14.
41 Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html (scroll to second question) (last
visited Apr. 3, 2010).
42 Id.
43 See Brian G. Cartwright, Whither the SEC Now?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2009).
44 MARK YALLOP, THE FUTURE OF THE OTC MARKETS § 3.1 (2008), available at
http://www.icap.com/Download.aspx?fileid=2a233c27-8736-406c-bb4a-e3c9ebfbl419.
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rently means only the following types of derivative instruments:
"futures, options on futures, and options."45
An important difference between derivatives that trade on an
exchange or use CCP clearinghouses4 6 and bilaterally cleared OTC
derivatives is counterparty credit risk. For derivatives traded on
exchanges or cleared through individual CCPs, the counterparty is
the CCP itself. Therefore, market participants are only exposed to the
credit risk of the CCP.47 Therefore, CCP clearinghouses should theo-
retically implement highly robust risk management practices. On the
other hand, counterparty credit risk is a very important concern for
bilaterally cleared OTC derivatives. Exchanges and CCP clearing-
houses, however, have important limitations. For example, it is gener-
ally only profitable for them to process standardized derivative
contracts. Another important difference between exchange-traded
derivatives or those cleared through an individual CCP and bilaterally
cleared OTC derivatives is that the former category has a clear physi-
cal presence in a particular jurisdiction. On the other hand, bilater-
ally cleared OTC derivatives are "transacted across jurisdictional
boundaries and are primarily governed by the contractual relations
between the parties."48
Exchange-traded derivatives are well regulated. In fact, some
calls for reform have suggested that all OTC derivatives should
migrate to exchange trading. Because exchange-traded derivatives
are relatively uncontroversial from a public policy perspective, this
Article does not focus on this market. The OTC derivative markets,
which have grown to have a global face value of approximately $605
trillion, 4 9 however, remain the "Wild West" of derivatives regulation.
And as this Article discusses, regulating this global "Wild West" in
which local outposts of regional CCP clearing facilities are increas-
ingly being developed is only becoming more challenging.
45 H. Financial Services Comm. Hearing, supra note 13, at 166 (statement of Chris-
tian Johnson, Professor, S.J. Quinney Coll. of Law, Univ. of Utah).
46 Exchanges generally use CCPs as part of their operational infrastructure.
47 Technically, both face a non-zero insolvency risk. As I discuss later in this Arti-
cle, an insolvent CCP clearinghouse could be potentially disastrous because of its con-
centration of credit risk.
48 Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, supra note 41 (scroll to third question).
49 MONETARY & ECON. DEP'T, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES
MARKET Acrrvrry IN THE FiRsT HALF OF 2009, at 5 (2009) [hereinafter BIS, OTC DERIV-
ATIVEs], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc-hy09l1 .pdf.
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A. Background
In essence, derivatives are complex financial contracts in which
one party pays another party if "something" happens in the future.5 0
Contracting about this "something" sometimes provides an insurance-
like, risk-neutralizing function, which is called a "hedge," and it some-
times simply provides an opportunity for speculation, a "bet." In the
simplest, most traditional case, a farmer can hedge the value of his as-
yet-to-be-harvested wheat crop by buying a derivative related to the
weather (so Mark Twain was actually wrong all along) or the market
price of wheat in the future. Similarly, businesses can hedge fluctua-
tions in foreign exchange rates by using derivatives related to prices in
foreign currency markets. The buyer of a CDS seeks to be compen-
sated and the seller of a CDS agrees to pay if the price of a reference
asset such as a bond (or the credit quality of an entire firm) decreases.
In short, the derivative contract "derives" its value from changes in
another underlying referenced asset, asset bundle, financial interest
rate, or even an event such as the weather. Examples of such refer-
ences include interest rates, foreign currency, credit products, equity
products, or even an event. Theoretically, "anything that can be quan-
tified and objectively verified can be the subject of a derivative."51
The widespread notoriety of the CDS form of financial derivative
is largely attributable to the near-collapse of American International
Group (AIG), a leading seller of these instruments, which teetered on
the brink of financial disaster in September 2008. But CDS are only
one type of credit derivative. And credit derivatives are only one type
of OTC derivative. The OTC derivative markets include a dizzying
array of complex financial instruments. Interest rate swaps constitute
the majority of OTC derivatives. Incredibly, less than two years after
Long Term Capital Management's (LTCM) near collapse in 1998,
Congress passed the CFMA in 2000.52 This legislation implemented a
sweeping deregulation of OTC derivative activity and is discussed in
Part II of this Article. The timing of the CFMA does not seem to have
been an anomaly. Although derivatives have earned star billing in
"every major financial calamity"5 3 for many years now, their regulation
appears to so far be inversely correlated with their ill-begotten fame.
The OTC derivative markets can be divided into the following catego-
50 See Stout, supra note 21, at 5 ("[Derivatives] are simple bets on the future-
nothing less, and nothing more.").
51 Mark A. Guinn & William L. Harvey, Taking OTC Derivative Contracts as Collat-
eral 57 Bus. LAw. 1127, 1129 (2002).
52 See Pub. L. No. 106-554 § 1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-366 (2000).
53 See Partnoy, supra note 13.
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ries and approximate notional amounts: $437.2 trillion of interest rate
products, $48.8 trillion of foreign exchange products, $36 trillion of
CDS, $6.6 trillion of equity derivatives, $3.7 trillion of commodity
derivatives, and $72.3 trillion of other variety.5 4 These categories
include "a very broad swath of product types from collateralized obli-
gations packaged as securities (including subprime mortgage obliga-
tions) to pure vanilla swaps that are unregulated versions of futures
contracts."55 It would be difficult to list all variety of OTC derivatives
both because they are often proprietary products and continuous
product innovations characterize these markets.
OTC derivative markets are many times the size of exchange-
traded marketS56 and compromise roughly eighty-three percent of the
derivative market.57 OTC derivatives are often nonstandardized finan-
cial instruments. These markets are characterized by "bespoke" or
customized financial derivatives. This enables the trading of a pleth-
ora of product types and structures "such as forwards, swaps, options,
caps, floors, etc.," which can themselves be "infinitely divided into cus-
tomized structures and all with a variety of cash flows very distinct
from exchange traded derivatives."58 Such flexibility is one important
reason these markets have long thrived.59 The beginnings of the OTC
derivative markets date to the early 1980s in an interest rate swap
between IBM and the World Bank.6 0
The building blocks of this exotic "broad swath," however, consist
of merely two basic structures: options and forwards (futures).61 For-
wards "neutralize risk" and options have an insurance-like function.62
An option is the right to buy, a right termed a "call," or sell, a right
termed a "put," a reference asset at a specific price, the "strike price,"
in the future. For example, to guard against a drop in the spot price
of wheat, our wheat farmer might want the right, but not the obliga-
54 See BIS, OTC Derivatives, supra note 49, at 5-6.
55 H. Financial Services Comm. Hearing, supra note 13, at 134 (statement of Ter-
rence A. Duffy, Exec. Chairman, CME Group Inc.).
56 JOHN HULL, OPnoNs, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 2 (7th ed. 2008).
57 BENN STEIL & MANUEL HINDS, MONEY, MARKETS & SovEREIGNTY 30 (2009).
58 H. Financial Services Comm. Hearing, supra note 13, at 166 (statement of Chris-
tian Johnson, Professor, S.J. Quinney Coll. of Law, Univ. of Utah).
59 See id. at 164 (noting that "OTC derivatives were developed in response to
market demand for derivatives that could be customized beyond what was offered in
the exchange-traded market").
60 Id. at 177 (statement of Robert Pickel, Chief Exec. Officer, Int'l Swaps & Deriv-
atives Ass'n).
61 But see HUDSON, supra note 38, at 15 ("All financial derivatives products are
based on variants of the option.").
62 See HuLL, supra note 56, at 11.
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tion, to "put" or sell his wheat to a cereal manufacturer in six months
at a set price. Similarly, if the cereal manufacturer depends upon this
wheat in her production processes and wants to insure against a rise in
the spot price of wheat, she can enter a forward contract with the
farmer to lock in a specified price for the wheat in six months. In this
case, the farmer/manufacturer is obligated to sell/buy wheat in six
months at the designated price.
OTC derivative markets are currently concentrated in New York
and London.63 But this global wholesale market, where small transac-
tions are in the millions of dollars, is inherently a global market and
includes participants from all parts of the world. As Professor Hudson
explains, "In the context of financial derivatives the use of foreign cur-
rency, the use of subsidiaries in other jurisdictions, and the use of
multiple branches and transactions across borders are the mainstay of
market activity."64 And certain regions such as China,65 the Middle
East,66 and Brazil6 7 are becoming increasingly important in these mar-
kets. The participants in the OTC derivative markets are as varied as
the instruments themselves. They are typically highly sophisticated
commercial parties and all types of financial institutions such as
banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, asset managers, multina-
tional corporations and various types of government entities. It is
important to note that the banks referred to largely constitute a small,
concentrated group. In the United States, an essentially two-tiered
banking system has evolved, consisting of a small group of large inter-
national banks and another tier of smaller more local/regional
banks.68 It is the former that tend to deal in derivatives. For example,
63 See Huw Jones, EU Says Clearing Key to Making Derivatives Safer, REUTERS, July 3,
2009, www.reuters.com/article/idUSBRU00943520090703.
64 HUDSON, supra note 38, at 453.
65 See Denis McMahon, Foreign Banks Caught in Bind, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at
C2.
66 For example, EuroMoney advertised a seminar in October 2008 entitled
"Derivatives in the Middle East Conference." The promotional materials state that
"[d]erivatives and structured products in the Middle East are on the verge of an
explosion." See EuroMoney Seminars, Derivatives in the Middle East Conference,
http://www.euromoneyseminars.com/EventDetails/0/703/Derivatives-Middle-East-
Conference.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
67 See Gerald Jefffis, Brazil to Set Up Registry for Foreign Derivatives, WAL ST. J., Nov.
12, 2009, at C7.
68 For example, Robert Wilmers explains that:
In fact, 90% of all trading revenues earned by bank holding companies
is concentrated in just five firms-Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman
Sachs, JP Morgan Chase and Morgan Stanley. These are the institutions
showing the renewed profitability that has attracted so much public com-
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the following quote offers a snapshot of OTC derivatives use by large
U.S. banks:
The five biggest derivatives dealers in the U.S.-JPMorgan,
Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley and Citigroup
Inc.-held 95 percent of the $291 trillion in notional derivatives
value of the country's 25 largest bank holding companies at the end
of the first quarter, according to a report by the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency. More than 90 percent of those derivatives
were traded over the counter, the OCC data show.69
OTC derivative market participants transact for three general rea-
sons: hedging, speculation, and arbitrage. Hedging is a risk manage-
ment practice that enables insuring against movements in market
prices.70 In the above example of a wheat forward, the cereal manu-
facturer was hedging her risk exposure to changes in the spot price of
wheat. The cereal manufacturer will need wheat, regardless of its
market price, to make her cereal. If the price of wheat skyrockets, it is
unlikely that the manufacturer can raise the price of her cereal an
equal amount without impacting consumer buying habits. This type
of risk management might sound boring and far removed from the
world of high finance, but "[o]ne of the unfortunate facts of life is
that hedging is relatively dull, whereas speculation is exciting."7' But
speculation is also controversial. 7 2 In fact, some have argued that
ment. But much of this improvement comes from trading and speculation.
The vast majority of American banks don't do either.
The five firms have swung from an aggregate loss of $14.0 billion in
2008 to $30.1 billion of net income through September 2009. The remain-
der of the industry, which earned $4.4 billion in 2008, is now showing $9.7
billion in red ink through this year's third quarter.
Robert G. Wilmers, Not All Banks Are Created Alike, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2009, at A13.
69 Christine Harper et al., Wall Street Stealth Lobby Defends $35 Billion Derivatives
Haul, BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 31, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601109&sid=agFM..w6e2iOO.
70 See Wayne Guay & S.P. Kothari, How Much Do Firms Hedge with Derivatives?, 70J.
FIN. EcoN. 423 (2003). Guay and Kothari's article "examine[s] the hypothesis that
financial derivatives are an economically important component of corporate risk
management." Id. at 452. Their study suggests that "the magnitude of the derivatives
positions held by most [nonfinancial] firms is economically small in relation to their
entity-level risk exposures." Id.
71 Huu., supra note 56, at 770. Hull notes that Nick Leeson's official role at Bar-
ings Bank, the bank he financially destroyed through derivatives speculation, was to
seek arbitrage opportunities. Id.
72 In Part II, I explain more of the controversy surrounding derivatives
speculation.
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there should be an "economic purpose" test for OTC derivatives.73
Speculators make bets about the future. These bets could involve the
direction of certain market prices or even the occurrence of a particu-
lar event. Consequently, a trader might buy/sell a wheat-related deriv-
ative, but have no more real economic interest in wheat than in UFO
sightings, except for the potential profit from betting correctly.
Finally, arbitrageurs look for assets financial markets should price sim-
ilarly, but are currently priced differently, and bet on their eventual
price convergence.7 4 But theory is often different from practice.
LTCM's strategy reportedly involved relatively riskless arbitrage.7 5
While dazzling many, the dizzying complexity of the OTC deriva-
tive markets also has its critics. Some charge that this complexity is
"one of the demons that makes our financial markets crisis prone."76
Therefore, I next provide a general overview of the benefits and costs
of OTC derivatives use.
B. An Overview of the Benefits and Costs of Using OTC Derivatives
1. Benefits
OTC derivatives serve important, productive, and necessary eco-
nomic purposes.77 Unlike the standardized derivatives traded on
exchanges, OTC derivatives allow for customized risk management.
This flexibility is important because "'real world' economic risk is nor-
mally non-standardised."78 The ability to customize OTC derivatives
has several important implications. This Part discusses merely a hand-
ful of these benefits. First, firms are able to closely hedge their actual
business and financial risks and, thereby, receive beneficial account-
73 See Thomas Lee Hazen, Filling a Regulatory Gap: It Is Time to Regulate Over-the-
Counter Derivatives, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 123, 133-35 (2009).
74 See HuLL, supra note 56, at 10.
75 Michael Lewis, How the Eggheads Cracked, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 24, 1999, at 24
(describing the "killer blows" to LTCM as involving interest-rate waps and long-term
options). See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED 3-39 (2000) (discuss-
ing the rise and fall of LTCM).
76 Testimony of Richard Bookstaber Submitted to S. Comm. Agriculture, Nutri-
tion, and Forestry 4 (June 4, 2009) [hereinafter Bookstaber Testimony], available at
http://216.40.253.202/%7Eusscanf/index.php?option=com-docman&task=doc-
download&gid=92; see also RicHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN 143
(2007) ("Complexity is a byproduct of today's interrelated markets. It is not always
benevolent; it is at times catastrophic and is always helped along by the organizational
jumble of firms .. . as well as by the host of derivative instruments that have come to
dominate the financial landscape.").
77 See, e.g., Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26114 (May 12, 1998).
78 See YALLoP, supra note 44, § 3.9.
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ing treatment under current hedge accounting rules.79 Second, OTC
derivatives can increase liquidity in various underlying markets, the
market on which a derivative itself is based. Third, they enable highly
tailored diversification of investment portfolios. Fourth, they can
improve the accuracy of certain market prices. For example, CDS
spreads provide signal the market's outlook on a specific credit risk.80
Fifth, OTC derivatives enable a broader diversification of risk than
possible with more traditional financial instruments. For example,
credit derivatives enable a more tailored transfer of credit risk than
traditional credit instruments. 8' Sixth, a related point is that certain
derivatives, such as credit derivatives, increase bank credit capacity,
which should facilitate additional amounts of lending.8 2 As the finan-
cial crisis has demonstrated, however, credit derivatives can also nega-
tively affect the amount of lending in an economy. Seventh,
bilaterally cleared OTC derivatives provide firms with more flexibility
in their counterparty credit arrangements than exchange trading. For
example, bilateral clearing allows firms to use flexibly tailored credit
support arrangements to manage counterparty credit risk.83 Firms
argue that this flexibility is crucial in efficiently managing their work-
ing capital. Cargill, 3M, and others argue that losing such flexibility
would have a significant negative impact on their business operations
because it would inefficiently reallocate substantial capital amounts
necessary for managing their businesses. They argue that losing this
flexibility would increase the overall cost of doing business. 84
Exchange trading or CCP clearing of derivatives requires standardized
79 See HuLL, supra note 56, at 38.
80 See Michael Casey, The U.S. Is Riskier Than Euro Zone; So Says CDS Market, WALL
ST.J. ONLINE, Mar. 24, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1 000142405274870331
2504575142112712294450.html (explaining that rising CDS spreads on U.S. debt sig-
nal that financial markets' view of an increased likelihood, even if remote, of a U.S.
default).
81 See J.P. MORGAN & CO. & RISKMETRIcs GROUP, THE J.P. MORGAN GUIDE TO
CREDIT DERIVATIVES § 3 (1999), available at http://www.investinginbonds.com/assets/
files/Intro-toCreditDerivatives.pdf.
82 See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Deriva-
tives, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1019, 1025 (2007).
83 Testimony of David Dines, President, Cargill, Risk Mgmt., Before the S. Agric.
Comm. on Regulatory Reform and Derivatives 2-3 (June 4, 2009), available at http://
216.40.253.202/%7Eusscanf/index.php?option=com docman&task=docdownload&
gid=94. Cargill estimates its own costs could exceed $1 billion.
84 See H. Financial Services Comm. Hearing, supra note 13, at 173-74 (statement of
Timothy Murphy, Foreign Currency Risk Manager, 3M).
[VOL. 85:41304
REGULATING THE INVISIBLE
collateral and margin arrangements. Eighth, derivatives are thought
to "complete" financial markets. 8 5
The limitations of exchange trading also highlight another rea-
son that the ability to create and trade customized derivatives in the
OTC markets is crucial. Exchange trading requires a certain level of
product demand. But the demand for new OTC derivative products
must be created over time. And for certain products, demand will
always be largely idiosyncratic. The ability to create customized prod-
ucts in OTC derivative markets spurs financial innovation. Finance
professor Raghuram Rajan explains:
New financial contracts will not be immediately accepted in the
market because the uncertainties surrounding their functioning
cannot be resolved by arm's length participants, who neither have
money nor goodwill to spare....
... Only when contractual features have been modified to address
most contingencies can consideration be given to trading the con-
tract on an exchange.86
Some commentators explain that "[f]inancial innovation finds its ful-
lest expression in the market for OTC derivatives."87 Some scholars,
however, argue that these markets are not necessarily so innovative88
and that some of these innovations cause more harm than good.
In addition to direct economic benefits, OTC derivatives also
arguably have indirect economic benefits. They are thought to
increase economic growth, contribute "rewarding jobs" to the econ-
omy, and augment the reputation, prestige, and influence of the U.S.
financial sector.89
2. Costs
Professor Lynn Stout argues that the innovative nature of OTC
derivative markets is often illusory.90 But she argues that lack of inno-
vation is only one possible drawback or cost of OTC derivative mar-
kets. Furthermore, Stout asserts that little empirical evidence
85 See Peter H. Huang, A Normative Analysis ofNew Financially Engineered Derivatives,
73 S. CAL. L. REV. 471, 473 (2000).
86 Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?, 2005
PROC. FED. RESERVE BANK KAN. Crry 313, 330.
87 See Darrell Duffie & Henry T.C. Hu, Competing for a Share of Global Derivatives
Markets: Trends and Policy Choices for the United States 3 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law
& Econ. Research Paper No. 145, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1140
869.
88 See Stout, supra note 21, at 5.
89 Duffie & Hu, supra note 87, at 7.
90 See Stout, supra note 21, at 5.
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supports claims that speculation with OTC derivatives has a broad pos-
itive impact on liquidity and price discovery.9 1 Additionally, she notes
that derivatives have a long history,9 2 which consistently provides "four
basic lessons":
First, derivatives contracts have been used for centuries, possibly
millennia. Second, healthy economies regulate derivatives markets.
Third, derivatives are regulated because while derivatives can be
useful for hedging, they are also ideal instruments for speculation.
Derivatives speculation in turn is linked with a variety of economic
ills-including increased systemic risk when speculators go bust.
Fourth, derivatives traditionally are regulated not through heavy-
handed bans on trading, but through common-law contract rules
that protect and enforce derivatives that are used for hedging pur-
poses, while declaring purely speculative derivative contracts to be
legally unenforceable wagers.9 3
Stout is not alone in her concerns. Professor Frank Partnoy, a former
derivative trader, notes that OTC derivatives are frequently used to
create excessive amounts of leverage, to bypass legal restrictions, and
to avoid disclosure.9 4
An important problem in OTC derivative markets is their lack of
transparency. This opacity can create market uncertainty in practice,
particularly in times of financial crisis. For example, how can firms
using OTC derivatives to hedge particular risks understand the true
robustness of their hedges if their counterparty's exposures are
unknown? Without this information, it could be the case that a mar-
ket participant trades one risk, but unknowingly assumes an excessive
amount of counterparty credit risk. This market opacity not only
makes it highly problematic for market participants to understand
counterparty credit risk, market risk concentrations, and interconnec-
tions, but also creates this challenge for regulators. It is extremely
challenging for regulators to oversee these markets without sufficient
data. These types of challenges arising from the lack of transparency
in OTC derivative markets had monumental consequences in the
recent financial crisis:
The opaqueness of the market prevented, on the one hand, other
market participants from knowing exactly what the exposures of
their counterparties were to these three entities [Bear Steams, Leh-
man Brothers, AIG], which resulted in mistrust and in the sudden
91 See id. at 8.
92 Id. at 5.
93 Id.
94 Partnoy, supra note 13; see also Bookstaber Testimony, supra note 76, at 2-3
(describing how OTCs "game[d]" the system).
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drying up of liquidity. On the other hand, it also prevented regula-
tors from being able to identify early the risks building up in the
system, the extent to which risks were being concentrated and con-
sequently the effects that their default would have for financial sta-
bility ... the crisis has highlighted how derivatives in general and
CDS in particular created a web of mutual dependence that was dif-
ficult to understand, disentangle and contain in the immediate
aftermath of a default. Therefore, the crisis has clearly shown that
the characteristics of OTC derivative markets-the private nature of
contracting with limited public information, the complex web of
mutual dependence, the difficulties of understanding the nature
and level of risks-increases uncertainty in times of market stress
and accordingly poses risks to financial stability.95
OTC derivatives can increase market volatility and the level of systemic
risk9 6 due to a combination of excessive amounts of leverage and low
capital requirements.
Another important longstanding issue in the OTC derivative mar-
kets has been market infrastructure development that has been
plagued with collective action problems. As I discuss in Part IV, OTC
derivative markets have a market structure that is distinct from and
potentially more costly to the public than those of multilateral
exchanges. Market infrastructure development is costly. Market par-
ticipants can earn more revenues by allocating resources to new deriv-
ative transactions rather than to addressing back office operational
capabilities. Inadequate market and operational infrastructures
increase systemic risk in OTC derivative markets. Therefore, the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) has at times had to intervene
to informally "encourage" market participants to address market infra-
structure issues through its powers of "moral suasion." For example,
without the FRBNY's informal regulatory actions in the credit deriva-
tive markets in 2005 and its more recent interventions in the financial
crisis, "the unwinding of Bear Stearns' derivatives portfolio [in March
2008] could have been extremely dangerous."9 7 Some market infra-
95 Commission of the European Communities, Working Paper: Ensuring Efficient,
Safe, and Sound Derivatives Markets, § 2.4, COM (2009) 332 final (July 3, 2009), availa-
ble at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/derivatives/
report-en.pdf.
96 Id. § 1.4.
97 Testimony of Darrell Duffie, Professor, Stanford Univ., Before the Subcomm.
on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking Housing and
Urban Affairs 2 (July 9, 2008), available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore-id=3902fb9c-eb72-4d75-90dc-c8d96b676
322; see also Darrell Duffie et al., Policy Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Market Infrastruc-
ture 2 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 70, 2010), available at
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structure issues could be ameliorated by greater use of CCP clearing,
but as discussed below, this solution is neither a panacea nor
unproblematic.
OTC derivatives are interrelated with and can negatively impact
their respective cash and exchange markets. Financial expert Richard
Bookstaber recently summarized for Congress a number of ways in
which OTC derivatives can have such potential negative impact. In
his testimony, he explained:
Those who create these products need to hedge in the market,
so their creation leads to a direct affect on the market underlying
the derivative.
Those who buy these instruments have other market exposures,
so that if they are adversely affected by the swaps or derivatives, they
might be forced to liquidate other positions, thereby transmitting a
dislocation from one market into another.9 8
Widespread use of credit derivatives has also arguably weakened the
traditional incentives of banks to monitor their debtors.99 Major
banks were allegedly "missing in action"10 0 in the time preceding
Enron's collapse. One potential explanation is that
[t]he banks that financed Enron had used massive amounts of
credit derivatives to limit their exposure in the event Enron
defaulted . . . . The banks would have preferred that Enron sur-
vive ... [b]ut the prospect of Enron's decline meant much less to
Enron's banks than if their loans were fully exposed. 0 1
OTC derivatives also can have important negative effects both on
the companies that own or sell these instruments and also on compa-
nies that are the underlying assets of derivative transactions. For
example, OTC derivatives increase both the accounting costs and the
complexity of financial statements for buyers and sellers of these
instruments. Although the SEC mandates certain derivatives disclo-
sure in financial statements, how helpful this disclosure ultimately is
seems unclear.102 Judge Frank Easterbrook lamented in Derivative
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1534874 (arguing that "[w]ithout the demands made by
regulators for improvements in this market, OTC derivatives might have contributed
to even greater systemic risk at the time of Lehman's default").
98 Bookstaber Testimony, supra note 76, at 3.
99 See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 82, at 1032.
100 Id. at 1033.
101 Id.
102 SeeJill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REv. 785,
809-11 (2009) (discussing the SEC's promulgation of Item 305 to Regulation S-K).
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Securities and Corporate Governance03 that while " [t]here is a large and
burgeoning literature on the financial aspects of derivatives[,] . . .
almost no one seems to be interested in the relation between deriva-
tive instruments and the corporations whose securities are the physi-
cal assets on which the derivatives depend." 0 4 Unfortunately, the
financial crisis has demonstrated the importance of this concern, but
legal scholars have made few additional contributions to address this
issue. But as Richard Bookstaber explained to Congress:
The market price of some derivatives can have real effects for a
company. For example, the credit default swaps are used as the
basis for triggering debt covenants, so if the swap spread for a com-
pany's debt rises above a critical level, it can have an adverse effect
on the company.' 0 5
Finally, leading up to the financial crisis, the financial sector had
increasingly accounted for a larger overall percentage of U.S. corpo-
rate revenues.1 0 6 This trend, however, arguably withdraws vital
human capital from other critical economic sectors.1 0 7 Additionally,
financial crises have become increasingly frequent occurrences. If the
financial sector continues to account for an increasingly greater level
of corporate revenues in the overall economy, more frequent finan-
cial crises are likely to have increasingly greater overall economic
impacts.
II. CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME AND CHALLENGES
In this Part, I briefly describe a bit of the history behind the cur-
rent regulatory structure of the OTC derivative markets. Following
this description, I then provide an overview of the current regulatory
scheme. I next briefly discuss several intractable regulatory challenges
in these markets and conclude this Part by addressing whether OTC
derivatives should even be subject to government regulation.
103 Frank H. Easterbrook, Derivative Securities and Corporate Governance, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 733 (2002).
104 Id. at 735.
105 Bookstaber Testimony, supra note 76, at 3.
106 See generally Michael Lim Mah-Hui, From Servant to Master: The Financial Sector
and the Financial Crisis, J. APPLIED REs. Accr. & FIN., Dec. 2009, at 12 (noting this
trend).
107 See Huang, supra note 85, at 507-08.
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A. Current Regulatory Scheme
Despite their astonishing size, the OTC derivative markets are
currently "largely excluded or exempted from regulation."10 8 Behind
this sparse regulation and the actual market structure lies a history of
intense financial lobbying, misdirected regulatory incentives,
favorable legislative protections, protracted turf wars among key finan-
cial regulators and intractable regulatory challenges such as the inno-
vations of financial engineering and globalization. As one
commentator stated, "the emergence and proliferation of financial
derivatives . .. have presented profound challenges for U.S. regulatory
specialists."109
1. A Brief History
As several legal scholars note,'10 derivatives have been around for
a very long time. But common law prohibitions against "difference
contracts" and the traditional requirement of an "insurable interest"
in insurance law moderated the growth of these markets."' This
moderation, however, came under stress with international legislative
changes beginning in the mid 1980s. Professor Stout explains that in
1986, a phenomenal "dismantling" of the traditional moderating
forces commenced when the United Kingdom dispensed with their
longstanding rule against "difference contracts" and, related to this,
made all derivative contracts legally enforceable.' 1 2 Not wishing to be
left behind, the United States performed a similar "dismantling" with
the passage of the CFMA in 2000. Stout explains that:
Although it was not widely appreciated at the time, the CFMA elimi-
nated more than a century of legal restraints on derivatives trading
by declaring that over-the-counter (OTC) financial derivatives were
not subject to traditional contract law rules and were not subject to
the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) or the oversight of the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 13
108 Letter from Timothy M. Geithner, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, to
Sen. Harry Reid at 1 (May 13, 2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/
docs/OTCletter.pdf.
109 EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS §14.01 (9th ed. 2008).
110 See HUDSON, supra note 38, at 12; Stout, supra note 21, at 5.
111 See Stout, supra note 21, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
112 Id. at 7 (discussing the effect of the United Kingdom's Financial Services Act of
1986).
113 Stout Testimony, supra note 24, at 2.
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This quote largely describes the current regulatory status of these
$605 notional trillion markets, but how did we get here?
Many factors likely contribute to the current lack of regulation in
the OTC derivative markets. Two particularly important considera-
tions are a longstanding political and ideological push towards der-
egulation and powerful financial lobbies. The finance industry has
been and continues to be one of the most powerful congressional lob-
bies. In 2007, there were estimated to be five financial industry lobby-
ists per congressman. 114 "Between 1998 and 2008, Wall Street
investment banks, commercial banks, hedge funds, real estate compa-
nies and insurance conglomerates paid an estimated $1.7bn in politi-
cal contributions and spent a further $3.4bn on lobbyists."' 15 And the
financial industry spent $224 million in the first half of 2009 on lobby-
ing efforts.' 16 But a deregulation ethos and powerful financial lobbies
are only two of the likely explanatory factors.
Scholars also point to "regulatory turf war [s]" as being a "key fac-
tor" in the development of the OTC derivative markets. 17 Professor
Stout explains that "there is a long-standing turf battle between ...
the SEC, and . . . the CFTC, over derivatives. And, in fact, that turf
battle, in part, is one of the reasons why they were not well-regulated
in the first place."' 18 Similarly, ProfessorJerry Markham describes this
competition between the SEC and CFTC,1i 9 which could have
diverted the attention of both financial regulators away from the
actual regulation of these markets. This infamous regulatory turf-war
has a lengthy history, which arguably justifies skepticism about current
regulatory reform proposals and draft legislation that advocates "split-
ting" regulation of these markets between these financial regulators
largely based upon whether a swap is classified as a "security."1 20
This agency tension has existed for most of the CFTC's history,
the younger of the two financial regulators. Although the CFTC was
114 John Plender, How to Tame the Animal Spirits, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at 11.
115 Id.
116 Rachel Beck, All Business: Lobbyists Influence Financial Reform, THESTREET.COM,
Oct. 16, 2009, http://www.thestreet.com/story/10612733/all-business-lobbyists-influ-
ence-financial-reform.html.
117 H. Financial Services Comm. Hearing, supra note 13, at 163 (statement of Chris-
tian Johnson, Professor, S.J. Quinney Coll. of Law, Univ. of Utah).
118 PBS NewsHour, supra note 28 (statement of Lynn Stout, Professor, UCLA Sch.
of Law).
119 See Markham, supra note 28, at 405.
120 For example, see Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. (as passed by the House, Dec. 11, 2009).
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not established until 1974, the Commodity Exchange Act1 21 (CEA)
dates back to 1936. The SEC, however, was established by the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.122 This legislation, in conjunction with the
Securities Act of 1933123 (together, the "Securities Acts"), constitute
the fundamental securities law statutes in the United States. Both the
CEA and the Securities Acts have been amended throughout the
years. In the year of its birth, certain amendments to the CEA allo-
cated to the CFTC "exclusive jurisdiction over financial futures and
options on certain financial interests (in addition to the agricultural
commodities traditionally regulated under the CEA)."124 From these
amendments arose significant uncertainties about the application of
the CEA and the Securities Acts in the OTC derivative markets.125
Ultimately, these amendments also precipitated the first shots fired
between the CFTC and SEC.
Flaring tensions finally ignited and led to an interagency accord,
the "Shad-Johnson Accord" of 1982,126 which divided regulatory juris-
diction of the OTC derivative markets. Congress soon codified this
truce, 127 which gave 'jurisdiction only over securities and options on
securities" to the SEC, and jurisdiction over "[m]ost other derivative
products"128 to the CFTC. Notwithstanding the Accord, jurisdictional
conflicts continued such as in 1987 when the CFTC attempted to
assert 'jurisdiction over virtually all hybrid instruments."' 2 9 But this
time, the CFTC had gone too far. Both market participants and other
financial regulators now joined forces with the SEC to pushback
against the CFTC's attempted incursion. Such struggles eventually led
121 Pub. L. No. 49-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 1-25 (2006)).
122 See Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 4, 48 Stat. 881, 885 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a)
(2006)).
123 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa.
124 GREENE ET AL., supra note 109, § 14.07[1].
125 See id.
126 See id. § 14.07[2]. Christopher Culp explains that the Shad-Johnson Accord
provided four basic ground rules:
The CFTC would regulate all futures and options on futures, even if the
futures are based on securities[.] The SEC would regulate all options on
securities[.] Futures on individual securities, such as stocks, were prohib-
ited[.] The SEC would play a formal role in the CFTC's approval of then-
evolving stock index futures contracts[.]
Christopher L. Culp, Derivatives Regulation: Problems and Prospects, in RESTRUCTURING
REGULATION AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONs 261, 275 (James R. Barth et al. eds., 2000).
127 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1).
128 Fisch, supra note 102, at 808.
129 GREENE ET AL., supra note 109, § 14.07[3].
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to Congress's passage of the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992
(FTPA), in which the CFTC gained authority to "grant broad exemp-
tions from regulation under the CEA for derivative instruments,
including hybrid instruments and swap transactions."13 0 Not surpris-
ingly, however, regulatory tensions in the OTC derivative markets
continued.131
In 1998, the CFTC issued its "Concept Release on Over-the-
Counter Derivatives," which is referred to in the Introduction of this
Article.132 The Concept Release sought the comprehensive regulation
of swaps and OTC derivative dealers.13 3 Long simmering tensions
proceeded to explode as market participants, the SEC, other financial
regulators, in addition to Congress, immediately reacted. And this
reaction and the market uncertainty it created was so strong that
"Congress took the extraordinary step of enacting standstill legisla-
tion . . . prohibiting the CFTC on an interim basis from issuing any
rule, regulation, interpretation, or policy statement that would restrict
or regulate activity in qualifying swaps or hybrid instruments." 34 The
vociferous reaction to the Concept Release, combined with growing
legal uncertainty in these markets, and the work of the President's
Working Group on Financial Markets, soon spurred the passage of the
CFMA.13 5
In addition to the variety of factors evident in the background
political and regulatory story, the OTC derivative markets are also
characterized by several intractable issues such as financial engineer-
ing and globalization. Regarding the importance of this latter consid-
eration, for example, Judge Frank Easterbrook suggests that:
What happened in the regulation of derivatives is that interna-
tional competition undid U.S. regulation. Trades moved from the
Chicago Board of Trade, which had to wait for regulatory approval,
to exchanges in London, Frankfurt, and Hong Kong that were not
so hobbled. The loss of business led U.S. exchanges to beg for stat-
utory change-and it also meant that there was no U.S. interest
group that could gain from holding onto the old rules or adding
130 Id.
131 See id.
132 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
133 See GREENE ET AL., supra note 109, §14.07[4]; see also Over-the-Counter-Deriva-
tives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (May 12, 1998) (contemplating the possible imposition of
comprehensive regulatory requirements applicable to swap agreements and OTC
derivatives dealers).
134 GREENE ET AL., supra note 109, § 14.07[4].
135 See id. § 14.07[5].
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another layer of regulation. That changed the political market, and
the Modernization Act of 2000 [the CFMA] was the result. 1 3 6
The effects of all these challenges, combined with political and regula-
tory issues, help to explain not only the current minimal regulatory
framework, but also the longstanding inertia surrounding the regula-
tion of these markets. In fact, even now, after the worst financial crisis
since the Great Depression, some commentators have started to opine
about "How Overhauling Derivatives Died."13 7
2. Description of Current Regulatory Scheme
The regulation of the OTC derivative markets that does exist is
primarily based upon two considerations: (1) regulation of institu-
tional market participants, and (2) various product categorizations.
This regulatory approach has contributed to a plethora of regulatory
gaps, particularly since the institutional segregations upon which
much of this regulatory structure is based are largely outdated. As
Professor Fisch explains,
The historical divides that produced our existing regulatory struc-
ture-the divide between banks and securities firms, between secur-
ities and commodities, and between broker-dealers and investment
advisors-have eroded, leading to a system in which similar func-
tions are under the regulatory oversight of different agencies. In
some cases this system produced jurisdictional conflicts; in others, it
may lead to regulatory gaps. 138
As financial institutions evolve and financial products innovation
occurs, regulatory gaps are continually created and exploited.1 3 9 And
a widespread consensus exists that such opportunities for regulatory
arbitrage can result in a decreased amount of regulatory oversight.1 40
Regarding the first regulatory consideration, many important
OTC derivative participants, such as banks and insurance companies,
are highly regulated institutions. Accordingly, commentators note
that "[t]he perception of OTC markets as 'unregulated' overlooks
that fact that all major market participants are individually regulated
136 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 VA. L.
REv. 685, 704 (2009).
137 Randall Smith & Sarah N. Lynch, How Overhauling Derivatives Died, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 26, 2009, at Bl.
138 Fisch, supra note 102, at 786-87 (2009).
139 For example, see EDWARD J. KANE, UNMET DUTIES IN MANAGING FINANCIAL
SAFEIY NETS (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1470123 (describing a con-
tinuous cycle of regulation and regulation-induced innovation in financial markets).
140 John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have
a Better Idea, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 715 (2009).
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and codes of conduct are set by supervisors in many OTC markets."14 1
Likely for this reason, as recently as July 2008, the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency (OCC), one of the primary banking regulators
in the United States, stated in congressional testimony that "[t]he
OCC has had a longstanding position that we do not believe that OTC
derivatives products need to be regulated, in part because the vast
majority of significant participants in these markets are regulated."142
Some significant market participants, such as hedge funds, however,
remain largely unregulated. And, of course, an important difference
exists "between ineffective supervision of individual market partici-
pants and changes to, or regulation of, market structure itself."1 43
Finally, it is important to remember that regulation is no panacea.
Several catastrophic derivative meltdowns have occurred on regulated
exchanges.'"
The second regulatory consideration, product categorization, is
primarily based upon whether a derivative instrument can be classi-
fied as a security, futures contract, or a commodity option. If an OTC
derivative is categorized as a "security," "futures contract," or "com-
modity option," then in the absence of an applicable exemption or
exclusion, it is subject to regulation by either the securities or com-
modities laws and, therefore, regulated by the SEC or CFTC respec-
tively. This classification is itself largely dependent upon two
considerations: (1) the reference asset or interest involved, and (2)
how the instrument is structured to relate to this asset or interest.145
Not surprisingly, OTC derivatives are often carefully structured to
qualify for exemptions or exclusions. And a cooperative Congress has
provided a plethora of these, particularly with the passage of the
141 YALLOP, supra note 44, § 1.1.
142 Testimony of Katherine E. Dick, Deputy Comptroller for Credit & Market Risk,
Comptroller of the Currency, Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and
Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 11 (July 9,
2008), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-79a.pdf.
143 YALLOP, supra note 44, § 3.15.
144 As Yallop points out, derivatives failures are not relegated to the OTC deriva-
tive markets as
significant failures in the exchange traded world include: the collapse of
Barings in 1995 as a result of $1.3bn losses in exchange listed Japanese stock
futures and options, Sumitomo's $2.5bn losses in copper futures in 1998, Liu
Qibing's losses of up to $1bn in copper futures in 2005, Mizuho's loss also in
2005 of $250m in Japanese equity trading, Amaranth's $6.5bn loss in natural
gas futures in 2006 and Societe Generale's $7.1bn loss on European stock
index futures in 2007.
Id. § 3.16.
145 GREENE ET AL., supra note 109, § 14.02.
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CFMA. As alluded to above, the CFMA's deregulatory scope was
astounding. This impact stemmed primarily from two considerations:
(1) it "excluded from regulation under the CEA [Commodity
Exchange Act], and accordingly from the prohibition on the trading
of products outside a CFTC-regulated trading facility, a wide range of
OTC derivatives transactions between qualifying counterparties and
so-called 'hybrid instruments,' "1 4 6 and (2) it excluded "certain indi-
vidually-negotiated swap agreements and other derivatives entered
into by qualifying counterparties"147 from the definition of "security"
in the Securities Acts, among other legislation.
The upshot of these changes was that if a derivative contract is
classified as a "security," then it is subject to the securities laws. But
the CFMA amended the Securities Acts, so that the definition of a
"security" does not include "certain qualifying 'swap agreements."" 4 8
The term "swap agreement," however, includes not only swaps, but
can also include certain "options, forwards, and other derivatives."149
Although not classified as securities, "qualifying swap agreements
relating to securities . . . remain subject to the fraud, manipulation
and insider trading prohibitions under the Acts."o50 In addition to
these exclusions, the CFMA limited the SEC's authority "to promul-
gate rules imposing reporting or recordkeeping requirements, proce-
dures or standards as prophylactic measures against fraud,
manipulation or insider trading"11 in OTC derivative markets.
Bizarrely, a few OTC derivatives, namely "security futures," are not
only categorized as both "securities" and "futures," but also are actu-
ally "subject to both the securities and the commodities laws."15 2
Understanding why most OTC derivatives are subject to little, if any,
oversight by the SEC and CFTC, while a select few are subject to over-
sight by both regulators requires reflecting on the above brief history.
If an OTC derivatives is not categorized as a "security," but can be
categorized as a "futures contract" or "commodity option," then it will
generally be subject to the regulations of the CEA. If classified accord-
ingly, then in the absence of an applicable exclusion or exemption, a
derivative contract must be traded on a CFTC-regulated exchange.
146 Id. § 14.01.
147 Id.
148 Id. § 14.05. As Greene notes, however, excluded "qualifying swap agreements
relating to securities, while not securities themselves, remain subject to the fraud,
manipulation and insider trading prohibitions under the [Securities] Acts." Id.
149 Id. § 14.05 [1].
150 Id. § 14.05.
151 Id. § 14.02(2].
152 Id. § 1.08.
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Several types of OTC derivatives generally qualify as "excluded" com-
modities such as financial commodities, certain commodities without
underlying cash markets,1 5 3 and forward contracts.15 4 Commodities
that are neither excluded commodities nor agricultural commodities
qualify as "exempt" commodities.15 5 In sum:
The CFMA enacted several overlapping exclusions and exemptions
from CEA regulation applicable to OTC derivatives. .. . [T] he pro-
visions, taken together, exempt from substantive regulation under
the CEA any agreement, contract or transaction that (i) involves a
nonagricultural commodity, (ii) is entered into solely between 'eli-
gible contract participants' . . . and (iii) is not entered into or exe-
cuted on a 'trading facility .... .156
The CFTC also retains exemption authority both through its authority
to make select "administrative exemptions,"' 57 and through certain
policies predating the CFMA.'5 8 Although the CFTC retains general
authority to police fraud and manipulation in the markets for
"exempt" commodities-though not in markets for excluded com-
modities-its limited oversight authority arguably often prevents
effective insight into the actual operations of these markets. 159 In
sum, the CFMA largely prevented the regulation of the OTC deriva-
tive markets by either the SEC or the CFTC. Equally important, it also
finally provided "legal certainty for the existing multitrillion dollar
OTC derivatives market."16 0
Additionally, the CFMA created and "expressly authorized, for
the first time, the establishment of clearing organizations for OTC
derivatives under several possible regulatory frameworks."' 6 ' It also
provided for the regulatory oversight of such facilities by the SEC, the
CFTC or the Fed.'6 2 I argue below that regulatory oversight of all
153 See id. § 14.02[6].
154 Greene explains that differentiating between forward contracts for deferred
delivery and future contracts with future delivery is challenging. See id. § 14.08[3].
155 Id. § 14.02[6].
156 Id. § 14.09[1] [a] (footnote omitted).
157 See id. § 14.10 for additional detail.
158 See id. § 14.05[3]. An example is the CFrC Swap Policy Statement in 1989
"establishing a non-exclusive 'safe harbor' for swap transactions meeting certain
requirements." Id. § 14.08[3] [b]; see also id. § 14.08[3] [c] [i] (discussing the CFTC's
1989 Statutory Interpretation Concerning Hybrid Instruments).
159 Greene explains that "[i]n certain enforcement actions, the CFTC has taken
the position that these exemptions apply only to the transaction itself and not to the
conduct of activities related to the transaction." See id. § 14.09[1] [a].
160 Id. § 14.05[1].
161 Id. § 14.07[5].
162 See id. § 14.09 [6].
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OTC derivative clearing organizations should be reallocated to an
SEC-CFTC regulatory joint venture. In recent congressional testi-
mony, Professor Johnson noted that, ironically, much of the cus-
tomization in OTC derivative markets responded to longstanding
CFTC regulatory policies, dating back to 1989, which "effectively pre-
vented clearing OTC derivatives."1 63 Johnson noted that if OTC deriv-
atives were "individually tailored" and involved "no exchange-style
offset or clearing," they would be exempted from regulation under
CFC policies. 64 Reinforcing this trend, the CFTC exempted from
CFTC regulation OTC derivatives that were not "'standardized as to
their material [economic] terms' " 6 5 in 1993. This history highlights
not only the importance of regulatory design and its potential effect
on market structure, but also the possible perverse effects of ill-con-
ceived regulatory policies. It should also both produce a healthy skep-
ticism about the efficacy of any current reform proposals or draft
legislation that aims to mandate CCP clearing of "standardized" OTC
derivatives and encourage very careful, thoughtful regulatory reforms.
In sum, the passage of the CFMA has arguably been one of the
most important factors facilitating the phenomenally explosive growth
in the United States of the OTC derivative markets. Professor Stout
suggests that "[t]he CFMA thus eliminated, in one fell swoop, a legal
constraint on derivatives speculation that dated back not just decades,
but centuries. It was this change in the law-not some flash of genius
on Wall Street-that created today's $600 trillion financial derivatives
market."166 And a pivotal aspect of this "one fell swoop" consists of
CFMA provisions which implement federal preemption of the applica-
tion of state gaming or bucket shop laws to OTC derivatives and pro-
vide legal certainty for swap agreements.16 7
B. Intractable Regulatory Challenges
Globalization, technology, financial engineering, increased insti-
tutionalization of financial markets, and privatization are all forces
which present difficult challenges for the regulation of OTC derivative
markets. Globalization and technology, in particular, have "proved to
be among the most dynamic and destabilizing forces" in financial mar-
163 H. Financial Services Comm. Hearing, supra note 13, at 162 (statement of Chris-
tian Johnson, Professor, S.J. Quinney Coll. of Law, Univ. of Utah).
164 Id. (referring to Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg.
30,694 (July 21, 1989)).
165 Id. at 163 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 35.2 (2008)).
166 Stout, supra note 21, at 7.
167 See H.R. 5660, 106th Cong. §§ 117, 301-04 (enacted).
[VOL. 85-41318
REGULATING THE INVISIBLE
kets.1 6 8 Since the 1970s, the combination of technological advances,
evolving financial institutional structure, and deregulation have
effected a "revolutionary change" in global financial markets.16 9 This
"revolutionary change" has increased access to credit and opportuni-
ties to diversify risk,170 one of the most important benefits of OTC
derivatives use. But these forces also made regulation of international
financial markets, especially the OTC derivative markets, exceedingly
problematic.
1. Globalized Financial Markets
An intractable issue surrounding not only regulation of the
global OTC derivative markets but also international financial markets
in general is capital mobility and potential invisibility. For example,
Professor Hudson explains that "[w] here a cash-settled derivatives
contract is created between a trader sitting in Frankfurt and a trader
sitting in London entirely over-the-counter, it could be argued that
the transaction has no inter-action with the outside world because it
provides only for the payment of cash between those parties."17 ' Such
transactions can be thought of as largely "invisible" and, consequently,
are extremely challenging to regulate. If one government actor's
financial regulations strike market participants as burdensome, they
can often choose to transact in a jurisdiction with a more favorable
regulatory approach.
The OTC derivative markets have always been global; globaliza-
tion is a "key theme" of derivatives law. 172 To fully understand this, it
helps to remember that " [t] he interest rate swaps market began life as
a supra-national market which sought to evade municipal exchange
controls which sought to prohibit the movement of currency across
borders."17 3 Derivatives can create synthetic financial exposures to an
underlying reference asset without requiring the type of physical pres-
ence that has traditionally provided regulators with jurisdiction in
financial markets. Accordingly, many financial regulators, such as the
SEC, have traditionally had "regulatory monopolies" within their own
jurisdictions, which are today increasingly circumscribed by globaliza-
tion. Globalization decreases regulatory sovereignty: "The full impli-
cations of globalized [securities] offerings and trading is the death of
168 Coffee & Sale, supra note 140, at 709.
169 Rajan, supra note 86, at 313.
170 Id. at 346.
171 HUDSON, supra note 38, at 465.
172 Id. at 451.
173 Id.
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the regulator's sovereignty." 17 4 Likely one objective of the regulatory
push to use local CCP clearing is assertion of regulatory control over
markets that have largely been beyond reach. Professor Hudson sug-
gests that "derivatives are used for asset arbitrage, regulatory arbitrage,
tax arbitrage and speculation on markets without the need to partici-
pate physically in those markets . . . [t]herefore, the extent to which
municipal legal system will and will not apply to derivatives contracts is
clearly important."175 Therefore, globalization necessitates a global
regulatory structure and approach. As the U.S. Treasury explains,
" [w] ithout consistent supervision and regulation, financial institutions
will tend to move their activities to jurisdictions with looser standards,
creating a race-to-the-bottom and intensifying systemic risk for the
entire global financial system."' 76 For this reason, both academics
and businesspersons often caution that any new legislation must be
particularly sensitive to this global reality.' 77 OTC derivative markets
174 James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-Year-Old
SEC, 95 VA. L. REv. 941, 978 (2009).
175 HUDSON, supra note 38, at 451-52.
176 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDA-
TION 8 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-
web.pdf.
177 See, e.g., H. Financial Services Comm. Hearing, supra note 13, at 84 (statement of
Thomas F. Callahan, Exec. Vice President, NYSE Euronext); id. at 133-35 (statement
of Terrence A. Duffy, Exec. Chairman, CME Group Inc.).; id. at 157 (statement of
Donald P. Fewer, Senior Managing Dir., Standard Credit Group); Duffle & Hu, supra
note 87, at 23-25. In 2002, Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) in response to
Enron and the financial scandals of the early 2000s. See Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). SOX is often
credited with driving many financial market transactions to non-U.S. jurisdictions.
Recently, a bipartisan amendment was introduced in the Senate to address concerns
about the competitiveness of U.S. financial markets. See S. amend. 956 to S. Res. 761,
110th Cong. (2007) (enacted). This amendment was inspired by reports such as that
of Charles Schumer and Michael Bloomberg entitled Sustaining New York's and the US'
Global Financial Services Leadership. As the report details: "In looking at several of the
critical contested investment banking and sales and trading markets-initial public
offering (IPOs), over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, and debt-it is clear that the
declining position of the US goes beyond this natural market evolution to more con-
trollable, intrinsic issues of US competitiveness." MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES
E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADER-
SHIP 11 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL116000
pub/materials/library/NYSchumer-BloombergREPORTFINAL.pdf. The "more
controllable, intrinsic issues" refers to (poorly designed) financial regulations that
have a detrimental impact on U.S. financial markets. Data on worldwide initial public
offering (IPO) volumes in 2001 versus 2006 offer an illustration. In 2006, the United
States' share of the international IPO market was about one-third that in 2001. Id. at
12. European markets, however, increased by more than thirty percent and IPOs in
non-Japan Asian markets doubled. See id. Financial markets are global. Financial
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are currently concentrated in New York and London, but this concen-
tration could shift if regulatory incentives change. As one congress-
man recently warned, "[t]he risk of mobile capital migrating
elsewhere if we overshoot the mark in regulatory reform is a very real
one."17 8
Paradoxically, global financial markets could potentially solve the
regulatory collective action problem faced by government actors.
Andrea M. Corcoran, former Director of the Office of International
Affairs at the CFTC, suggests that "markets potentially can harmonize
requirements across borders where legislatures have failed (or have
yet) to do so, and can provide internationally-ruled trading facilities
notwithstanding the national nature of financial services law."' 79 This
is because "markets-through their rulemaking powers-have the
means to transcend or improve upon national law."180 As Corcoran
explains, markets make participant identity or location inconsequen-
tial and can provide global trading rules.181 OTC derivative markets
illustrate the potential of this phenomenon as discussed below.
2. Financial Engineering and Innovation
Financial engineering and innovation makes regulation of OTC
derivative markets particularly difficult, especially as some of this activ-
ity is specifically designed to skirt current regulatory structures.
Through financial engineering, financial instruments lying outside of
existing regulatory structures, but with similar or equivalent economic
substance to that of regulated instruments can be created. This con-
sideration is likely to make any current reform proposals or draft legis-
lation seeking to mandate CCP clearing of "standardized" derivatives
highly problematic. As Professor Johnson recently explained in con-
gressional testimony, the OTC derivatives industry has several decades
regulation is not only an issue of global public policy, but also an issue of national
regulation that individual jurisdictions must craft with an international perspective.
New regulations of the OTC derivative markets, therefore, must consider the behav-
ioral implications in a global financial market of any new rules.
178 Press Release, Rep. Scott Garrett, Garrett Opening Statement for Financial Ser-
vices Committee (July 22, 2009), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hear-
ing/financialsvcs dem/rep._scott_garrett.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted).
179 Andrea M. Corcoran, The Uses of New Capital Markets: Electronic Commerce and the
Rules of the Game in an International Marketplace, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 581, 608 (2000).
Note that the first version of this paper appeared in Applied Derivatives Trading Maga-
zine in December 1999.
180 Id. at 585.
181 See id. at 608.
2010] 1'321
1322 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:4
of experience in creating customized OTC derivatives.18 2 Financial
engineering techniques have undoubtedly assisted in this practice.
Routinely, financial innovation that is "regulation-induced" spurs a
never-ending, challenging cycle: "Regulation begets avoidance activity,
and avoidance eventually begets some form of re-regulation .. . [and]
[i]nevitably, the range, size, and speed of regulation-induced innova-
tion outpaces the vision and disciplinary powers that regulatory
authorities can bring to bear."' 8 3
III. THE CONTENDERS: COMPETING REGULATORY PARADIGMS,
PROPOSALS, AND INSTITUTIONS
A. Contending Regulatory Paradigms
Despite the contributions of OTC derivatives, particularly CDS, to
the recent financial crisis and the enormously expensive taxpayer
bailouts of AIG and other financial institutions that traded these
instruments, some nevertheless argue that the only "regulation" neces-
sary for OTC derivative markets is market discipline. Of course, the
strength of this argument ultimately depends upon politicians, regula-
tors, and the financial industry actually insisting in practice upon the
operation of market discipline. 184 Events not only during the finan-
182 H. Financial Services Comm. Hearing, supra note 13, at 162 (statement of Chris-
tian Johnson, Professor, S.J. Quinney Coll. of Law, Univ. of Utah) (referring to Policy
Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (July 21, 1989)).
183 Edward J. Kane, The Importance of Monitoring and Mitigating the Safety-Net Conse-
quences of Regulation-Induced Innovation 7 (Ind. State Univ., Networks Fin. Inst., Policy
Brief No. 2009-PB-08), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507802.
184 At least three considerations are particularly relevant to the issue of whether
market discipline can effectively regulate OTC derivative markets or if critical consid-
erations surrounding these markets implicitly distort the functioning of market disci-
pline and make government regulation necessary. First, the most significant
derivative market participants are dealer banks. Bank deposit insurance can both cor-
rupt market discipline and distort firm decision making. See Jean-Charles Rochet,
Capital Requirements and the Behavior of Commercial Banks, in CREDIT, INTERMEDIATION,
AND THE MACROECONOMY 339, 339-40 (Sudipto Bhattacharya et al. eds. 2004). Sec-
ond, in addition to deposit insurance, the existence of a lender of last resort-such as
the Federal Reserve-can also distort market discipline. See William C. Hunter &
David Marshall, Financial Derivatives, Systemic Risk and Central Banking, in RESTRUCTUR-
INc REGULATION AND FINANctAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 126, at 303, 313-14. Third,
current trends in financial regulatory reform suggest that reliance upon market disci-
pline to regulate excessive risk taking by large financial institutions such as the dealer
banks is highly unlikely in the near future. The best evidence for this suggestion is
the congressional push to create a new resolution authority, which many experts
across the political spectrum think is extremely unlikely to end the "too big to fail"
problem, for failing financial institutions. See Edward E. Kaufman, Ending "Too Big
To Fail," Address to U.S. Senate (Mar. 26, 2010), available at http://kaufman.senate.
REGULATING THE INVISIBLE
cial crisis, but also surrounding other past near financial collapses
such as that of LTCM, 185 instead suggest that if a financial institution
is deemed "too big to fail" or "too interconnected to fail,"1 86 it will
likely be protected in practice from the discipline of the market. An
extensive discussion of the arguments for market self-regulation versus
some type of government regulation of the OTC derivative markets is
beyond the scope of this Article. But, because even in the midst of the
current widespread support for additional government regulation of
OTC derivative markets there are proponents of a market disci-
pline-only approach to regulation, it is helpful to briefly suggest why
there is a case for increased government regulation of these mar-
gov/imo/media/doc/3-26-10%20Ending%2Too%2Big%20to%20Fail.pdf
("[T] here is little in the current legislation that would change the behavior or reduce
the size of the nation's six mega-banks.... Thus far, on the central aspect of 'too big
to fail,' financial reform consists of giving regulators the authority to supervise institu-
tions that are too big, and then the ability to resolve those banks when they are about
to fail. Upon closer examination, however, the former is virtually the same authority
regulators currently possess, while the latter-an orderly resolution of a failing mega-
bank-is an illusion."); see also Michael R. Crittenden & Sarah N. Lynch, Dodd Agrees to
Change in Finance Overhaul Bill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2010, at A7; Peter Eavis, Congress
Is Wasting a Good Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2010, at C16; Marcy Gordon, Bair Says
Senate Bill Must Be Tweaked, ABC News, Mar. 19, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Busi-
ness/wireStory?id=10150069.
185 For example, as Kevin Dowd points out, LTCM had a market buyer and, argua-
bly, the Federal Reserve's intervention was unnecessary:
A group consisting of Warren Buffett's firm, Berkshire Hathaway, along with
Goldman Sachs and American International Group, a giant insurance hold-
ing company, offered to buy out the shareholders for $250 million and put
$3.75 billion into the fund as new capital. That offer would have put the
fund on a much firmer financial basis and staved off failure. However, the
existing shareholders would have lost everything except for the $250 million
takeover payment, and the fund's managers would have been fired."
KEVIN DowD, CATO INST. BRIEFING PAPER No. 52, Too BIC TO FAIL? LONG-TERM CAPI-
TAL MANAGEMENT AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE 4 (1999), available at http://www.cato.
org/pubs/briefs/bp52.pdf. Dowd also presciently notes that the Federal Reserve's
rescue of LTCM signaled the return of the "too big too fail" doctrine. Id. at 10. But
see Lewis, supra note 75 ("William McDonough, president of the New York Fed, came
to the same conclusions as Meriwether-different from Buffett's-that the fund
could not legally sell without consulting its investors, which Buffett had given them
less than an hour to do.").
186 Arthur Levitt describes "too big to fail" as a situation "in which large financial
institutions are not allowed to fail because of the impact their failure would have on
the rest of the market" and "too interconnected to fail" as "when a financial institu-
tion's positions in the unregulated and non-transparent derivatives markets are so
complex, so secretive, and so leveraged that to unwind them quickly is either impossi-
ble or dangerous." Arthur Levitt, Op., Risk and Discipline in the Financial Markets, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 22, 2010, at A19.
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kets.1m7 This case is supported by: (1) market failuress88 involving
both information failures and systemic risk; (2) considerations of fair-
ness based upon the distributional consequences of OTC derivatives
trading, public policy preferences conferred on OTC derivatives in
bankruptcy, the potential negative impact on corporate governance of
OTC derivatives, and public policy decisions to permit trading in a less
efficient market structure; and (3) the inadequacy of private eco-
nomic incentives to effect a sufficient amount of private ordering in
OTC derivative markets.
Market failures generally provide one justification for govern-
ment regulatory intervention in financial markets. OTC derivative
markets exhibit at least two types of market failures:189 (1) informa-
tion asymmetries and deficiencies, and (2) systemic risk. 190 Systemic
risk is the risk that the collapse of one financial institution will trigger
a domino-like collapse of other financial institutions, which could
have a very broad economic impact. The systemic risk created by
OTC derivatives trading activity can create negative externalities
because of "the participants' possible failure to internalize all costs
associated with their derivatives activities. Market discipline might
demand the bankruptcy of a derivatives dealer as the price for impru-
dent risk-taking, but the private costs of a financial institution's failure
may not reflect the even greater social costs of its demise."' 9 ' OTC
derivatives are a primary contributor to systemic risk because of the
counterparty credit risk they create.192 Therefore, the counterparty
187 This topic requires a much further discussion, which is beyond the scope of
this Article.
188 As some of the most important OTC derivative market participants are dealer
banks, potential market failures surrounding the banking industry are also implicitly
relevant to this discussion. See generally Xavier Freixas & Anthony M. Santomero, Reg-
ulation of Financial Intermediaries: A Discussion, in CREDIT, INTERMEDIATION, AND THE
MACROECONOMY, supra note 184, at 424 (discussing potential market failures in the
banking industry).
189 See J. Christopher Kojima, Product-Based Solutions to Financial Innovation: The
Promise and Danger of Applying the Federal Securities Laws to OTC Derivatives, 33 Am. Bus.
L.J. 259, 279 (1995). Kojima calls these "potential" market failures. See id. But, after
fifteen years of history, they clearly appear to be actual market failures.
190 In fact, a recent FRBNY staff report states that "[d]espite the significant recent
improvements in market infrastructure . . . the infrastructure for OTC derivatives still
poses systemic risks that should be addressed with further improvements." Duffie et
al., supra note 97, at 11.
191 Kojima, supra note 189, at 281.
192 It is important to note that counterparty credit risk is theoretically unnecessary.
That is, if all derivatives were traded on multilateral exchanges, then counterparty
credit risk would be eliminated (though there would still theoretically be the risk of a
failed exchange). See Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Wish List for Fixing Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES,
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credit risk associated with OTC derivatives activity can create enor-
mous negative externalities because of excessive buildup of risk in
individual financial institutions and the interconnections among
counterparties. In the financial crisis, both types of market failures
materialized.
First, certain information asymmetries and deficiencies clearly
contributed to the financial crisis. For example, information deficien-
cies, which can refer to a lack of information by counterparties,
end-users, or regulators, severely impacted both regulators and
counterparties when Lehman Brothers collapsed. This information
failure lead to a breakdown in market confidence that froze credit
markets since neither counterparties nor regulators knew Lehman's
true OTC derivative exposures: "[t]he market for Credit Default
Swaps (CDS) froze, as Lehman was believed to be counterparty to
around $5 trillion of CDS contracts." 193 The actual amount of
Lehman's net liability was closer to $6 billion.19 4 Similarly, in the near
collapse of LTCM, "[t]he risks inherent in LTCM portfolio were
perhaps not as fatal as the consequences of the industry's exagger-
May 13, 2008, at Cl. Duffle et al. explain the important dimensions of the
counterparty credit risk issue:
Counterparty credit risk rises to the level of systemic risk when the fail-
ure of a market participant with an extremely large derivatives portfolio
could trigger large unexpected losses on its derivatives trades, which could
seriously impair the financial condition of one or more of its counterparties.
Systemic risk also arises when the fear of such a failure could lead
counterparties to attempt to avoid potential losses by reducing their expo-
sures to a large weak market participant, possibly contributing to a "run"
that indeed accelerates the failure of that market participant. An additional
form of systemic risk that can arise from the actual or anticipated failure of a
large OTC derivatives market participant is the potential for an accompany-
ing "fire sale," which can lead to significant price volatility or price distor-
tions (in both derivative markets and underlying asset markets) when
counterparties suddenly attempt to replace their positions with the dis-
tressed firm, and otherwise attempt to sell risky assets in favor of safer assets,
a "flight to quality." Through price impacts, such a fire sale or flight to qual-
ity could cause failure-threatening losses to some market participants, even
those with no direct counterparty credit risk to the firm in question.
Duffie et al., supra note 97, at 4-5.
193 Andrew G. Haldane, Executive Dir. of Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Rethinking
the Financial Network, Address at the Amsterdam Fin. Student Ass'n 2 (April 2009),
available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/20 09 /speech
386.pdf.
194 Press Release, Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., DTCC Addresses Misconcep-
tions About the Credit Default Swap Market (October 11, 2008), available at http://
www.dtcc.com/news/press/releases/2008/tiw.php.
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ated opinion of its portfolio."195 Not surprisingly, therefore,
"[t]ransparency can have a calming influence on trading patterns at
the onset of a potential financial crisis." 19 6 But without government
intervention, the OTC derivative markets are likely to remain unac-
ceptably opaque because of strong economic incentives for the private
market participants controlling these markets, namely the derivatives
dealers, to maintain the status quo.' 9 7 But without understanding a
counterparty's exposures to other counterparties, it is impossible for a
OTC derivatives market participant to responsibly assess the
counterparty credit risk it assumes.' 98 And because in these circum-
stances, such necessary risk assessment is generally impossible, a
"counterparty risk externality,"199 which is ultimately an information
failure, can arise.
Accordingly, regulators should require the disclosure200 of cer-
tain data to facilitate the monitoring of the systemic risks OTC deriva-
tives create. This is particularly important since derivative trading is
often accompanied by excessive amounts of leverage, which is easily
masked by the opacity of the OTC derivative markets. In the financial
crisis, "[t]he complexity and limited transparency of the market rein-
195 Desmond Eppel, Note, Risky Business: Responding to OTC Derivative Crises, 40
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677, 686 (2002); see also id. at 685 ("The Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements reported that LCTM was 'perhaps the world's single most active
user of interest rate swaps.'" (quoting U.S. GEN. AccouNrING OFFICE, LONG-TERM CAP-
ITAL MANAGEMENT: REGULATORS NEED TO Focus GREATER ArrENTION ON SYSTEMIC
RISK 7 (1999))).
196 Duffie et. al, supra note 97, at 16.
197 See generally Christopher Whalen, Yield to Commission: Is an OTC Market Model to
Blame for Growing Systemic Risk?, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Summer 2008, at 8, 11 (noting
that the opacity of OTC derivative markets helps maintains high profits for derivatives
dealers, who are at the center of this market structure and provide "all liquidity").
198 Of course, this risk can be largely mitigated by the taking of collateral. For this
reason, in a Wall Street journal opinion piece, Professors of Finance Viral Acharya and
Robert Engle argue that transparency should be mandated for all derivatives trades.
See Viral Acharya & Robert Engle, Op., Derivatives Trades Should All Be Transparent,
WALL ST. J., May 15, 2009, at A13.
199 Viral Acharya & Alberto Bisin, Centralized Versus Over-the-Counter Markets 3
(Mar. 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1573355 ("[Olpacity of exposures in OTC markets leads to an important risk
spillover-a counterparty risk externality-that leads to excessive 'leverage' in the
form of short positions that collect premium upfront but default ex post and result in
inefficient levels of risk-sharing and/or deadweight costs of bankruptcy." (emphasis
omitted) (footnote omitted)).
200 Delineating the exact parameters of this disclosure is beyond the scope of this
Article. But in general, disclosure must be sufficient for regulators to adequately
monitor market integrity and systemic risk and for counterparties to responsibly assess
counterparty credit risk.
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forced the potential for excessive risk-taking, as regulators did not
have a clear view into how OTC derivatives were being traded."2 0 1
Therefore, having the "right data" is an essential "starting point"202 for
effective regulation of OTC derivative markets. Currently, however,
[r]egulators are ill equipped to monitor risk because they lack the
data.... We are not even in a position to learn from past disasters,
because we cannot review the firm-level details of what occurred. It
is as if the National Transportation Safety Board was not given flight
recorders or allowed to investigate a crash site . ... .0
Similarly, finance professor Joseph Mason notes, "The key problem
facing markets today is information. ... Information problems ... are
201 Duffie et al., supra note 97, at 1.
202 See BOOKSTABER, supra note 76, at xii.
203 Id. at xii-xiii. Bookstaber provides the following example:
[I]n a few days in early August 2007, many quantitative long/short equity
hedge funds suffered large losses, in some cases losses of more than 30 per-
cent. We do not know what set off this wave of losses or why the losses
affected so many of these funds. We suspect too much leverage was a culprit
and the triggering event was somehow related to the subprime and credit
stresses, but we do not know because we do not have the relevant data.
Id. at xiii. Similarly, Professor Andrew W. Lo argues that
the current financial crisis, and the eventual cost of the bail-out, should be
sufficient motivation to create a "Capital Markets Safety Board" (CMSB) pat-
terned after the NTSB, dedicated to investigating, reporting, and archiving
the "accidents" of the financial industry. By maintaining teams of exper-
ienced professionals-forensic accountants, lawyers, and financial engi-
neers-working together on a regular basis over the course of many
investigations, a number of new insights, common threads and key issues
would emerge from their analysis.
Andrew W. Lo, The Financial Industry Needs Its Own Crash Safety Board, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
2, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/01lcbf2e-2599-1Idf-9bd3-00144feab49a.html.
Related developments include the SEC's new division of "Risk, Strategy, and Financial
Innovation," where Richard Bookstaber is a senior officer, and regulatory reform pro-
posals calling for a "National Institute of Finance" (NIF):
a proposed U.S. Government entity that would serve as a resource to gather
and provide appropriate data for the financial regulatory community. The
NIF would also provide the analytical capabilities to monitor systemic risk,
perform independent risk assessments of individual financial entities, and
provide advice to the Federal regulatory agencies tasked with ensuring the
health of the financial system.
Comm. to Establish the Nat'l Inst. of Fin., FAQs-Role of the NIF, http://www.ce-nif.
org (last visited Apr. 6, 2010). Additionally, Senator Dodd's financial reform bill that
recently passed the Senate Banking Committee proposes the creation of an "Office of
Financial Research," which would have data collection as one of its mandates. Restor-
ing American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong., § 152.
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the root of most every financial crisis known to history."204
Information deficiencies also potentially decrease market integ-
rity in at least three ways. First, information deficiencies make it diffi-
cult for regulators to spot insider trading 205 or investigate and police
market irregularities, cornering, fraud or any other abuses. Second, if
some OTC derivatives are used in financial market price discovery
processes, then information deficiencies can be particularly harmful
to the integrity of this process. 2 0 6 Additional pricing information
would clearly contribute to OTC derivative market efficiency in many
ways, including facilitating inefficient, but frequent disputes about col-
lateral amounts due to counterparties. 20 7 Third, as Professor Duffie
notes, "competition" is the "most important ingredient for market effi-
ciency."208 But healthy competition in financial markets "depends on
price transparency and on relatively unencumbered access to trading
by a broad set of market participants."2 0 9 Currently, the OTC deriva-
tives markets exhibit little price transparency and are dominated by a
small number of large, international banks.
Information deficiencies are related to the second market failure,
the problem of systemic risk, in which market participants do not
completely internalize the risks of their OTC derivatives activity and
thereby create negative externalities for society to absorb. Without
sufficient data and effective government regulation, neither regula-
tors nor counterparties know whether the collapse of a specific finan-
cial institution will have a larger market or social impact. In financial
emergencies, therefore, financial institutions are more likely to be
204 Joseph R. Mason, The (Continuing) Information Problems in Structured Finance, J.
STRUCTURED FIN., Spring 2008, at 7, 7.
205 See, e.g., Shannon D. Harrington & John Glover, Credit-Default Swaps May Incite
Regulators Over Insider Trading, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 10, 2006, http://www.bloom-
berg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aAMbO.6cgOLs; Rachelle Younglai, SEC
Probes Derivatives in Insider Trading Cases, REuTERs, Nov. 25, 2009, http://www.reuters.
com/article/idUSN2535917220091125; Viral V. Acharya & TimothyJohnson, Insider
Trading in Credit Derivatives (September 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=767864 (making an attempt to quantify the problem of
insider trading in this market).
206 Related to this, the Justice Department is conducting an antitrust investigation
of Markit and its CDS pricing. See Liz Rappaport et. al., U.S. Tightens Its Derivatives
Vise, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2009, at C1.
207 For example, collateral related pricing disputes grew so time consuming and
problematic for market participants that ISDA intervened to craft a solution: its "Col-
lateral Dispute Resolution Procedure." Additional background information on this
issue can be found at Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, Collateral Committee, http://
www.isda.org/c-anda/collateral.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
208 Duffie, supra note 12, at 1.
209 Id.
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bailed out by public taxpayers-as in the case of AIG, Bear Stearns, 210
and other financial institutions because regulators fear the unknown
consequences of letting such institutions collapse due to their inter-
connectedness with other financial institutions.
In addition to these market failures, at least four considerations
surrounding the OTC derivatives markets present issues of fairness.
First, the distributional effects during the financial crisis of OTC deriv-
atives trading, an activity whose overall social welfare effects is contro-
versial, 211 have been patently unjust. Profits from excessively risky
financial activity have been privatized, but the downside risk of this
activity has been socialized. Unfortunately, it is foreseeable that tax-
payers will continue to subsidize this activity in the future in the
absence of meaningful financial regulatory reforms. For example,
there is an increasingly prevalent assumption that taxpayers would
bail out an insolvent CCP clearing facility for OTC derivatives. 212 As
210 J.P. Morgan bought Bear Steams, but the Federal Reserve's generous guaran-
tee to J.P. Morgan, constituted a government subsidy.
211 For example, Paul Volcker has said that the most beneficial financial innova-
tion in the past few decades has been the ATM. See Alan Murray, Paul Volcker: Think
More Boldly, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2009, at R7.
212 For example, in Centralized Clearing for Over-the-Counter Derivatives, Gordon
Rausser, William Balson, and Reid Stevens state that "[t]he government cannot rely
on the private sector alone to clear OTC derivatives, and must take an active role in
creating and managing a CCP. Government backing is an essential ingredient, since
it is the guarantor of last resort." Gordon Rausser et al., Centralized Clearing for
Over-the-Counter Derivatives 12 (Sept. 18, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1475351. Professor Darrell Duffie notes that "[a]mong
the issues to be resolved for the effective international supervision of clearing houses
is the division of responsibility for bailouts, should a clearing house need government
support." Duffie, supra note 12, at 9. And European Central Bank Governor Chris-
tian Noyer has said that CCP clearing ought to "'take place at conditions that would
make the recourse to the central bank possible in case of need."' See Patrick
McGroarty & Carolyn Henson, EU Backs Tighter Regulation of CDS, WALL ST. J. ONLINE,
Mar. 9, 2010 (on file with author) (quoting Noyer). Finally, the Federal Reserve
Board recently approved the application of Warehouse Trust Company LLC (Ware-
house Trust) to be a member of the Federal Reserve System. Warehouse Trust "pro-
poses to operate a central trade registry for credit default swap contracts and to offer
related services, including the processing of life-cycle events for the contracts and
facilitation of payments settlements." Press Release, Fed. Reserve Sys. (Feb. 2, 2010),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/20100202a.htm.
And ICE US Trust LLC, the most significant CCP clearing house for credit derivatives
in the United States, also recently became a member of the Federal Reserve System.
Fed. Reserve Sys., Order Approving Application for Membership (Mar. 4, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders2009O3O 4 al.
pdf. As members of the Federal Reserve System, both institutions have access to the
Federal Reserve's discount window and lender of last resort protection. Membership
of both institutions in the Federal Reserve System is controversial. See generally Gret-
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discussed below, the bailout of an insolvent OTC derivatives CCP
clearing house could cost many times that of AIG. To rebut such
costly assumptions rife with moral hazard, financial regulatory reforms
should clearly and credibly mandate that OTC derivative market infra-
structures not have access to any type of government funding or sub-
sidy. But given past history and the trend of both these current
assumptions and financial regulatory reforms, future government
bailouts of financial institutions or OTC derivatives CCP clearing facil-
ities in a financial crisis is foreseeable. Therefore, there must be ex-
ante government regulation of OTC derivative markets sufficient to
minimize the cost of ex-post government bailouts. Second, current
U.S. bankruptcy law confers on OTC derivatives a privileged status in
bankruptcy. As Senator Edward E. Kaufman recently, eloquently
stated: "This is special treatment, not market discipline." 21 3 If OTC
derivative markets benefit from government intervention granting a
special status in bankruptcy, a reasonable tradeoff for this governmen-
tal ex post privileged protection is some level of ex-ante government
regulation. 214 Third, as both Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor
chen Morgenson & Don Van Natta Jr., Even in Crisis, Banks Dig in for Battle Against
Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at Al.
213 See Kaufman, supra note 184 (urging reconsideration of the privileged legal
status of "qualified financial contracts"-which includes OTC derivatives-in
bankruptcy).
214 The normative desirability of this special bankruptcy carve out for OTC deriva-
tives is an important question, but beyond the scope of this article. Gary Gensler,
CFTC Chairman, recently stated,
Though reform efforts to date have yet to address the bankruptcy laws, we
should seriously consider modifications to address this new development in
capital markets. One possible reform would be to require CDS-protected
creditors of bankrupt companies to disclose their positions. Another is to
specifically authorize bankruptcy judges to restrict or limit the participation
of 'empty creditors' in bankruptcy proceedings.
Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Keynote Address at
Markit's Outlook for OTC Derivatives Markets Conference (Mar. 9, 2010), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/speechandtes-
timony/opagensler-32.pdf. But see David Mengle, The Empty Creditor Hypothesis, ISDA
REs. NoTEs, No. 3, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/
ISDA-Research-Notes3.pdf (questioning the empty creditor hypothesis). For further
discussion of these issues, see Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors (Seton Hall
Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1497040, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1497040 (arguing for repeal of bankruptcy code's safe harbor provisions);
Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors (Seton Hall Law Sch.,
Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1569627, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1569627 (discussing possible revisions to the bankruptcy code once its safe
harbors are removed); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy's Financial Crisis Accelerator The Deriva-
tives Players' Piorities in Chapter 11 (Harv. Law Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 10-
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Duffie note, it is reasonable to question whether derivatives could
have important corporate governance implications. 2 15 Professor Duf-
fie argues:
There is, however, a good case for mandating the public disclosure
of derivatives positions (whether obtained on exchanges or over the
counter) that offset the economic exposures of major holders of
debt or equity in public corporations. For example, the public has
an interest in discovering whether a major shareholder, who ostensi-
bly contributes to proper corporate governance, has severely diluted
its governance incentives through a derivatives position. Likewise,
the major creditors of a distressed corporation are normally pre-
sumed to act in a manner that mitigates distress costs. If, however, a
creditor has purchased protection against default using credit deriv-
atives, the creditor may even have a net incentive to accelerate the
default or may have a substantially diluted interest in raising the
recovery value of debt claims. In general, regulators should ration-
alize disclosure requirements for derivatives positions that raise sub-
stantial concerns over moral hazard in corporate governance.2 16
Fourth, many approaches to the regulation of OTC derivatives
exist.2 17 While this Article does not advocate requiring all derivatives
to trade on multilateral exchanges, it is important to recognize that
exchange trading has clear public benefits such as superior access,
transparency, price discovery, and liquidity that "the systemically
unstable nature of an OTC market structure"2 1 8 lacks. Therefore, if
public policy permits a less efficient OTC derivatives market structure
that is potentially much more costly to the public than alternative pos-
sibilities in order to advance financial innovation and enable the
hedging of idiosyncratic risks, an appropriate tradeoff is government
oversight of this less stable market structure.
Finally, OTC derivative markets have been largely unregulated
for years. The market failures discussed above have likewise been evi-
dent for years. But, as is clear from the financial crisis, an insufficient
17, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1567075 (discussing failures of cur-
rent bankruptcy policy to ensure adequate monitoring of debtors and suggesting
reforms).
215 See Duffie, supra note 12, at 13-14; Easterbrook, supra note 103.
216 Duffie, supra note 12, at 13-14.
217 These include: (1) private regulation relying exclusively upon market disci-
pline; (2) regulation mandating exchange trading of all derivatives; (3) regulation
banning the trading of all/some derivative products; (4) regulation by "deregula-
tion," that is, by removing legal enforceability for all or some OTC derivative prod-
ucts; or (5) regulation adopting some sort of "middle of the road" approach.
218 Whalen, supra note 197, at 12. Whalen's article provides a general overview of
the market structure differences between multilateral exchanges and OTC markets.
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level of private ordering has materialized to ameliorate these and
other market concerns. 219 For example, it was only due to regulatory
prodding that the CDS markets engaged in extensive portfolio com-
pression of redundant positions in 2008. Prior to that time, "These
redundant positions posed significant unnecessary counterparty expo-
sure and offered no material economic benefit."220 Additionally, the
development of CCP clearing houses for OTC derivatives has long
been discussed, 221 but private ordering on its own has failed to fully
implement this solution. 222 And it is clear that although many OTC
derivatives instruments are clearing eligible, regulatory pressure
rather than private ordering has been responsible for the recent
migration of many OTC derivatives to CCP clearing. 223 Clearing can
be thought of as a collective action problem, a type of problem whose
solution generally requires regulatory intervention. CCP clearing is
costly and often less profitable for private market participants. For
example,
although market participants might not individually choose to incur
the cost of clearing more of their derivatives exposures, they collec-
tively benefit from the market-wide use of clearing, and would be
more inclined to agree to the increased use of clearing if all market
participants are held to common high standards in this respect. 224
219 See generally David Barboza & Jeff Gerth, On Regulating Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1998, at C1 (reporting calls for government derivatives oversight and industry
support for self-regulation); Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the
Financial Crisis of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 549 (2009) (discussing the causes of the
2008 financial crisis and proposing policy changes).
220 Duffie et al., supra note 97, at 4.
221 See, e.g., Barboza & Gerth, supra note 219; Randall S. Kroszner, Can the Finan-
cial Markets Privately Regulate Risk? The Development of Derivatives Clearinghouses and
Recent Over-the-Counter Innovations, J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING, Vol. 31, No. 3 (August
1999, Part 2).
222 Beginning in 2001, the private market began clearing interest rate swaps-the
largest category of OTC derivatives-and there is also limited CCP clearing of a few
other derivatives products. It is also the case that many OTC derivatives are highly
standardized and could easily be traded on exchanges, which would best promote
market efficiency, but would also decrease dealer margins. See Duffie, supra note 12,
at 14-15.
223 For example, Duffie notes that OTC derivatives dealers "reap substantial prof-
its from OTC trading, and have little incentive to foster the migration of trading from
the OTC market to exchanges, even after a derivative product achieves a high level of
standardization and breadth of investor activity. Anyone suggesting otherwise should
be embarrassed by the examples of standardized and extremely heavily traded deriva-
tives that are available only in the OTC market . . ." Id. at 14.
224 Duffie et al., supra note 97, at 14.
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Additionally, in theory, CCP clearing of "both vanilla and complex
derivatives is possible." 2 2 5 However, given the economics of CCP
clearing, insufficient economic incentive exists for the private market
to clear a socially optimal level of OTC derivatives. Therefore, some
economists suggest that a "public-private OTC clearing partnership is
inevitable, given the systemic importance of OTC clearing and recent
public sector support for failing financial institutions to prevent cas-
cading defaults."226
The private market has created many proactive solutions, particu-
larly under the leadership of ISDA. Its solutions are generally rapid
and often ingenious. Such solutions, however, have sometimes only
proved temporary and only arisen after much informal regulatory
prodding.227 Therefore, it is clear that private ordering solutions have
been insufficient in the past2 28 and likely will continue to be insuffi-
cient in the future. In sum, there is insufficient economic incentive
for a publically acceptable level of private ordering in the OTC deriva-
tive markets in the absence of government regulation.
B. Contending Regulatory Reforms
As this Article goes to press, it appears likely that Congress will
implement OTC derivative markets reforms, but the exact parameters
of these reforms remain uncertain.229 Assuming such reforms are
implemented, it seems clear both that jurisdiction of the OTC deriva-
tive markets will be split between the SEC and CFTC and, for now, the
225 Rausser et al., supra note 212 (manuscript at 4).
226 Id. (manuscript at 10).
227 See generally Siona Robin Listokin, Can the Derivatives Market Self-Regulate?
Evidence from OTC Derivatives Confirmations (Nov. 4, 2009) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499964 (describing the confirmation
backlog crisis in the credit derivatives industry and the industry's ultimate failure to
sufficiently address this issue).
228 See Duffie et al., supra note 97, at 2 ("Regulatory efforts over the past four
years have significantly improved a market that had been fraught with inefficient systems
and processes-especially in the case of credit derivatives." (emphasis added)).
229 As of March 29, 2010, the House of Representatives has passed a financial
reform bill, Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong., which includes additional regulations for OTC derivative markets. Sena-
tor Dodd's financial regulatory reform bill, Restoring American Financial Stability Act
2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong., passed the Senate banking committee on March 22, 2010.
Senator Dodd's bill, however, has a "placeholder"-reflecting earlier drafts-for
reform of the OTC derivative markets as "Senators Jack Reed (D-RI) and Judd Gregg
(R-NH) are working on a substitute amendment to this title that may be offered at full
committee." Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, Summary: Restor-
ing American Financial Stability, http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/
FinancialReformSummary231510FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
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international dimension will be largely addressed by general calls for
consultation, coordination, and information sharing. Since the finan-
cial crisis began, both domestically and internationally, there have
been a plethora of reform proposals and draft legislation 230 (alto-
gether, reform proposals) with many common elements. The foresee-
able congressional reforms will likely reflect many of these
recommendations. Although I agree with the basic elements of many
of these reform proposals, all fall short of constructing the linked
domestic and international frameworks of cooperation needed for the
regulation of the OTC derivative markets.
An illustrative reform proposal is the Department of the Trea-
sury's Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation (Treasury
Report),231 which includes a section on the "comprehensive regula-
tion" of the OTC derivative markets. It proposes four public policy
objectives as guideposts to OTC derivative markets regulatory reform:
"(1) preventing activities in those markets from posing risk to the
financial system; (2) promoting the efficiency and transparency of
those markets; (3) preventing market manipulation, fraud, and other
market abuses; and (4) ensuring that OTC derivatives are not mar-
keted inappropriately to unsophisticated parties." 23 2 Accordingly, it
recommends regulatory reforms in five general areas: (1) universal
record keeping and reporting, including creating audit trails; (2)
increased prudential supervision and regulation of OTC derivatives
dealers and firms with large counterparty exposures; (3) the migra-
tion of standardized OTC derivative contracts to regulated CCPs with
robust risk management policies; (4) market integrity reforms, includ-
ing "clear unimpeded authority [for the CFTC and SEC consistent
with their mandates] to police and prevent fraud, market manipula-
tion, and other market abuses . . . [and that] [t]he CFTC also should
have authority to set position limits on OTC derivatives that perform
230 A few such examples include: Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market of 2009,
H.R. 3795, 111th Cong. (2009); Derivatives Trading Accountability and Disclosure
Act, H.R. 3300, 111th Cong. (2009); The Derivatives Markets Transparency and
Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 977, 111th Cong. (2009); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREA-
sURY, supra note 176; Collin Peterson & Barney Frank, Description of Principles for
OTC Derivatives Legislation (July 30, 2009) [hereinafter Draft Principles], available at
http://agriculture.house.gov/inside/Legislation/111/otc-principles final_7-30.pdf.
231 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 176. The Treasury Report also gave
the mandate for the joint Report of the SEC and CFTC, see U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMM'N & U.S. COMMODrIY FuTuREs TRADING COMM'N, AJoiNT REPORT OF THE SEC
AND THE CFIC ON HARMONIZATION OF REGULATION (2009), available at http://www.
cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/opacftc-secfinaljointre-
portl0l.pdf (hereinafter SEC-CFTC, JoINT REPORT).
232 Id. at 46-47.
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or affect a significant price discovery function with respect to regu-
lated markets;"23 3 and (5) increased protections for less sophisticated
counterparties. Although the Treasury Report would continue to per-
mit bilateral trading of customized derivatives, it would increase
related capital and margin requirements for firms.2 34
Many of the Treasury Report's recommendations are shared by
other reform proposals. In sum, many common regulatory reforms
center on increased transparency, additional disclosure, increased
regulatory powers to insure market integrity and stability, using CCP
to clear standardized derivatives, and regulatory measures to discour-
age excessive amounts of leverage. The application of these reforms
should not be based upon the legal organizational form of a major
market participant, 235 nor should they only apply to certain types of
OTC derivatives. To increase market transparency and disclosure, all
OTC derivative trades of major market participants that are not cen-
trally cleared should be reported to trade repositories within a brief,
but appropriate span of time.2 3 6 As discussed below, trade reposito-
ries should be global market infrastructures. 237 The required report-
ing information must provide regulators the data necessary to
proactively identify excessive leverage and market concentrations and
to police fraud, market manipulations, or any other irregularities. It
must also enable regulators to create audit trails.238 Increased trade
reporting requirements for OTC derivatives are an important reform
necessary to counteract information asymmetries, especially those
confronting regulators and responsible counterparty credit risk assess-
ment. China already requires reporting of all derivative trades.239
Brazil has recently moved to "require registry of all derivatives linked
233 Id. at 48.
234 H. Agric. Comm. Hearing, supra note 37, at 13-14 (statement of Timothy F.
Geithner, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury).
235 Congress should give the SEC-CFTC joint venture that I propose the regulatory
authority to define "major market participant," but require that this definition be
based upon activity levels rather than form of legal organization or applicable finan-
cial regulators.
236 Some derivative transactions have a short time frame and regulators would
need to consider such differences.
237 Some have suggested locating a central trade repository in the Bank of Interna-
tional Settlements. I argue for a different solution.
238 SeeJoshua Gallu & David Scheer, SEC's Schapiro Calls Derivatives Data 'Critical'
for Probes, BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=20601087&sid=aKOAX86H8NxY.
239 SeeJames T. Areddy & Denis McMahon, China is Ahead of the Curve on Oversight,
WALL ST. J., May 15, 2009, at Cl.
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to overseas financing operations." 2 4 0 And the OTC derivative market
has already testified to the general feasibility of a trade reporting
requirement. For example, the Depository Trust Clearing Corpora-
tion's (DTCC) Trade Information Warehouse is "the market's first
and only comprehensive trade database and centralized electronic
infrastructure for post-trade processing of OTC derivatives con-
tracts,"241 and is already in operation. As of August 3, 2009, DTCC
reported that because of such efforts "the goal of trying to ensure that
risk could be seen from a central vantage point at a central repository
has now been achieved for the CDS market." 2 4 2
Regulators, such as the SEC-CFTC joint venture this Article pro-
poses, should have the authority to increase margin/collateral and
capital requirements for firms with bilaterally cleared OTC derivatives.
Increased margin/ collateral and capital requirements should discour-
age excessive risk taking, which should decrease systemic risk. As a
prerequisite to OTC derivative trading, major market participants
should also be required to maintain certain minimal operating
standards. 243
C. Contending Regulatory Institutions
One of the two fundamental questions about reform of the regu-
lation of OTC derivative markets is: who? Which regulatory agencies
should have a starring role? As Professor John Coffee explains,
"Washington is a world in which it matters critically which agency is
empowered, and there are at least three agencies that are contending
in a kind of bureaucratic rebounding contest for enhanced power [of
the OTC derivative markets]: the Federal Reserve, the SEC, and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission." 244 While acknowledging
that arguments exist in favor of all three agencies, Coffee casts his vote
for the SEC, arguing that "the SEC has the best capacity for enforce-
ment. They are the most experienced and toughest of the enforce-
240 Jeffris, supra note 67.
241 See The Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., Trade Information Warehouse,
http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/suite/tradeinfo warehouse.php (last vis-
ited Feb. 18, 2010).
242 See Press Release, The Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., DTCC Values Addi-
tional CDS Contracts in Trade Information Warehouse at $5.7 Trillion (Aug. 3,
2009), available at http://www.dtcc.com/news/press/releases/2009/cds-contract_
values.php.
243 The concern here is to require market participants to internalize the totality of
their business cost, which includes back office operations.
244 PBS NewsHour, supra note 28 (statement ofJohn Coffee, Professor, Columbia
Law Sch.).
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ment agencies, and we need a good deal of that right now."2 4 5
Professor Lynn Stout distinguishes the case for the SEC versus the
CFTC:
The Commodities [sic] Futures Trading Commission . . . has
more of a history in regulating this kind of speculative derivatives
trading and is more experienced at it. The SEC traditionally has
taken more of a hands-off approach, simply requiring disclosure
and not getting too involved in how people actually do their
business.
But the SEC is the much larger agency, has lot more clout. So
you've got a smaller agency with less clout, but maybe more experi-
ence with this particular problem, going up against a much larger
agency that swings more weight. 246
The Federal Reserve currently plays one of the most important
regulatory roles in the OTC derivative markets since it regulates five
commercial banks, which are among the critical derivatives dealers:
"Five large commercial banks [J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America,
Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo ] represent 97% of the
total banking industry notional amounts [of OTC derivatives] and
88% of industry net current credit exposure."2 4 7 It also regulates
some of the most critical OTC derivative market infrastructures in the
United States, such as ICE US Trust, a CCP clearing house for CDS,
and Warehouse Trust Company, "a central trade registry for credit
default swap contracts . . . [which also offers] related services, includ-
ing the processing of life-cycle events for the contracts and facilitation
of payments settlement."*2 4
As I argue below, an SEC-CFTC joint venture should have a star-
ring role in regulating the OTC derivative markets. This arrangement
would represent a combination of their respective strengths and ame-
liorate the longstanding transaction costs associated with tensions
between these agencies. It should also decrease the moral hazard
associated with having a lender of last resort regulate critical OTC
derivatives market institutions and infrastructures.
245 Id.
246 Id. (statement of Lynn Stout, Professor, UCLA Sch. of Law).
247 OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRAD-
ING AND DERIVATIVEs ACTIVITIES, FOURTH QUARTER 2009, at 1 (2010), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/ 2010-33a.pdf.
248 Press Release, supra note 212.
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IV. FRAMEWORKS OF COOPERATION: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
APPROACHES TO INCREASE REGULATION OF THE
OTC DERIVATIVE MARKETS
Calls to regulate OTC derivative markets started many years and
crises ago. Ideally, OTC derivatives "reregulation"249 should be part
of comprehensive financial regulatory reform. And legal scholars cau-
tion against hasty regulatory reformS250 premised upon incomplete
understandings of the current financial crisis. While many important
regulatory reforms have been proposed, such as those discussed in
Part III, they fall short of constructing the linked domestic and inter-
national frameworks needed to successfully regulate the OTC deriva-
tive markets. Therefore, in this Part, I first suggest a domestic
framework of cooperation to improve regulation of the OTC deriva-
tive markets: a regulatory joint venture between the SEC and CFTC. I
then propose a system of international public-private regulatory part-
nerships as a way to promote the international frameworks of coopera-
tion needed to regulate the global OTC derivative markets. I then
link these domestic and international frameworks of cooperation.
Finally, I conclude by suggesting that my frameworks of cooperation
can be generalized and used to examine other regulatory issues in
financial markets such as sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investment.
A. Domestic Frameworks of Cooperation: A SEC-CFTC Joint Regulatory
Venture: The Derivatives Supervision Initiative
An incremental, domestic step designed to potentially harmonize
with any future financial regulatory agency reform is the creation of a
fully integrated SEC-CFTC joint venture, which I call the "Derivatives
Supervision Initiative" (DSI). Although this is an unprecedented reg-
ulatory form, as argued below, recent regulatory reform proposals sur-
rounding the creation of a new consumer protection agency provide
an interesting and important parallel. The DSI is the best approach
to the domestic component of OTC derivative markets regulation
since it is both an immediate, practical step capable of harmonization
with likely future comprehensive financial regulatory reforms and it
deftly combines the regulatory expertise of the SEC and CFTC, the
composite skill set necessary for the successful regulation of the OTC
derivative markets. It also leverages the SEC and CFTC's own recent
249 See POSNER, supra note 21, at 291.
250 See id. at 288; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or
Four Approaches to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Criis
Response, 78 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 39, 74-89 (2009) (discussing different proposals for
crisis response).
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recommendations for the harmonization of their individual regula-
tory approaches. My proposal actually instantiates several of the core
recommendations of the SEC and CFTC in their October 2009 report,
A joint Report of the SEC and the CFTC on Harmonization of Regulation251
(Joint Report), which was prompted by directives in the Treasury
Report. Although the Joint Report specifically omits addressing the
regulatory gaps in the OTC derivative markets, 252 the substance and
approach of its recommendations is nevertheless applicable to these
markets. The DSI, however, improves upon, streamlines, and ulti-
mately expands upon these recommendations. In this first subsec-
tion, I touch upon possible configurations of future financial
regulatory reform to show that the DSI easily harmonizes with various
arrangements, then briefly summarize specific task-force recommen-
dations of the Joint Report and explain why these recommendations,
in addition to other recent discussions and developments in financial
regulatory reform, support creation of the DSI with its comparable
advantages, then sketch and argue for the DSI, and finally address
several objections against it. In the end, the "reregulation" of the
OTC derivative markets can be thought of as a Coasian "make" or
"buy" decision. The domestic regulatory production process can be
undertaken by: (1) the SEC and/or CIFTC; (2) the SEC and/or CTFC
in conjunction with outsourcing to a third-party-such as the deci-
sionmakers already proposed to settle anticipated jurisdictional dis-
putes between these financial regulators; (3) the OTC derivative
markets can self-regulate-largely the current solution; or (4) the SEC
and CFTC can undertake a hybrid institutional solution, the DSI.
1. The DSI and Financial Regulatory Reform
Although a comprehensive discussion of financial regulatory
reform is beyond the scope of this Article, I support a gradual transi-
tion towards a modified "twin peaks" model of financial regulation in
the United States. Worldwide, various models of financial regulation
exist, but a few dominate. Professors Coffee and Sale explain that
" [f]inancial regulation in the major capital markets today follows one
of three basic organizational models: the functional/institutional
model, the consolidated financial services regulator model, and the
'twin peaks' model."2 5 3 The U.S. approach reflects a functional/insti-
tutional model, which means that regulation is based both upon the
specific type of financial institution and the function of a financial
251 SEC-CFTC, JoNT REPORT, supra note 231.
252 See id. at 2.
253 Coffee & Sale, supra note 140, at 717.
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product or market.2 5 4 Therefore, there is an insurance regulator for
insurance companies, banking regulators for banks, etc. As discussed
in Part II, however, this approach is increasingly problematic because
today's financial institutions engage in a variety of financial markets
and activities. The United Kingdom and Japan illustrate a consoli-
dated approach, which means there is one "super regulator," which
can take various configurations. 25 5 Finally, Australia and New Zealand
largely rely upon a "twin peaks" model, which consists of having two
primary financial regulators: a prudential regulator to ensure the
safety and soundness of financial institutions and a regulator focused
on "business conduct and consumer protection."256 In other words,
the twin peaks model largely takes an objective based approach, which
should minimize the possibility of regulatory arbitrage through either
manipulation of organizational form or financial instrument categori-
zations. And assuming the central bank is not also the prudential reg-
ulator, this approach should promote central bank independence. 257
In fact, some argue that the Federal Reserve's main responsibility
should be monetary policy.2 5 8 Coffee and Sale, however, suggest that
"the Federal Reserve or a similar agency"25 9 should undertake the task
of consolidated prudential supervisor and that the business conduct/
consumer protection role should be allocated to the SEC. 260
Although I largely agree with Coffee and Sales's recommenda-
tion, I think strong arguments support having the Federal Reserve
254 See e.g., Culp, supra note 126 (discussing both the differences between func-
tional and institutional regulation and the hybrid approach to financial regulation
taken by the United States).
255 For a discussion of the differences in Japan and the United Kingdom's
approach to consolidated financial regulation, see Jerry W. Markham, Super-Regulator:
A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, The
United Kingdom and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 319, 374-410 (2003).
256 Coffee & Sale, supra note 140, at 723.
257 Coffee and Sale explain that Michael Taylor, an academic central banker and
creator of the twin peaks model, "apparently feared that if the Bank of England
remained responsible for the prudential supervision of banks, its independence in
setting interest rates may be compromised by its fear that raising interest rates would
cause bank failures for which it would be blamed." Id. at 724. An independent cen-
tral bank is of paramount importance.
258 See Rachelle Younglai, US. Senate Panel Nears Agreement on Role of Fed, REUTERS,
Jan 6, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN053650820100106. The Federal
Reserve is currently tasked with several responsibilities, including monetary policy,
bank supervision, and consumer protection. For additional information on its various
roles, see Fed. Reserve Sys., Purposes and Functions, http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pf/pf.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
259 Coffee & Sale, supra note 140, at 782.
260 See id. at 717.
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focus on monetary policy. 261 The Federal Reserve is currently one of
the United States' most important banking regulators. But a critical
reality of today's financial markets is that credit markets are no longer
"bank-centric," but "securities-centric." 262 Therefore, bank-style
"runs" now threaten other types of financial institutions, 263 which
should also be the subject of prudential regulation. The risk of the
Federal Reserve acting as the prudential regulator for all financial
institutions is of the financial markets assuming that the federal safety
net will cover all such institutions.2 6 4 Financial markets will be partic-
ularly likely to make this assumption about any OTC derivative market
infrastructures for which the Federal Reserve has oversight authority.
Unfortunately, many are already assuming that central banks around
the world will "bailout" OTC derivative markets CCPs in times of cri-
sis. 265 This assumption is likely to be even stronger if the Federal
Reserve or another central bank is also a CCPs' primary banking
supervisor and regulator. Therefore, responsibility for the prudential
supervision of financial institutions should transition to a new consoli-
dated entity of current banking regulators.266
Responsibility for business conduct, market regulation and
enforcement, and consumer protection should be allocated to a sec-
ond regulatory entity. The DSI could constitute the core beginnings
of this institution by beginning with a focus on the OTC derivative
markets. Regulatory reform should occur gradually and cautiously.
Such reforms could begin with a consolidation of banking regulation
and supervision and later draw upon lessons learned from the crea-
tion and operation of the DSI in establishing the second consolidated
entity. But even if the United States never adopts a modified twin
peaks model, the design of the DSI is deliberately versatile: it can
stand alone or be absorbed into a multitude of regulatory institutional
configurations at a later date.
261 See, e.g., Younglai, supra note 258.
262 Brian G. Cartwright, Wither the SEC Now?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1085, 1094 (2009).
263 See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo
2 (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 09-14, 2009), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1440752.
264 SeeJoel Seligman, The SEC in a Time of Discontinuity, 95 VA. L. REV. 667, 677
(2009).
265 See supra note 212.
266 Note that Dodd's current bill advocates a minor consolidation of the banking
regulators, but earlier reports suggested a more radical transformation of banking
industry regulators. See, e.g., Younglai, supra note 258. -
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2. The SEC and CFTC's Joint Report and Current Reform
Proposals
Although comprehensive financial reform remains in the future,
the Joint Report is a recent effort of the SEC and CFTC focused on
harmonizing their regulatory approaches. The many recommenda-
tions of the Joint Report include legislation authorizing the creation
of three new joint committees: (1) a Joint Advisory Committee, (2) a
Joint Agency Enforcement Task Force, and (3) a Joint Information
Technology Task Force. The Joint Advisory Committee "would be
tasked with considering and developing solutions to emerging and
ongoing issues of common interest in the futures and securities mar-
kets."267 Specifically, the Joint Advisory Committee would "identify
emerging regulatory risks and assess and quantify their implications
for investors and other market participants, and provide recommen-
dations for solutions."2 68 The Joint Agency Enforcement Task force
would "harness synergies from shared market surveillance data,
improve market oversight, enhance enforcement, and relieve duplica-
tive regulatory burdexis." 269 Among its primary responsibilities would
be integrating the education, training, development, and agency rota-
tion of CFTC and SEC staff in addition to creating "enforcement and
examination standards and protocols, and [to] coordinate informa-
tion sharing."270 Finally, the Joint Information Technology Task force
would "pursue linking information on CFTC and SEC regulated per-
sons made available to the public and such other information as the
Commissions find jointly useful and appropriate in the public inter-
est."271 Nevertheless, and not surprisingly, despite recommending the
creation of these three joint entities, the Joint Report also
recommends
legislation that would provide a process for expedited judicial
review of jurisdictional matters regarding new products. Specifi-
cally, the SEC and the CFI'C support legislation to establish and
clarify: (i) legal certainty with respect to the agencies' authority over
products exempted by the other agency; and (ii) a review process to
ensure that any jurisdictional dispute is resolved by the Commis-
sions against a firm timeline. 272
267 SEC-CFIC, Joint Report, supra note 231, at 14.
268 Id. at 10.
269 Id. at 14.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 15.
272 Id. at 11.
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In sum, the Joint Report not only implicitly recognizes the need of a
permanent 'joint venture" between the SEC and the CFTC by recom-
mending the creation of at least three joint tasks forces, but it also
implicitly recognizes that their traditional tensions will continue. This
is problematic.
The DSI makes creation of these three interagency entities
unnecessary and facilitates the resolution of jurisdictional disputes.
The appointed tasks of these three joint entities could be, and should
be, accomplished by the DSI as the natural complement of its regula-
tion of the OTC derivative markets. Unlike the United States, most
countries task one regulator with securities and commodities market
regulation. 273 As should now be apparent by the problems of the
anomalous U.S. structure, there is good reason for the majority's
approach. It avoids a complicated, inept split of increasingly interre-
lated product markets, which has proved particularly problematic in
the financially engineered OTC derivative markets. Additionally, the
SEC and CFTC have important, complementary, but somewhat dis-
tinct skill sets which are all necessary to the proper regulation of the
OTC derivative markets. The institutional expertise of the SEC rests
primarily in disclosure, enforcement, and consumer protection. Its
responsibilities also include "market regulation, broker-dealer and
investment adviser regulation, new securities offerings, municipal and
governmental securities dealers."274 The CFTC's expertise lies prima-
rily in market regulation: "There is likely no regulator anywhere that
is as fluent and capable in understanding the mechanics of markets,
or as focused on their workings, as the CFTC."2 7 5 It is also responsible
for the "prudential regulation of financial institutions, and settlement
and trading practices."276 The Joint Report recognizes that agency
personnel need cross-training in the traditional skill sets of the SEC
and CFTC as both are arguably necessary for the robust regulation of
securities and commodities markets. Without doubt, both skill sets
are also necessary for the regulation of the OTC derivative markets.
In combining the traditional expertise of the SEC and the CFTC,
the DSI will ultimately enable objective based regulation of the OTC
derivative markets. This should significantly reduce the transaction
costs related to the problems of dividing regulation of the OTC deriv-
ative markets between the SEC and CFTC upon a product basis. An
273 See Coffee & Sale, supra note 140, 719-20; Seligman, supra note 264, at 679-80.
274 Seligman, supra note 264, at 675.
275 Steven M.H. Wallman, Commentary on Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have
a Better Idea, 95 VA. L. REv. 825, 833 (2009).
276 Fisch, supra note 102, at 795.
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unfortunate byproduct of U.S. product-based financial regulation has
been the creation of both regulatory gaps and incentives to harness
financial engineering to design products to evade regulation categori-
zation. By definition, the core of financial derivatives is financial engi-
neering. Former SEC Commissioner Steven Wallman explains that:
Various good and worthwhile derivatives products, for example,
might have fallen into an intricate web of conflicting rules from dif-
ferent regulators with presumptive authority. Because of that, two
things happened: some products were designed to remain outside
the regulatory system altogether and others were precluded from
being regulated by Congress after lobbying showed that, without an
exemption, the current regulatory structure likely would have been
deadly to their creation and offering. The result is a lack of over-
sight and regulation that has now led to significant problems. Had
the regulatory structure been better and more reasonable, the gap
allowing products to be designed to escape regulation would not
have existed, and Congress, presumably, would not have been so
easily convinced to exempt the others.2 7 7
Furthermore, as recounted in Part II, the ongoing historical ten-
sions between the SEC and CFTC consume regulatory resources,
increase market uncertainty, and have arguably even contributed to
decreased regulation of the OTC derivative markets. Continued
efforts to split regulatory authority of the OTC derivative markets
between these two financial regulators on a product basis, the path
most reforms anticipate, is simply untenable. Thirty years of history
testify that this "solution" is problematic. In fact, in addition to the
Joint Report's recommendation for the legislative establishment of a
judicial review process to resolve jurisdictional disputes, many other
reform proposals similarly explicitly anticipate the continuation of
these longstanding jurisdictional tensions and the need to introduce
third-party arbiters.27 8 Third-party intervention will do little to ame-
liorate these current problems, but it will add unnecessary layers of
regulation, increase legal uncertainty, and multiply transaction costs.
However, an inversion of this solution, such as the DSI, would consti-
tute a more streamlined, effective approach.
Two recent regulatory reform developments also argue for crea-
tion of the DSI. First, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2009,279 passed by the House of Representatives in
December 2009, mandates that the SEC and CFTC perform a "Study
of Desirability and Feasibility of Establishing Single Regulator For All
277 Wallman, supra note 275, at 831-32.
278 See supra note 212.
279 H.R. 4173, 111th Cong., (as passed by House, Dec. 11, 2009).
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Transactions Involving Financial Derivatives." 2 8 0 This provision likely
responds to the implicitly recognized need for unified regulation of
the OTC derivative markets. But a prolonged study is unnecessary
and will be costly. History tells us all we need to know. Second, the
proposed new consumer protection agency in Senator Dodd's regula-
tory reform bill, which recently passed the Senate Banking Commit-
tee, provides an important institutional parallel to support the
unprecedented regulatory form suggested by the DSI. Many regula-
tory agencies currently focus on consumer protection, but the Dodd
bill proposes to create a new consumer protection agency housed in
the Federal Reserve, the "Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
(Bureau)."281 The Director of the Bureau is to be appointed by the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Among its many
features, the Bureau will be independent, responsible for determining
its own budget (with an upper cap), have rule-making authority, the
power to create general policies for its executive and administrative
functions, and can be delegated certain powers by the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve. The Bureau will also coordinate with the
SEC, CFTC, and other regulatory agencies "to promote consistent reg-
ulatory treatment of consumer financial and investment products and
services."282 The structure of the proposed Bureau strongly suggests
that although unprecedented, the structure and powers of the DSI
should be congressionally unproblematic.
3. The DSI: A Sketch
The institutional design of the DSI should maximize the respec-
tive regulatory strengths and knowledge bases of both the SEC and
the CFTC, but insure equal participation, that is, "to jointly form,
fund and operate."283 It should have three objectives that depend
upon and combine the traditional strengths of the SEC and CFTC:
disclosure-based regulation, market integrity and surveillance, and
enforcement. As explained in Part II, most OTC derivatives are cur-
rently excluded or exempted from the CFTC's or the SEC's jurisdic-
tion as a result of the CFMA. Congress should give the DSI
comprehensive regulatory jurisdiction of all current and future OTC
derivatives based upon underlying assets such as "physical commodi-
ties (e.g., agricultural products, metals, or petroleum), financial
280 Id. § 3005.
281 See Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong.
282 Id. § 1015.
283 SEC-CFTC, JoINT REPORT, supra note 231, at 14. In addition to congressional
authorization, Congress would also need to increase its budget.
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instruments (e.g., debt and interest rate instruments or equity securi-
ties), indexes (e.g., based on interest rates or securities prices), for-
eign currencies, or spreads between the value of such assets."28 4
A sketch of the DSI's organizational structure should include gov-
ernance by a committee of five members (Commissioner Committee).
This should include two Commissioners of different political parties
from each the SEC and the CFTC in addition to an outside member,
with significant regulatory experience in banking, appointed by the
President and with the advice and consent of the Senate.2 8 5 The Com-
missioner Committee members would facilitate coordination and
sharing of information, particularly that necessary for identifying any
market manipulations among interrelated cash, OTC and exchange
markets. For example, Sumitomo used both exchanges and OTC
markets to manipulate copper markets. 28 6 The DSI should be staffed
by comparable numbers of periodically rotated employees from the
CFTC and the SEC in addition to new, permanent hires. Such mea-
sures will facilitate melding the diverse institutional cultures of the
SEC and CFTC.
284 Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act, 63
Fed. Reg. 26114 (May 12, 1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 34-35). This quote
merely offers a suggested way of defining the derivatives for which the DSI would have
jurisdiction. In order to capture future financial innovations in OTC derivative mar-
kets, such definition inherently requires an element of flexibility. An interesting par-
allel can be seen in J. Christopher Kojima's discussion of the inclusiveness of the
"investment contract" language of the securities laws for capturing various OTC deriv-
atives. Kojima, supra note 189, at 293-305. He argues that, "[iln many instances,
therefore, the investment contracts analysis provides a mechanism through which
OTC derivatives may fall within the scope of the securities laws." Id. at 304.
285 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States . . . ."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1975) (per curiam) ("[A] ny
appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is
an 'Officer of the United States,' and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner
prescribed by [the Appointments Clause]."). Also, based upon longstanding
Supreme Court jurisprudence surrounding the nondelegation clause, it is unlikely
that any delegation issues under Article I of the Constitution would exist as long as
Congress provided an "intelligible principle" to any discretion it delegated. See e.g.,
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) ("In the history of the
Court we have found the requisite 'intelligible principle' lacking in only two statutes,
one of which provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the
other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no
more precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring "'fair
competition.'").
286 See Born, supra note 19, at 624.
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Congress should require all major market participantS287 in the
OTC derivative markets to register with the DSI. This requirement
could be streamlined for participants already registered with either
the SEC or CFTC. The DSI's market surveillance activities should
focus on the prevention of market fraud, manipulation, and irregular-
ities. As further developed below, the DSI should also have supervi-
sion authority and regulatory oversight of all significant OTC
derivative market infrastructures such as CCP clearing facilities288 and
trade repositories.
Coordinated disclosure, market surveillance, and enforcement
activities in OTC derivative markets are best accomplished by a single
regulator. This should be the DSI. The presence of multiple primary
regulators of the OTC derivative markets creates opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage, costly and unnecessary regulatory overlap, patch-
work understandings of information, and poor, if any, coordination
among regulators. As discussed in Part IV.B, strong arguments exist
for global CCP clearinghouses and global trade repositories. As also
discussed in Part IV.B, the DSI should coordinate the U.S. interna-
tional regulatory efforts related to such institutions.
The DSI also provides opportunities for regulatory learning and
experimentation. In discussing possible transitions in financial regu-
lation, Coffee and Sale suggest a probable need for a period of trial
and experimentation.2 8 9 The DSI would facilitate essential knowledge
acquisition, trial, and experimentation in at least two ways. First, it
would be a learning laboratory providing insights applicable to likely
future financial regulatory consolidation. Second, it would integrate
distinct regulatory cultures, knowledge, and expertise, an immediate
and necessary task as indicated by the Joint Report. Similar to the
Joint Report's recommendations, legal scholars have also suggested
institutional rotation for financial regulators to increase their exper-
tise and career satisfaction.290 For all of the above reasons, Congress
should pass legislation establishing a fully integrated, joint venture,
the DSI, to regulate the OTC derivative markets and to provide a vehi-
cle for implementing the substance of the joint task forces recom-
mended in the Joint Report.
287 Congress should give the DSI authority to define "major market participants,"
but require that this be an activity level definition rather than one related to legal
structure.
288 Congress %,ill need to amend the CFMA.
289 See Coffee & Sale, supra note 140, at 783.
290 See generally POSNER, supra note 21, at 289-90 (describing the inefficiency and
fragmentation of regulatory authority).
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4. The DSI: Potential Objections
The strongest arguments against comprehensive regulation of
the OTC derivative markets by the proposed DSI are political
infeasibility, regulatory inefficiency, and additional legal uncertainty.
First, it could be argued that the DSI is politically infeasible because of
likely opposition by the SEC and CFTC and their respective congres-
sional oversight committees.29' Specifically, merging the SEC and
CFTC has proven politically untenable in the past and there is no rea-
son to expect that the DSI would fare any better. But it is important
to recognize many current regulatory reforms suggest naming a third
party to resolve anticipated disputes between the SEC and CFTC. If
Congress passes legislation reforming the OTC derivative markets and
if such regulatory reforms split jurisdiction of the OTC derivative mar-
kets between the SEC and CFTC on a product basis, Congress will
likely also designate a third-party umpire mechanism. Both financial
regulators might ultimately prefer retaining, albeit by combination,
final decisionmaking authority through an egalitarian DSI structure
rather than abdicating their ultimate decision making authority to a
separate third-party. Second, the Joint Report explicitly recognizes
the urgent need for various joint "task forces." Designing and
designating one entity as a permanent, joint "task force" with equal
participation from each agency would be simpler and more effective.
Finally, if both agencies recognize the importance of a joint approach
to harmonize the regulation of securities and commodities markets,
they should recognize that this approach is even more important in
markets based upon financial engineering, the OTC derivative
markets.
A second possible objection is that the DSI would create unneces-
sary additional layers of regulation which would be costly and ineffi-
cient. First, the regulatory inefficiencies and costs of prolonged
jurisdictional disputes between the SEC and CFTC can be expected to
continue and possibly increase. The DSI would minimize, if not elimi-
nate, such costs. It would also make costly studies unnecessary. Sec-
ond, it is unlikely that any inefficiencies and costs related to the DSI
would exceed those of an alternative third party decision maker. In
fact, they should be much less because it is highly unlikely that a third-
party decision maker would have the costly and complex knowledge
expertise of the DSI. It would be very costly and highly redundant for
291 See, e.g., Seligman, supra note 264, at 673-74 (arguing that one reason pro-
posed mergers of the SEC-CFTC have been politically unfeasible is because of consid-
erations related to congressional committee oversight). A joint congressional
committee task-force could be formed to overcome such resistance.
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a third party decision maker to acquire the necessary knowledge of
OTC markets and institutions to address jurisdictional and related
issues. Furthermore, any costs incurred by the DSI could significantly
decrease future costs that could be incurred if necessary comprehen-
sive financial regulatory reform occurs. This is due not only to the
partial consolidation that the DSI could effect, but also to the learning
about regulatory consolidation gained from its creation and opera-
tion. Any arguments that tension among the DSI and the SEC and
CFTC would increase costs are equally applicable to any third party
decision maker designed to resolve their disputes. Such costs, how-
ever, are likely to be less in the case of the DSI because of its close
interrelationship with these regulators due to overlapping Commis-
sioners and employees.
Finally, the argument could be made that the creation of the DSI
could create additional legal uncertainty concerning whether an OTC
derivative was regulated by the SEC, the CFTC or the DSI. First, as
already explained, some legal uncertainty already exists and it is likely
to remain, if not increase, if the SEC and CFTC have increased juris-
diction over these markets, but continue splitting their jurisdiction
based upon product categorization. In fact, the DSI should decrease
legal uncertainty because it will have regulatory jurisdiction over
essentially all OTC derivatives not traded on CFTC or SEC regulated
exchanges. This should actively decrease legal uncertainty surround-
ing the creation of new OTC derivatives and not act as a disincentive
to productive financial innovation.
B. International Frameworks of Cooperation
One consequence of the financial crisis is that "' [t]here is defi-
nitely a recognition among regulators and central banks that we need
a new macro-prudential apparatus to address systemic risk."' 292 OTC
derivatives are a primary contributor to global systemic risk and com-
mentators argue that localized regulation can sometimes even add to
this systemic risk.2 9 3 In the United States, reform proposals generally
advocate international coordination. But they generally fail to pro-
pose substantial solutionS294 or offer conceptual frameworks for think-
292 Joel Clark, OTC Trade Repository Plan Faces Hurdles, RISK.NET, May 20, 2009,
http://www.risknews.net/public/showPage.html?page=858359 (quoting Andrew
Haldane, Exec. Dir. of Financial Stability, Bank of Eng.).
293 See Jeffrey B. Golden, The Courts, the Financial Crisis and Systemic Risk, 4 CAP.
MARKETS L.J. S141, S144-48 (2009).
294 Note that Peterson and Frank's Draft Principles, supra note 230, suggest that
the U.S. Treasury take certain actions against banks from countries with lesser regula-
tory standards.
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ing about this critical challenge. And although international
regulatory groups such as the OTC Derivatives Regulators' Forum 29 5
(DRF) have recently arisen, commentators are already remarking that
"cracks are emerging in [the] transatlantic approach to reform." 2 9 6
Therefore, the second part of my frameworks of cooperation
approach proposes international public-private governance partner-
ships to coordinate regulation of the OTC derivative markets. As I
discuss, developments surrounding three OTC market infrastruc-
tures-CCP clearing, trade repositories, and global adjudication sys-
tems-make the issue of global regulatory solutions urgent. In this
section, I first describe several regulatory challenges in the OTC deriv-
ative markets motivating my public-private partnership framework
solution: the difficulty for local regulators in regulating inherently
global financial markets; the problems created by local regulators in
trying to solve this issue by "localizing" such global markets, particu-
larly in relation to existing or developing OTC derivative market infra-
structures; and the problem of transaction costs in coordinating
international government solutions, but the corresponding compara-
tive advantages of private actors, such as ISDA, in implementing such
global coordination through private contracting mechanisms, ena-
bling the creation of private global governance solutions. I then sug-
gest that in combining descriptions in the literature of international
public-private partnerships with both regulatory concepts from inter-
national law and economics and contracting theories arguably facili-
tating the instantiation in practice of such hybrid partnerships,
including their maintenance through equilibrium mechanisms, my
model of public-private governance partnerships to regulate the
global OTC derivative markets arises.
1. Background Descriptions
a. The Problem of Local Regulation of Global Financial
Markets
The regulation of OTC derivative markets is an international col-
lective action problem, but no global financial regulator exists to rem-
edy this challenge. Collective action problems are endemic to
domestic regulations addressing global financial markets because cap-
295 See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., A Global Framework for Regula-
tory Cooperation on OTC Derivative CCPs and Trade Repositories (Sept. 24, 2009),
available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/news/markets/2009/ma090924.html.
296 See Tom Braithwaite et al., Cracks are Emerging in Transatlantic Approach to
Reform, FT.com, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ad574f78-fa62-11de-beed-
00144feab49a.html.
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ital is highly mobile and can relocate to preferred regulatory jurisdic-
tions. As Professors Erin O'Hara and Larry Ribstein explain, financial
market participants "in effect, can shop for law, just as they do for
other goods. This can occur domestically or internationally, where
limiting the downsides of the market competition is much more prob-
lematic. Nations and states must take this 'law market' into account
when they create new laws."29 7 They define the "law market" as the
"ways that governing laws can be chosen by people and firms rather
than mandated by states."298 In other words, law can be viewed as a
commoditizable product offered by government actorS299 and this
"law market" competition imposes inherent limits on regulators.300 In
sum, no individual jurisdiction can successfully enact unilateral
reforms of global OTC derivative markets.
b. The Problem of Local Market Infrastructures
And although individual jurisdictions can implement OTC deriv-
ative market infrastructures such as CCP clearing facilities and trade
repositories, a local approach is problematic in these areas. OTC
derivative market infrastructures such as CCP clearinghouses, trade
repositories, and adjudicatory systems need global scope-which
requires global regulation-as I discuss below.
In theory, CCP clearing facilities are market infrastructures that
reduce risk and provide additional market transparency. When an
OTC derivative is cleared through a CCP, the CCP becomes the buyer
to the seller and the seller to the buyer through a process of trade
novation. Because the CCP becomes a counterparty to each trade, it
concentrates credit risk. A banker aptly explained that this is "'like
the military putting all its artillery shells in a single dump.' "301 There-
fore, a CCP clearing market infrastructure, which potentially
decreases risk management efficacy, should be avoided. Regulations
mandating local CCP clearing of OTC derivatives, however, carry this
potential implication for market safety, regulatory access, and local
economies. Such regulations also raise jurisdictional issues generally
absent from reform proposals. Regulatory mandates of local CCP
clearing physically localize transactions once largely global, which
then subject these transactions to local regulation. Therefore, man-
297 O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, at 3.
298 Id. at 65.
299 See id. at 66.
300 See id. at 7.
301 The Great Untangling, EcoNoMisT, Nov. 8, 2008, at 85, 86 (quoting an unnamed
banker).
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dating local CCP clearing has both global regulatory and political
implications. 302 The CDS markets, which have received regulators'
initial focus because of their role in the financial crisis, are already
providing a ready example of potential international regulatory and
political tensions. For example, France's central bank has specifically
called for E.U.-based CCP clearing to avoid business losses to either
New York or London.303 E.U. regulators have "encouraged" Euro-
pean CDS dealers to use local CCP clearing facilities or face possible
legislative mandates.30 4 U.S. regulators have also exerted pressure on
U.S. CDS dealers to use CCPs.3 05 Not surprisingly, multiple CCP
clearing facilities for CDS now exist in the United States and Euro-
pean Union. But it is not clear this is an encouraging development.
Although the CDS CCP clearing infrastructure is developing locally,
the relevant risks are global.306 Both academics and industry are con-
cerned that localized or multiple clearing facilities could ultimately
decrease the efficacy of CCP risk management.307 Traders insist that
"[i]t doesn't matter where the clearinghouse is based, as long as it's in
one place . . . . If your purpose is to reduce systemic risk, it makes
sense to have one clearinghouse."3 0 8 And local CCP clearing risks
local taxpayer bailouts of global counterparties-as happened in the
case of AIG-if a local CCP becomes insolvent. It will also create
strong incentives for financial market participants to use CCP clearing
infrastructures in "bail-out friendly" countries because of the implicit
financial subsidy market participants would receive.
302 See David Gow, France, Germany and Britain Battle for Primacy in $28tn Derivatives
Trade, GuARDIAN.CO.UK, Feb. 19, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/
feb/19/cds-european-clearing-deal.
303 Shannon D. Harrington & John Rega, Banks Agree to EU Demand for Credit-Swaps
Clearing, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 19, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=newsarchive&sid=auumhRn9Udmo.
304 See Alex Chambers et al., Credit Derivatives: Big Bang to Avert Blow-Up,
EUROMONEY, Mar. 4, 2009, at 21.
305 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and other regulators periodi-
cally meet with the OTC derivatives industry to discuss industry reform objectives. In
turn, the OTC derivative markets industry periodically provides the FRBNY with "com-
mitment letters" describing its progress in such areas. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed.
Reserve Bank of N.Y., New York Fed Welcomes Further Industry Commitments on
Over-the-Counter Derivatives (Mar. 1, 2010), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
newsevents/news/markets/2010/mal 00301.html.
306 See Alex Chambers, Credit Derivatives: OTC CDS Clearing Moves Ahead,
EUROMONEY, Aug. 3, 2009, at 28.
307 See, e.g., Duffie & Hu, supra note 87, at 37 (noting potential drawbacks to multi-
ple CCP clearing facilities).
308 Neil Shah, EU Derivatives Revamp Puts Bankers on Edge, WALL ST. J., July 3-5,
2009, at C2 (quoting a derivatives trader).
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For such reasons, a global CCP clearing infrastructure is neces-
sary. A primary challenge of a global CCP clearing infrastructure,
however, will be its regulation. But regulation mandating a local
approach is unlikely to avoid this international complexity, especially
if CCPs in the United States and European Union have common cor-
porate ownership. For example, the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE)
has CCP clearing subsidiaries in the United States and Europe, ICE-
Trust, and ICE-Trust Europe, respectively. Common corporate own-
ership facilitates creation of a global clearing network among private
actors. This is likely to occur as "[b]anks and other traders would
benefit from having to provide less capital at different clearing
houses."309 Therefore, a de facto global CCP clearing infrastructure
will likely arise regardless of whether government actors adopt a uni-
fied global approach to regulation. Designing regulation for a global
approach is challenging, but regulation of a de facto system, especially
in the event of insolvency, is likely to be even more arduous.
Global OTC derivative markets also require global trade reposito-
ries. Trade repositories are market infrastructures that store recorded
trade position data. Global trade repositories would provide a com-
prehensive snapshot of markets to regulators and aid them in identify-
ing possible systemic threats. A few global trade repositories already
exist such as DTCC's Trade Information Warehouse for CDS. Unfor-
tunately, however, the international tensions surrounding the devel-
opment of global CCP clearing likewise exist with trade
repositories.310 For example, Spain recently announced plans to
establish an OTC trade repository "in a surprise move . . . that looks
set to fuel concerns on both sides of the Atlantic over the growth of
such post-trade services."31 Similar to the case of local CCP clearing,
local trade repositories are potentially problematic as "multiple repos-
itories could do more harm than good."3 12 A common perspective is
that "[i]f a central trade repository is bound by institutional or
national boundaries, it will probably miss the bigger problems."3 1 3 In
sum, "[e]veryone agrees derivatives are an international cross-border
market, so any trade repository should be globally co-ordinated. The
ultimate objective is that supervisors look properly at risk exposures
309 Harrington & Rega, supra note 303.
310 There are also technical issues associated with the establishment of global
trade repositories, but these are beyond the scope of this Article.
311 Jeremy Grant, Spain to Launch OTC Trade Repository, FT.com, Nov. 4, 2009,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/efda4cda-c8e2-11de-8f9d-00144feabdcO.html.
312 Clark, supra, note 292.
313 Id. (quoting Andrew Haldane, Exec. Dir. of Financial Stability, Bank of Eng.).
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across borders." 3 1 4 But global trade repositories also face the chal-
lenge of global regulation.315
A third OTC derivative market infrastructure requiring a global
rather than local approach is cross-border financial courts.316 Com-
plex financial litigation, such as that sometimes arising with OTC
derivatives, is challenging for traditional judicial systems. Conse-
quently, "senior figures in the financial world are looking for solu-
tions" to this challenge, including advocating a "specialist, cross-
border financial court."3 17 As with global CCP clearing and trade
repositories, strong arguments exist for global adjudicatory mecha-
nisms. First, "a 'tsunami' of financial markets litigation"318 arising
from the financial crisis is likely. Second, such cases increasingly rest
upon complex financial issues rather than traditional and judicially
familiar legal concepts such as contract formation.319 Third, as noted
above, the widely used standard form contracts for OTC derivatives
trading are arguably akin to statutes. Therefore, individual judicial
decisions could potentially have systemic significance.320 In sum:
Concerns are growing that the present, decentralized way of adjudi-
cating financial market disputes is unnecessarily slow, expensive and
unpredictable, and failing to produce a settled and authoritative
body of relevant law. As a result there is impetus to think more cre-
atively about dispute settlement in the global financial markets and
ways to ensure a ready supply of competent jurists equipped to han-
dle effectively the cases arising.3 21
But here too, the challenging issue of global regulatory cooperation
anses.
In conclusion, strong arguments exist for the creation of global
market infrastructures and because of possible regulatory arbitrage,
no individual jurisdiction can successfully enact unilateral reforms of
global OTC derivative markets. Furthermore, government actors
should welcome global CCP clearing, trade repositories, and adjudica-
314 Joel Clark, Counterparty Maze, RISK, June 1, 2009, at 18, 21 (quoting Richard
Metcalfe, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n).
315 See id. at 20-21. Note that the recently established Derivatives Regulators'
Forum (DRF) was "formed to provide regulators with a means to cooperate, exchange
views and share information related to OTC derivatives CCPs and trade repositories."
Press Release, supra note 295.
316 Golden, supra note 293, at S148.
317 Tett, supra note 36 (mentioning a suggestion by Jeffrey Golden, a prominent
derivatives lawyer).
318 Golden, supra note 293, at S142.
319 Id. at S143-44.
320 Id. at S149.
321 Id. at S141 (emphasis added).
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tory structures for at least four reasons. First, government actors stand
to increase their regulatory jurisdiction in previously inaccessible
international realms. As discussed below, individual government
actors have limited "regulatory asset bundles," but when bundle com-
ponents with comparative advantage are deftly combined with com-
plementary "regulatory asset components" of consolidated global
private actors, their reach is extended. Professor Jody Freeman sug-
gests that domestically "public-private contracts could be a means of
extending government priorities and policies to private actors, and of
exacting concessions and gains that might otherwise be beyond the
government's regulatory reach."322 Her insights can be extended to
the international arena; public-private partnerships in the OTC deriv-
ative markets arguably create such opportunities in global financial
markets that are otherwise beyond the reach of any individual govern-
ment actor. Second, government actors should be concerned about
"too big to fail" CCP insolvencies occurring in their local jurisdiction.
An important benefit of global infrastructures regulated by interna-
tional public-private partnerships is that OTC derivative market par-
ticipants should be much less certain of government bailouts, and
therefore, more prudent about their risk taking activities. This uncer-
tainty should incentivize market participants to maintain highly robust
risk-management practices. Third, the information deficiencies of
local trade repositories limit their potential efficacy to regulators.
Fourth, local adjudicatory approaches to complex international finan-
cial issues could increase systemic risk and likely will be increasingly
replaced by alternative private market solutions.
2. The Problem of Transaction Cost
In the above discussion, I argue that the OTC derivative markets
need global regulation. This section discusses why because of transac-
tion costs the best global regulatory solution involves both govern-
ment and private actors: a system of public-private regulatory
partnerships. Transaction costs are "the costs of measuring the multi-
ple dimensions of the goods and legal rights being exchanged in an
economic transaction and the costs of enforcing these rights."32 3
These costs entail "time, energy and money" and can be generally cat-
egorized as costs related to "search, information, negotiation, and
322 Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 159 (2000).
323 John N. Drobak, Law & The New Institutional Economics: Introduction, 26 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2008).
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enforcement."3 2 4 The transaction costs of negotiating, implementing,
and enforcing coordinated regulatory solutions among individual gov-
ernment actors in the complex, continuously innovative, and uncer-
tain OTC derivative markets are stupefying. Given such transaction
costs, what type of international institutional arrangement could best
regulate the OTC derivative markets? Possible contenders include an
international treaty, an international regulatory network, and an inter-
national system of public-private regulatory partnerships.
Traditional paths of international governmental cooperation
such as treaties are time consuming and will likely be outdated upon
implementation due to the pace of financial innovation. The reality is
that "[regulators may attempt to reevaluate regularly and to revisit
their rules to accommodate economic reality and change; but in areas
where multi-agency coordination is required-especially across
national borders, as with the Basel Accord-the lag between financial
innovation and regulatory amendments will not be insignificant."3 2 5
And international law scholars, such as Professor John Murphy, note a
trend away from formal international agreements, such as treaties,
towards more informal, flexible arrangements.3 2 6 But neither is a
flexible network of international regulators3 2 7 a suitable alternative
because of the transaction costs of requisite knowledge and expertise
acquisition without an explicit, permanent partnership structure
involving private actors.32 8 For these reasons, I explore the possibility
of public-private partnerships to regulate global OTC derivative
markets.
324 Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DuKE L.J. 821, 839
(2008).
325 Kojima, supra note 189, at 290.
326 See JOHN F. MURPHY, THE EVOLVING DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-4
(2010).
327 See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Informa-
tion Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041, 1042 (2003) (pro-
posing to "develop a typology of . . . transgovernmental regulatory networks" and
evaluating common criticisms of such networks); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the
Global Economy Through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 177 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) (advocating for regulation of an "increasingly
global economy" through a system of international government networks).
328 For example, a report of the Financial Services Authority and HM Treasury
state, in regard to certain regulatory questions such as to the meaning of standardiza-
tion, that "[r]egulators alone are not equipped to make these decisions" and recom-
mends that regulators and industry work together. FIN. SERVS. AUTH. & HM
TREASURY, REFORMING OTC DERIVATIVE MARKETS § 3.7 (2009), available at http://
www.fsagov.uk/pubs/other/reformotcderivatives.pdf.
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A helpful methodology to explore why public-private partner-
ships could best regulate OTC derivative markets is transaction cost
economics (TCE), an approach originated by Ronald Coase and made
popular by Oliver Williamson.329 In general, TCE argues that institu-
tional arrangements/organizations respond to the coordination costs
contracting parties confront in economic or political markets. The
methodology's "unit of analysis is the contract or transaction," 3 o
which conveniently "places firms and regulatory mechanisms on a sin-
gle scale of analysis."33 1 Therefore, TCE can be used to analyze both
government and private actors. TCE is a helpful methodology for this
Article's suggestion of public-private regulatory partnerships because
it "poses the problem of economic organization as a problem of con-
tracting."33 2 And when TCE is applied to government actors, it can
likewise pose the problem of political organization, domestically or
internationally, as a contracting problem. Legal scholars have applied
Coase's paradigmatic idea of the make (firm) or buy (market) pro-
duction decision to analyze outsourcing decisions by the government
to the private sector domestically.333 Administrative law scholarship
has suggested that both Congress and administrative agencies con-
front a "make" or "buy" decision in determining the boundaries of
various regulatory institutions.33 4 In other words, government agen-
cies can provide goods, services, or regulation (all "make" decisions)
or outsource this production decision to the private sector (a "buy"
decision).
TCE is particularly suited for analyzing international questions
because it "maintains that the governance of contractual relations is
primarily effected through the institutions of private ordering rather
than through legal centralism."3 3 5 International regulatory coordina-
tion ultimately consists of a "private ordering" of public actors. Profes-
sor William Aceves argues that "[t] he principles of transaction cost
economics apply with equal rigor at the international level."336 He
argues that "[1] ike firms engaged in private contractual relations,
329 See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONoMicA 386 (1937).
330 Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microa-
nalysis of Institutions, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1393, 1413 (1996).
331 Id. at 1415.
332 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE EcONOMIc INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 20 (1985).
333 See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389,
391-95 (2003) (using transaction cost analysis to compare the relative merits of gov-
ernment employees and private actors in regulatory roles).
334 See, e.g., id. at 395 (noting that government institution face the same 'make-or-
buy' decision faced by private actors).
335 WILLIAMSON, supra note 332, at xii.
336 Aceves, supra note 30, at 1016.
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states are involved in the negotiation and implementation of contrac-
tual arrangements. These arrangements are also subject to transac-
tion costs."3 3 7 These transaction costs, however, present a "significant
limitation to the development and operation of international institu-
tions . ."338 One consequence of this, therefore, is that interna-
tional agreements are "incomplete." In fact, scholars have analyzed
the Basel Accord as an "incomplete contract."339 Aceves suggests that
state practice, a "fundamental principle of international law" can act
as an "endogenous governance structures" to overcome these transac-
tion costs.3 40 He explains that "state practice allows states to interpret
or even modify their original agreements through subsequent prac-
tice, thereby diminishing the need to draft extensive agreements at
the outset. Additionally, states maintain the flexibility necessary to
address new circumstances as they arise while remaining grounded
within the context of their original agreement."341 As discussed
below, my system of public-private partnerships incorporates this
flexibility.
As Aceves describes, transaction costs are an impediment to inter-
national cooperation among government actors. But transaction costs
can have the opposite effect on private market actors and catalyze
widespread international cooperation. Particularly in financial mar-
kets, transaction costs incentivize and facilitate the formation of global
private law and governance mechanisms. For example, the ISDA, the
global trade association of the OTC derivative markets, is arguably a
highly efficient institutional response to such global transaction
costs. 342 Aceves suggests that "[i]nternational institutions play an
important role in establishing cooperation among states, even in a
decentralized world."3 4 3 I argue that private international institutions
(private actors) such as ISDA can facilitate cooperative global regula-
tory structures otherwise highly problematic for government actors
because of transaction costs. ISDA, a global private actor, has argua-
bly implicitly begun this task by its creation of a global private law for
337 Id. at 1003.
338 Id. at 1002.
339 See Edward J. Kane, Basel II: A Contracting Perspective 8-10 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12,705, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=945345.
340 Aceves, supra note 30, at 1004.
341 Id. at 1005.
342 For more information about the history of ISDA, see Sean M. Flanagan, The
Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211, 227-53 (2001).
343 Aceves, supra note 30, at 1064.
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OTC derivatives, self-help mechanisms, and increasingly, adjudicatory
mechanisms.
a. ISDA: The Global Industry Association of the OTC
Derivative Markets
ISDA describes itself as:
the largest global financial trade association .... [It] has over 830
member institutions from 56 countries on six continents. These
members include most of the world's major institutions that deal in
privately negotiated derivatives, as well as many of the businesses,
governmental entities, investment managers and other end users
that rely on over-the-counter derivatives to manage efficiently the
financial market risks inherent in their core economic activities.34 4
It has developed extensive standardized documentation used by most
OTC market participants.3 4 5 Through its standardized documenta-
tion, ISDA has created the "global rules" of the OTC derivative mar-
kets. It has also developed highly effective and rapid "legislative"
344 H. Financial Services Comm. Hearing, supra note 13, at 176 (statement of Robert
Pickel, Chief Exec. Officer, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n).
345 For an excellent introduction to explanation of ISDA's standard form docu-
mentation, see ALLEN & OVERY LLP, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DOcUMENTATION OF
OTC DERIVATIVES (2002), available at http://www.isda.org/educat/pdf/ten-themes.
pdf. As this material discusses, the design of ISDA's standard form documentation
incorporates a "modular architecture," which allows counterparties to enter into a
standard form "Master Agreement" detailing the general legal and credit arrange-
ments to which they have agreed. Id. at 1-2. The language of the Master Agreement
anticipates the incorporation of a "Schedule," and additional agreements such as a
"Credit Annex," "Confirmations," and possible other transactions. See id. at 2-5.
ISDA documentation generally includes express choice of law, choice of jurisdiction,
and arbitration provisions. Omitting such provisions can mean ending up in a for-
eign court. See Robert Cookson & Sundeep Tucker, Morgan Stanley Faces Court Battle
in China Over Hedging Contract, FT.com, Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
e222bdla-c3f7-lde-8de6-00144feab49a.html. Confirmations are contracts that detail
the economic terms of an individual trade. After entering into their foundational
agreements, the counterparties can easily make future trades with one another by
simply entering into a confirmation. The "genius" of ISDA's "modular architecture"
is that counterparties only need to negotiate the general legal terms of their relation-
ship (contained in the Master Agreement Schedule, which is part of the Master Agree-
ment itself, but it is a separate form that allows the parties to customize the terms of
their relationship as the language of the Master Agreement itself should never be
altered) and possibly a Credit Support Annex, (to collateralize one or both parties'
obligations under the Master Agreement) and then individually document the eco-
nomic terms of each trade with a confirmation. Without such an arrangement, every
time counterparties wanted to trade, they would have to negotiate every term of their
relationship-a process that would be incredibly time consuming and expensive,
resulting in fewer transactions and lower liquidity levels.
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reform processes through its protocols, self-help mechanisms through
its collateral practices, and increasingly, global adjudicative mecha-
nisms through Credit Derivative Determination Committees. As a
global private actor, ISDA has replicated in varying degrees the basic
jurisdictional powers-prescriptive, adjudicatory, and enforce-
ment3 46-of government actors. Therefore, ISDA is more than just an
industry trade association.3 4 7 It performs a very important private law
making and governance function in the OTC derivative markets.
b. Global Private Law and Global OTC Derivative Markets 3 4 8
Law is not always made by public entities. Much law is privately
made. Professor David Snyder terms privately made law a "robust
component of commercial and consumer life"3 49 and "unavoidable
now-a political fact we would do well to recognize."3 50  Snyder
explains that "in various commercial contexts, as a practical matter,
the lawmaking function has been partially reallocated from the gov-
ernment."35 1 This reallocation is particularly evident in the global
OTC derivative markets. The global OTC derivative markets are
arguably "the embodiment of global private law"35 2 and a market that
"has no territory."353 Professor Annelise Riles defines "global private
law regimes" as systems that "do not rely primarily on the legitimacy or
the coercive power of the state for their authority."3 5 4
346 See Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 30, at 22-28.
347 In fact, Adam Glass, former partner at Linklaters LLP and now a senior official
in the SEC's new division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation has compared
certain of ISDA's features to those of a "public utility" and recommends that regula-
tors "listening in to" certain ISDA meetings and conference calls. Adam Glass, Helpful
Hints for the New Derivatives Regulators, FINREG21.com, Aug. 31, 2009, http://www.
finreg2l.com/lombard-street/helpful-hints-new-derivatives-regulators. Somewhat
related to this, Emilios Avgouleas argues that "bringing ISDA's rule-making function
under some kind of global public interest oversight should be seen as a desirable
inevitability." Emilios Avgouleas, Financial Innovation Versus Systemic Stability: The
Unresolved Dilemma of Derivatives Regulation?, FINREG21.com, Aug. 31, 2009, http://
www.finreg2l.com/lombard-street/financial-innovation-versus-systemic-stability-the-
unresolved-dilemma-derivatives-reg.
348 Questions about the exact nature of the state, global private law or the
symbiotic relationship between these legal regimes are beyond the scope of this
Article.
349 David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 Omo Sr. L.J. 371, 374 (2003).
350 Id.
351 Id. at 377.
352 SrEIL & HINDS, supra note 57, at 30.
353 Id. at 31.
354 Annelise Riles, The Anti-Network: Private Global Governance, Legal Knowledge, and
the Legitimacy of the State, 56 AM. J. Comp. L. 605, 606 (2008).
[VOL. 85:41360o
REGULATING THE INVISIBLE
Although OTC derivative markets are currently concentrated in
New York and London,355 they are in reality global markets: 356
[I]t is not a U.S. market or a U.K market, or even an "offshore"
market. Its legal foundation is a privately produced document of
about thirty-two pages [the ISDA Master Agreement] ... laying out
the common rules for each derivatives transaction, and specifying
that any dispute resulting from the transaction will be adjudicated
by a common law English or New York State court, as per the speci-
fied preference of the parties.357
Professors Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati argue that certain standard-
ized contracts between sophisticated commercial parties, such as ISDA
agreements, are "better viewed as akin to statutes"35 8 rather than ordi-
nary contracts. Consequently, they suggest that courts should "inter-
pret boilerplate terms [in such contracts] similarly with statutes."3 59
Since ISDA has "created a kind of global law by contract,"360 it has a
"virtual monopoly on the creation of legal rules"3 61 in the OTC deriva-
tive markets, which scholars have described as "the most private of
markets."36 2
ISDA has not only developed global rules/law for OTC derivative
markets, but is also increasingly developing innovative global govern-
ance institutions. Trade associations have long developed private law
and arbitration mechanisms for their members.363 Scholars have
noted that arbitration is "quite explicitly an analog to state law, an
alternative to state law with all of state law's functional elements-a
regime of norms, a set of procedures, a set of problems (disputes) ."364
Certain recent governance developments by ISDA such as their Credit
Determination Committees (DCs), however, arguably represent an
important step beyond such traditional practices. DCs are distinct
from international commercial arbitration because the decisions of
355 FIN. SERVS. AUTH. & HM TREASURY, supra note 328, § 2.1 ("43% of the global
OTC market is located in the UK").
356 Not all scholars agree with this. Using the OTC derivative markets as an exam-
ple, Riles argues that global private law should be thought of "as a set of institutions,
actors, doctrines, ideas, documents, that is, as a specialized set of 'knowledge prac-
tices."' Riles, supra note 354, at 605.
357 STEIL & HINDS, supra note 57, at 31.
358 Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129,
1130 (2006).
359 Id. at 1172.
360 Golden, supra note 293, at S144.
361 Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 82, at 1039.
362 Riles, supra note 354, at 608.
363 See O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, at 88-89.
364 Riles, supra note 354, at 623.
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DCs apply to all effected transactions of market participants who have
adhered to the relevant protocol. The decisions of DCs are binding
upon OTC derivative market participants who have incorporated rele-
vant protocols. 3 65 DCs currently adjudicate issues surrounding credit
derivatives, but could extend their focus to other areas and aspects of
OTC derivative markets. Therefore, these nascent DCs could conceiv-
ably be the nascent beginning of cross-border specialist financial
courts.3 6 6 ISDA is the central link in a federally structured system of
five regional DCs, which are the Americas, non-Japan Asia, Japan, Aus-
tralia-New Zealand, and EMEA (Europe). 367 But, participants in OTC
derivative markets and legal scholars should not be the only ones
interested in such developments. DC decisions are already having
important practical impacts on government regulatory efforts.
c. Global Private Market Governance Mechanisms
In September of 2008, the U.K Treasury nationalized Bradford &
Bingley (B&B), a large mortgage lender. The U.K. government pro-
vided B&B with both financial assistance and a guarantee of its senior
debt, whose terms were amended in February 2009.368 In an effort to
365 If less than eighty percent of a DC is in agreement concerning a particular
decision, then the issue is sent to an external review panel. See Howard T. Spilko &
Fabien Carruzzo, After The Big Bang: The New Credit Default Swap Landscape, METRO.
CORP. COUNS., Apr. 10, 2009, at 10, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/
pdf/2009/April/10.pdf. This article explains the external review process:
External reviewers are selected for each question from a pool determined by
the relevant Determination Committee. If a vote of the Determination Com-
mittee reached less than a 60% majority, two out of the three external
reviewers can overturn the result. If a vote of the Determination Committee
was greater than 60% but less than 80%, all three external reviewers are
required to overturn the decision.
Id.
366 Cf Golden, supra note 293, at S148 (suggesting a need for an international
tribunal of market experts).
367 See INT'L SWAPs & DERIVATIVES Ass'N, 2009 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES DETERMI-
NATIONS COMMITTEES AND AucrION SETTLEMENT CDS PROTOCOL (2009), available at
http://www.isda.org/bigbangprot/docs/Big-BangProtocol.pdf For additional infor-
mation, see Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, Big Bang Protocol-Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.isda.org/bigbangprot/bbprot-faq.html (last visited Feb. 23,
2010), which explains the make-up of these committees: "8 global dealers, 2 regional
dealers, 5 non-dealer ISDA members, 1 non-voting dealers (sic) (for the first year,
there will be 2 non-voting dealers), 1 non-voting regional dealer per region, and 1
non-voting non-dealer member."
368 Radi Khasawneh, Skipping Interest Payout Equals Default, ISDA Says: UK Govern-
ment Couldn't Change Rule as Part of State Aid, WALL ST.J. ONLINEJuly 10, 2009, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB124718275176320271.html.
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quickly recoup taxpayer funds, the U.K Treasury permitted B&B to
"defer all payments on subordinated bonds without being in
default"369 and that such action would not constitute a "credit
event."370 Despite the U.K Treasury's position, Morgan Stanley
asked-by some reports pressured 3 71-an ISDA DC to rule on
whether a credit event had occurred. Two days later, the EMEA DC
said "yes."3 7 2 This decision was important for at least two reasons.
First, it "sets a precedent in the U.K that will help determine when
people who have insurance on bonds get paid."373 Second, it is a pow-
erful example of the development of global private governance mech-
anisms and their potential impact on government actors.
Other DC decisions have also raised important issues for govern-
ment actors. For example, Kazakhstan's largest bank, BTA, was also
recently nationalized. After BTA's nationalization and during restruc-
turing negotiations, Morgan Stanley, in addition to another creditor,
demanded repayment of their debt. Since BTA could not repay its
debt, Morgan Stanley asked the EMEA DC whether a credit event had
occurred.3 7 4 The DC quickly said "yes."375 But, even long before DCs
existed, the Japanese government consulted ISDA prior to its national-
ization of Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB) because it was concerned
about triggering a "termination event" under ISDA contracts.376
369 Id.
370 The occurrence of a "credit event" would trigger seller obligations to pay on
credit derivative contracts.
371 See Radi Khasawneh, ISDA Unanimous in Bradford & Bingley CDS 'Default' Vote,
FIN. NEWS, July 9, 2009, http://www.efinancialnews.com/homepage/content/
1054655718.
372 See Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, ISDA to Publish Auction
Terms for Bradford & Bingley (July 9, 2009), available at http://www.isda.org/press/
press070909.htm1; see also Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, EMEA Determinations
Committee Decision (July 9, 2009), http://www.isda.org/dc/docs/EMEADetermina-
tions-CommitteeDecisionA.09072009.pdf (cataloguing unanimous vote). Interest-
ingly, Bloomberg reports that this question had also been considered in February
2009 by dealers before the advent of DCs and it was decided that this was not a credit
event. See John Glover, ISDA Dealers Decide No Credit Event on Bradford & Bingley CDS,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 23, 2009, http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601009&
sid=avLlYePCCcjo.
373 Khasawneh, supra note 368.
374 See Gillian Tett, Insight: Kazakh Bank Falls Foul of CDS, FT.com, Apr. 30, 2009,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fa428ee-35a 7-11de-a997-00144feabdcO.html; Quentin
Peel et al., Kazakhstan Central Bank Grapples with CDS Headache, FIN. TIMEs, July 17,
2009, at 31.
375 See Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, Credit Event Determinations Requests,
http://www.isda.org/dc/creditrequests.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
376 Anna Gelpern, Commentary, 51 Amrz. L. REV. 57, 60 (2009).
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Therefore, as Professor Anna Gelpern notes, ISDA's issuance of a
statement of support for the Japanese government's approach func-
tioned as "a private 'no-action letter' of sorts."3 77
The B&B, BTA, and LTCB examples signal important develop-
ments in the relationship between government and private actors in
international financial markets, especially the OTC derivative markets.
This interaction extends beyond the domestic outsourcing from the
public to the private sector analyzed in administrative law scholarship
as government actors cannot "outsource" in an arena in which they
have limited or no authority. Interestingly, consolidation develop-
ments in global private governance contrast with trends towards verti-
cal disintegration among government actors. Professor Freeman
notes that "[a]round the world, governments appear to be both
shrinking and outsourcing many of their traditional functions to pri-
vate parties .... "378 If government actors are increasingly finding it
necessary to outsource to the private sector at the domestic level, fre-
quently due to knowledge and expertise considerations, this trend
strongly suggests partnering with private actors in the regulation of
international, private financial markets.
Scholars have argued that "transactions in international relations
are analogous to transactions in private markets."3 7 9  Professors
Dunoff and Trachtman suggest the international system can be
thought of as an international marketplace:
Like economic markets, the international system is formed by the
interactions of self-regarding units-largely, but not exclusively,
states. . . . Actors in each system are willing-to some extent-to
relinquish autonomy in order to obtain certain benefits.
The assets traded in this international "market" are not goods
or services per se, but assets peculiar to states: components of
power. In a legal context, power is jurisdiction, including jurisdic-
tion to prescribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to
enforce. In international society, the equivalent of the market is
simply the place where states interact to cooperate on particular
issues-to trade in power-in order to maximize their baskets of
preferences.38 0
They term "governmental regulatory authority"381 the "unique fea-
ture" or asset of states. Dunoff and Trachtman decompose regulatory
377 Id. at 61.
378 Freeman, supra note 322, at 155.
379 Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 30, at 12; see also Aceves, supra note 30, at
1016-31 (distinguishing exogenous and endogenous governance structures).
380 Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 30, at 13.
381 Id.
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authority into three separate components: prescription, adjudication,
and enforcement. Consistent with this perspective, Professors O'Hara
and Ribstein suggest that law can be viewed as a "government-pro-
vided" good.3 2 Government actors currently have formal, coercive
enforcement powers, local prescriptive powers, and established, but
local, adjudicatory powers. Global private actors currently have global
prescriptive powers, limited enforcement power, and increasingly,
global adjudicatory mechanisms. Therefore, the jurisdictional compo-
nents of each legal regime are distinct with unique characteristics,
which are necessary, but inaccessible to the other because of transac-
tion costs. Their complementary aspects suggest a system of public-
private partnerships.
3. Theoretical Background
Professor Norton describes "public-private partnerships" as fea-
tures of modern international financial regulation.3 8 3 In proposing
my system of public-private partnerships, I borrow from Norton's
descriptive account. He notes that "in the context of international
economic activities" there is an increasing "reliance by the public sec-
tor on private sector involvement."3 8 4 Norton argues that "elite
banks" constitute "the institutional fabric that connects domestic and
international banking and financial markets .... .3 86 I argue that con-
solidated global private actors, such as ISDA, constitute similar con-
nective "institutional fabrics," and should partner with government
actors in the regulation of the OTC derivative markets. Norton
explains that:
although the theoretical and practical examination of these [part-
nership] parameters is currently in its infancy, several observations
may be noted. First, the partnership is both formal (established
through banking laws, regulations, and other supervisory guidance)
and informal (established through certain supervisory and market
practices and understandings not necessarily reduced to writing).
Second, there are various responsibilities of the partnership to be
fulfilled by governments and/or banking authorities. Third, there
382 O'HARA & RmsTEIN, supra note 35, at 14.
383 Norton, supra note 15, at 47-53. But see Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein, The
Fed's New Model of Supervision for "Large Complex Banking Organizations": Coordinated Risk-
Based Supervision of Financial Multinationals for International Financial Stability, 18 TRANS-
NAT'L L. 283, 290 (2005) ("Norton seems to misconceive the purpose and the
mechanics of the new supervisory approach ...
384 Norton, supra note 15, at 43.
385 Id. at 47.
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are various responsibilities to be fulfilled by the elite banking insti-
tutions in this configuration.386
Many of Norton's "elite banks" are also some of the most important
participants in the OTC derivative markets. Norton appears ulti-
mately somewhat skeptical of the regulatory effectiveness of public-
private partnerships, particularly in certain areas such as the OTC
derivative markets. He is concerned that the partnership "provides
elite banks with incentives consistently to 'push the envelope' of com-
plex risk-taking in their activities" and that "[t]he basic ambiguities,
gaps, or failures to perform under the partnership" will contribute to
banking crises.387
With the background of the current financial crisis, Norton's con-
cerns are not unwarranted. Although I am sympathetic to such hesita-
tions, I also think that public-private partnerships are the best
approach to increase regulation of the global OTC derivative markets,
particularly with the collective action problems and transaction cost
considerations involved. Ultimately, the regulatory effectiveness of
public-private partnerships depends on achieving a certain power bal-
ance between government and private actors. Therefore, it is impera-
tive to find mechanisms to create such balance.
One method of finding such regulatory equilibria is through con-
tracting theories designed for highly innovative, uncertain environ-
ments, an environmental context also characteristic of the OTC
derivative markets. Contract law has provided a "useful metaphor" for
legal scholars to analyze a variety of areas, including regulation and
interrelationships between the public and private sector.388 Professor
Jody Freeman notes that "the conceptual distinction between contract
and regulation may not be as clear as we think."389 In fact, regulation
can be thought of as a comprehensive contract. In an ideal world,
government regulation would consist of many "comprehensive con-
tracts" between the regulators and the regulated to create a compre-
hensive regulatory regime.390 Analogously, ideal regulation of global
financial markets would consist of such global, comprehensive con-
tracts. Whether domestic or international, such "comprehensive con-
tracts" would delineate regulations for all possible future states of the
world. In reality, of course, such contracts are impossible to write due
to transaction costs, which are particularly salient at the global level.
386 Id. at 48.
387 Id. at 52.
388 Shapiro, supra note 333, at 404.
389 Freeman, supra note 322, at 190.
390 See OUVER HART, FiRMs, CoNTRAcrs, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 11 (1995).
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Nevertheless, analogizing regulation to contract and harnessing
insights from contract theories focused upon innovative collabora-
tions, such as would be an international system of public-private part-
nerships, illuminates possible governance arrangements.
One such theory is "Contracting for Innovation."3 91 It provides
helpful intuitions for designing governance arrangements to imple-
ment a specific regulatory power balance between government and
private actors in the public-private partnerships. The authors, Profes-
sors Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, and Robert Scott, describe certain
contracting practices in highly innovative, uncertain environments
requiring "transaction-specific investments,"39 2 in which they observe
"increasingly . . . novel forms of collaboration."3 9 3 These collabora-
tions "blur the distinction between contract and organization, or mar-
ket and firm"39 4 and likely arise since "[p]roducers today recognize
that they cannot themselves maintain cutting-edge technology in every
field required for the success of their products. Accordingly, compa-
nies are increasingly electing to acquire by contract components that
in the past they would have made themselves."3 9 5 These collaborative
arrangements are held together by "a formal governance mechanism
that stimulates the development of stable cooperative equilibria to
support informal, relational contracting."396 The formal governance
mechanism consists of a "braiding" of explicit (enforceable) and
implicit (nonenforceable) obligations,397 which "creates an interactive
process that constrains opportunism as the parties' investments in
detailed knowledge of each other's character and capabilities raise
switching costs-the costs one party to a contract must incur in order
to replace the other party to the contract."393
The OTC derivative markets are also highly innovative, uncertain
environments. Regulation of these markets can be thought of as a
product produced by government or private actors. The regulatory
production process-whether of government or private actors-like-
wise requires transaction-specific investments. This investment is
much more significant and vulnerable to hold-up problems in politi-
391 Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and
Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009).
392 See id. at 433.
393 Id. at 437.
394 Id. at 494.
395 Id. at 434.
396 Id. at 458.
397 This braiding of explicit and implicit terms arguably parallel's Norton's recog-
nition of formal and informal aspects of the public-private partnerships he describes.
398 Gilson et al., supra note 391, at 435.
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cal markets, where transaction costs are formidable, than in private
markets. As Professor Snyder comments,
the kind of lawmaking that is at the most private end of the [law-
making] continuum would seem most likely to be adapted and
revised as the world changes and practices develop .... [ilt surely
seems easier for an industry association to innovate than to get legis-
lation passed in Congress or the many states.3 99
This consideration seems particularly true at the international level.
For example, ISDA has been an extremely rapid and successful gov-
ernance innovator, particularly in introducing industry wide "proto-
cols," or reforms, which quickly respond to market exigencies. Such
practices arguably demonstrate that
[t]he obstacles to reform are not nearly as great with private
lawmaking .... No new legislation is required, no reversal of judi-
cial precedent, no instigation of an administrative agency. Market
participants simply need to convince-whether through force of
argument or more straightforwardly, by paying a price-a
counterparty to accept a different regime. 400
OTC derivative market counterparties frequently "convince" one
another to accept "different regimes" through their adoption of ISDA
protocols.
But as Gilson, Sabel, and Scott note, another consideration about
transaction specific investments in highly innovative, uncertain envi-
ronments is producers' inability to continuously update all the tech-
nological aspects of their production process. 401 Similarly, when
financial markets were primarily local and less innovative, government
actors could largely adopt a vertically integrated production process
(a "make" decision) for their regulation. In today's international
financial markets, this is no longer possible. In general, government
actors simply do not have the requisite expertise or jurisdictional
expanse to produce a "cutting-edge" regulatory product. Therefore,
in complex, innovative, global markets such as the OTC derivative
markets, government actors must acquire by contract "regulatory com-
ponents," from private actors which "in the past they would have
made themselves." 4 0 2
399 Snyder, supra note 349, at 424.
400 Id. at 438.
401 Gilson et al., supra note 391, at 434.
402 Id.
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4. Model of International Public-Private Governance Partnerships
Building upon the conceptual foundations of Professors Norton;
Dunoff and Trachtman; and Gilson, Sabel, and Scott, in conjunction
with TCE, I sketch the beginnings of a possible framework of interna-
tional regulatory cooperation in the OTC derivative markets: public-
private governance partnerships, which could also be thought of as
'joint ventures." I develop my partnership framework in three parts.
First, I propose a conceptual device, an "international regulatory pro-
duction continuum," to illuminate both the implications of regulatory
production decisions by individual government or private actors and
to illustrate various institutional configurations for possible partner-
ships in the OTC derivative markets. Second, I apply Norton's tripar-
tite descriptive approach to detail the parameters of public-private
partnerships: a description of the explicit and implicit terms of the
partnership, the role of government actors, and the role of private
actors. Third, using concepts from Gilson, Sabel, and Scott's Con-
tracting for Innovation, I delineate possible power balances, or equilib-
ria, arrangements within the partnership.
First, in Dunoff and Trachtman's international marketplace, I
argue that government actors can be thought of as akin to production
firms. A distinct product of their production process is regulation,
with its prescriptive, adjudicatory, and enforcement components.
Consolidated private actors such as ISDA also produce a regulatory
product with prescriptive, adjudicatory, and enforcement components
and likewise inhabit this international, financial marketplace.
Although the private actor focused on in this Article is ISDA because
of its role in the OTC derivative markets, the role of the consolidated
private actor can be generalized for other global financial markets.
Although both government and private actors produce a regulatory
product, the characteristics of the components of their regulatory
asset bundles differ. Each asset bundle has its own comparative advan-
tages, but neither asset bundle alone is sufficient to enact comprehen-
sive global regulation.
Government actors can be viewed as resting on one end of this
"global regulatory production continuum" (continuum) and private
actors on the other. This "continuum" provides a hypothetical device
for analyzing the implications of various regulatory production deci-
sions made by government or private actors in international financial
markets. An implicit public-private governance partnership already
exists in the OTC derivative markets. It consists primarily of the adju-
dicatory asset and enforcement asset components of government
actors, namely New York and London, combined with the prescriptive
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asset components and a minimal amount of enforcement assets sup-
plied by private actors, such as ISDA. Regulatory decisions/develop-
ments affecting the components of regulatory asset bundles of either
government or private actors shift the implicit location on the contin-
uum of this implicit partnership. For example, DCs can be thought of
as an evolutional shift on the continuum towards global private actors.
In other words, global private actors are increasingly opting for
"make" decisions surrounding adjudicatory assets. Recent calls for
cross-border financial courts largely staffed by private market exper-
tise 4 0 3 Will likely continue this shift.
At the same time, the current pressure of U.S. and E.U. regula-
tors on market participants to use CCP clearinghouses for standard-
ized OTC derivatives within their respective home jurisdictions
represents a counter-shift on this continuum. Therefore, government
actors are increasingly opting for "make" decisions in mandating CCP
clearing of standardized derivatives within their own regional jurisdic-
tion. As these CCP clearing and trade repository pressures are likely
to continue in other product markets, 404 such directional shifting is
also likely to continue. Unfortunately as discussed above, both aca-
demic and industry participants question whether this shift, presuma-
bly away from points on the continuum where necessary macro-
prudential solutions implicitly reside, should be welcomed. But this
shifting along the continuum, whether productive or unproductive, is
likely to continue as government actors increasingly seek to locally
regulate these global markets and global private actors such as ISDA
increasingly develop their own governance capabilities. Therefore,
the longstanding implicit partnership between government and pri-
vate actors in the OTC derivative markets will increasingly come
under stress unless a more cooperative, explicit partnership approach
is implemented.
Regulatory decisions by government or private actors in global
financial markets can be thought of as "make" (produce) or "buy"
(market) decisions. For example, in addressing the regulation of
OTC derivative markets, government actors can make comprehensive
regulatory decisions, a "make" decision, can opt for regulation by pri-
403 See, e.g., Jeffrey Golden, We Need a World Financial Court with Specialist judges,
FIN. TIMEs, Sept. 9, 2009, at 3Y (advocating for a world financial court to regulate
markets).
404 Note that the OTC derivatives industry said it would "implement a centralized
reporting infrastructure for all interest rate derivatives" by December 31, 2009. Letter
from Senior Management of AllianceBernstein et al. to William C. Dudley, President,
Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. (June 2, 2009), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
newsevents/news/markets/2009/060209letter.pdf.
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vate actors, a "buy" decision, or can opt for a hybrid institutional
arrangement such as a partnership. Any regulatory product decision
by either government or private actors in OTC derivative markets
shifts where on the continuum their implicit partnership resides.
Importantly, neither endpoint of the continuum offers a feasible regu-
latory solution. And market participants can opt to "buy" regulatory
product from a competitor, that is, transact in an alternative jurisdic-
tion. As regulation is a "transaction specific investment," market par-
ticipants' ability to engage in regulatory arbitrage produces a "hold
up" problem which has a disproportionate impact on government
producers. The solution to this hold-up problem is not increased ver-
tical integration, the equivalent of regulatory measures surrounding
CCP clearing that individual government actors are now taking in the
OTC derivative markets, but innovative contracting/partnering with
consolidated, global private actors. The advantage of a partnership
structure is that its "regulatory product" can be a carefully crafted mix
of optimal regulatory asset components.
Second, I now use Norton's tripartite approach to sketch the
parameters of an explicit system of public-private partnerships. The
general, explicit framework of the partnership system should consist
of an informal, international accord. Informal accords have become
"a central feature of transgovernmental networks ... [and] an increas-
ingly important mode of cooperation between national regulatory
officials," 405 a trend representing "an increased preference for infor-
mal nonbinding guidelines and flexible procedures in place of bind-
ing legal instruments [such as treaties] ."406 This explicit, static
framework would delineate the background "relationship" terms of
the partnership and could be thought of as analogous to an ISDA
Master Agreement. The explicit framework of the partnership should
be overseen, maintained, and very rarely updated by a governance
committee, the Global Derivatives Council, composed of government
and private actors. As discussed below, this Council would be one link
between the domestic and international frameworks of cooperation.
Supervisory power over this Council should be by an international
Global OTC Derivatives Supervisory Board composed only of interna-
405 MURPHY, supTa note 326, at 4.
406 Id. at 3. Also note that in October 2008, a plethora of government actors cre-
ated the "Santiago Principles" to provide best practices for sovereign wealth fund
(SWF) investment. I discuss SWF investment in more detail below, but the interesting
point here is that SWF investment represents widespread public investment in private
markets. Therefore, informal governance arrangements are already being explicitly
constructed surrounding the interactions of public and private actors in international
financial markets through informal arrangements.
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tional government actors. Established international regulatory groups
such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), or the OTC Derivatives
Regulators' Forum407 could fill this role.
An implicit subsidiary, market infrastructure-based framework
should be interwoven within the explicit, outer framework. The
implicit framework of this partnership structure should be designed
to facilitate a flexible, public-private "endogenous governance struc-
ture"408 analogous to Aceves's description of the role of "state prac-
tice" in incomplete contracts, to likewise overcome the transaction
costs involved in regulating the OTC derivative markets, particularly
those related to knowledge acquisition and expertise. This implicit
framework would be akin to ISDA Schedules, capable of renegotiation
so that governance arrangements evolve with market infrastructure
developments. Such developments currently consist of global CCP
clearing, global trade repositories, and a global adjudicatory system.
These subsidiaries should be governed by standing oversight commit-
tees, subject to the oversight of the Council, composed of government
actors and private actors dependent upon the comparative advantages
of their regulatory asset components. These subsidiaries would like-
wise reside on the continuum, but their movements would be
bounded by the external partnership framework. The aim of this elas-
ticity would be to facilitate incorporation of global governance devel-
opments, while constraining unproductive, national regulatory
competition. The equilibria, or regulatory bundle of asset compo-
nents, will balance when a regulatory product is created such that
both the government and private actors are better off cooperating
than defecting from the partnership. For example, such regulatory
partnerships could facilitate the creation of specialist, cross-border
financial courts, which should significantly decrease costs to both gov-
ernment and private actors.
The negotiated governance approach of the subsidiaries has sev-
eral possible predecessors. First, Aceves describes state practice as
allowing "states [to] maintain the flexibility necessary to address new
circumstances as they arise while remaining grounded within the con-
text of their original agreement."409 Consolidated global private
actors can negotiate informal agreements with government actors and
also engage in a "state practice like" process with government
counterparties. Second, Freeman suggests that administration is "a
407 See Press Release, supra note 295.
408 Aceves, supra note 30, at 1004.
409 Id. at 1005.
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set of negotiated relationships" between public and private actors4 1 0
and argues that "public and private actors negotiate over policy mak-
ing, implementation, and enforcement."4 11 This phenomenon is
likely to be more robust at the international level where individual
government actors have decreased jurisdiction. Third, informal gov-
ernance processes have long been characteristic of the OTC derivative
markets in the United States.4 1 2 Fourth, the flexibility inherent in the
governance of these subsidiaries is also supported by the approach of
the "new governance" literature, which consists of
strategies for regulation that seek to enlist the cooperation of the
regulated community so as to overcome the inevitable informa-
tional disadvantage that regulators have when dealing with rapidly
changing markets. The basic idea is to let regulated entities experi-
ment with compliance practices without a one-size-fits-all command,
so long as outcomes satisfy the articulated principles.4 1 3
From a TCE perspective, at least three reasons exist for a system
of public-private regulatory partnerships. First, knowledge can be
thought of as a transaction cost that both affects and is generated by
firm structure. 4 14 ISDA's prescriptive assets embed the global knowl-
edge of OTC derivative market participants. International regulators
simply do not have similar access to such knowledge, expertise, or the
resources to acquire it. Second, as a global private industry standard
setting organization, ISDA's prescriptive abilities are rapid and capa-
ble of much broader global implementation than those of individual
government actors. Scholars have noted ISDA's characteristic rapid
410 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548
(2000).
411 Id.
412 Informal regulation and "moral suasion" characterize the FRBNY's longstand-
ing involvement in the OTC derivative markets, which has included arranging a
bailout for LTCM and joining with other international regulators to "encourage" mar-
ket participants to address confirmation backlogs issues in the credit derivative mar-
kets. See, e.g., Letter from Senior Management of Bank of America et a]. to Timothy
Geithner, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. (Oct. 4, 2005), available at http://
www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2005/industryletter.pdf (adressing
industry commitments following a September 15, 2005, meeting at the FRBNY con-
cerning the confirmation backlog in the credit derivatives industry).
413 Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1032 (2009).
414 See Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and
Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1123,
1127 (2007).
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responses to market exigencies in a number of areas. 415 For example,
ISDA's recent "Big Bang" and "Small Bang" Protocols, both aimed at
standardizing CDS contracts to facilitate CCP clearing, were imple-
mented rapidly. Third, because ISDA increasingly represents a
broader array of global market participants, its governance solutions
should increasingly reflect an acceptable level of overall market
representation.
Several objections can be made against the use of public-private
partnerships to regulate the OTC derivative markets. First, it could be
argued that it would be preferable for an international group of gov-
ernment regulators to govern the OTC derivative markets. A related
objection is that global governance of these markets should be located
within an international institution such as the Bank for International
Settlements or the International Monetary Fund. The problems with
these two alternative suggestions are the transaction costs involved not
only in coordination of such regulatory efforts, including keeping
them current, but also in the cost of knowledge and expertise
acquisition.
Next it could be objected that this governance partnership relies
heavily on regulation by market actors and that "self-regulation" has
often failed in the past. As a preliminary matter, the financial crisis
has clearly demonstrated that regulators themselves are sometimes
"asleep at the switch." 4 1 6 More importantly, in the absence of a global
financial regulator, there are few realistic alternatives to relying upon
private market governance of global markets as it is the best way to
solve international regulatory collective action problems. It is also not
clear that a global, governmental financial regulator would be a pref-
erable alternative. Instead, the key to successful regulation of the
OTC derivative markets lies in careful alignment of the often diverse
incentives of government and consolidated, private market actors.
Many objections will likely center on a concern for public legiti-
macy and transparency of decisionmaking. Government actors face
similar objections whenever they outsource any aspect of their regula-
tory function to the private sector. But with the financial crisis and its
bailouts, "Main Street" is increasingly demanding political accounta-
bility for concentrations of private economic power. Therefore, the
415 See, e.g., Choi & Gulati, supra note 358, at 1142-44 (relating ISDA's response to
an ambiguity in its definitions).
416 See Richard A. Posner, Op-Ed., Our Crisis of Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2009, at A23; see also Gretchen Morgenson, But Who Is Watching the Regulators?, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 13, 2009, at BU1 ("Awarding increased power to those who failed in their
oversight duties flies in the face of all notions of accountability.").
REGULATING THE INVISIBLE
importance of public legitimacy in financial regulation should not be
underestimated. For example, Professor Donald Langevoort explains:
I am convinced that part of the motivation for the substantive and
procedural disclosure requirements of U.S. securities regulation
increasingly is disconnected from shareholder or investor welfare
per se, and instead relates to the desire to impose norms that we
associate with public governmental responsibility-accountability,
transparency, openness, and deliberation-on nongovernmental
institutions that have comparable power and impact on society.417
He terms this a "publicization of the governance of private
sources of economic power"418 and argues that Sarbanes-Oxley is an
example of this public ethos. His perspective harmonizes with Profes-
sor Freeman's insight that the privatization process can extend public
norms into previously private realms.419 But as discussed above, Free-
man also notes that around the world, government actors are increas-
ingly downsizing and outsourcing their functions to the private sector.
My system of public-private partnerships represents a distinct frame-
work from these domestic predecessors. It is a unique, regulatory
institutional form that promotes more public accountability than the
traditional outsourcing practices of government actors. 420
A final argument against global public-private governance part-
nerships could be that while this structure avoids an "international
race to the bottom," it also facilitates possibilities for regulatory cap-
ture and stifles any positive aspects of international regulatory compe-
tition. The concern is that "while federal or uniform laws reduce
some problems, they may create others by reducing the diversity of
laws and parties' ability to avoid bad laws."42 1 Judge Easterbrook
argues that "[t]he national government . .. can win a race to the bot-
tom in a way that states cannot."422 In international markets, a global
financial regulator or global regulatory structure could arguably like-
wise "win a race to the bottom" in a way no individual government
actor could. U.S. history, however, suggests that a federal regulator is
sometimes needed to prevent a race to the bottom among individual
417 Langevoort, supra note 413, at 1066.
418 Id. at 1078.
419 See Freeman, supra note 410, at 592-664.
420 Somewhat similarly, Gordon Rausser, William Balson, and Reid Stevens argue
in Centralized Clearing for Over-the-Counter Derivatives for a public-private CCP. The
authors argue that "[t]hough private CCPs provide an adequate amount of clearing's
private good, they do not provide the socially optimal level of the public good or
impure good." Rausser et al., supra note 212 (manuscript at 1).
421 O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, at 16.
422 Easterbrook, supra note 136, at 692.
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states. Since there is no global regulator, it is not clear what force if
necessary could prevent a global race to the bottom. Second, the pub-
lic-private nature of these partnerships and the necessity of maintain-
ing equilibrium in the regulatory asset bundle, suggests that each
party will be better off cooperating and should moderate this tension.
Finally, global regulatory partnerships for market infrastructures
should strengthen market discipline. While it might be politically and
legally feasible to bailout "local" market infrastructures, this is unlikely
to be the case globally. This uncertainty should encourage OTC
derivative market participants to maintain robust risk management
practices.
C. Linked Domestic and International Frameworks of Cooperation
As indicated above, similar to the SEC-CFTC joint venture, my
system of international public-private regulatory partnerships can also
be thought of as a 'joint venture." These domestic and international
"joint-ventures" are linked in at least two ways. First, government
actors on the Council of the public-private partnership will consist of
government actors in charge of domestic OTC regulation such as the
CFTC-SEC joint venture in the case of the United States. Second,
these same domestic regulators should be the ones involved in the
international, government regulatory group eventually chosen for the
role of the Supervisory Board.
D. Extensions of Domestic and International Frameworks of Cooperation
My conception of international frameworks of cooperation
through public-private partnerships can offer a generalized approach
for thinking about domestic regulations addressing global financial
markets. For example, it is also a helpful framework for thinking
about the domestic regulation of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) invest-
ment. SWFs are government investment vehicles that invest in private
enterprises. Prior to the financial crisis, they were highly controversial
because of the unique issues which arise from widespread public
investment in private markets. Domestic regulatory decisions of
investment recipient countries, such as the United States, can similarly
be thought of as located on the continuum. Recipients face a spec-
trum of regulatory production choices residing on this continuum.
They can pass highly protectionist legislation and not permit any SWF
investment. This represents a "make" decision reflecting a highly ver-
tically integrated regulatory approach. On the other hand, a recipient
can chose to forego any SWF investment restrictions. This represents
a "buy" decision reflecting a market-based solution. Recipients must
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decide where on this continuum to locate their regulatory production
process and understand its consequences for capital investment.
As in the OTC derivative markets, recipient countries face a col-
lective action issue: capital is likely to migrate to less restrictive regula-
tory jurisdictions. Most recipients will likely want to avoid locating
their production process at either extreme of the continuum. It
would therefore be helpful for recipients to conceptualize various pos-
sible governance arrangements on the continuum which reflect their
regulatory preferences. The two contracting parties, the recipient
and the group of SWFs, should form public-private regulatory partner-
ships whose parameters are characterized by explicit and implicit gov-
ernance mechanisms. Although these partnerships consist of public
institutions, I term these arrangements "public-private" since they ulti-
mately represent a private ordering of public institutions in the inter-
national financial system. The explicit terms or framework of this
partnership could consist of the regulations of the recipient country.
The implicit terms could consist of sets of best practice guidelines
developed both by recipients and SWFs such as the best practice
guidelines for recipient countries created by the OECD 42 3 and the
best practice guidelines for SWF investment called "The Santiago
Principles." 424 Public-private partnerships surrounding SWF regula-
tion are highly feasible because many countries play investor and
recipient roles, a reality which could facilitate finding the cooperative
equilibria necessary to maintain regulatory balance.
CONCLUSION
Today, major financial markets, such as the OTC derivative mar-
kets, are global markets which no jurisdiction can individually success-
fully regulate. International regulatory cooperation is needed to
regulate the OTC derivative markets. But the transaction costs
involved in what is essentially an international collective action are
significant. Government actors can intervene locally to solve market
failures associated with collective action problems. In the interna-
tional marketplace, however, government actors themselves can cause
the collective action problem when it comes to regulation. A possible
global solution to this issue is an inversion of the local one: interven-
423 See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Guidance on Sovereign Wealth Funds,
http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3343,en_2649_34887_41807059_1_1_1-1,00.
html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
424 INT'L WORKINc GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 1-3 (2008), available at http:/
/www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.
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tion by consolidated global private actors. In the international mar-
ketplace, transaction costs incentivize standardization and governance
consolidation by global private market actors.
One of the purposes of this Article is conceptualize frameworks
of domestic and international cooperation in the OTC derivative mar-
kets. Even if only a beginning, these ideas make at least three contri-
butions. First, an inversion of commonly proposed "solutions" for
resolving the likely continuing jurisdictional tensions between the
SEC and CFTC in OTC derivative markets if domestic reforms are
based upon product categorizations by suggesting the creation of a
regulatory joint venture: the DSI. Second, it assists legislators in think-
ing about responses of global OTC derivative market participants to
domestic regulatory production decisions. Third, it suggests a poten-
tial international framework to coordinate increased international
regulation of OTC derivative markets which offers individual jurisdic-
tions regulatory inroads otherwise inaccessible in a global
marketplace.
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